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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV -13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)
)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
)
limited liability company,
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE AND
MOTION TO STRIKE AND
DISREGARD AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY
OF KEN EDMONDS, JAY CLARK,
ROBERT F. BENNETT AND JAMES C.
HILLIARD

COMES NOW the above-named Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company,
LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and through its undersigned counsel of record, and submits the
following objections to evidence and Memorandum in Support of Defendant/Counterclaimant's
Motion to Strike and Disregard Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmonds, Jay Clark, Robert F.
Bennett and James C. Hilliard.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S OBJECTIONS
TO EVIDENCE AND MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISREGARD AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY
OF KEN EDMONDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT F. BENNETT AND JAMES C. HILLIARD - 1
45522.0004.6253286. I
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I.

LEGAL AUTHORITY
The standard of admissibility in a summary judgment proceeding is governed by Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which provides that:
Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein....
I.R.C.P. 56(e).
Rule 56(e) is clear that affidavits presented in opposition to motions for summary
judgment must contain admissible evidence. See Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co.,
122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 ( 1992). In Hecla Mining, the Idaho Supreme Court
held that affidavits which consist only of conjecture, conclusory allegations as to ultimate facts,
or conclusions of law are to be disregarded. ld. Conclusory statements, statements based on
hearsay, statements that lack adequate fow1dation, and statements not made on personal
knowledge are insufficient. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partners, 127 Idaho 267, 271,
899 P.2d 977,981 (1995). Last, "a sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony

may be disregarded on a summary judgment motion." Keeven v. Estate of Keeven (in Re Estate
of Keeven), 126 Idaho 290, 298, 882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994).
When an objection is made, the trial Court should make a preliminary determination
whether the foundational requirements have been satisfied in the affidavits and depositions

which have been submitted in support of a motion before the Court can consider the merits of a
motion. See, e.g., Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992) (concerning
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for summary judgment). If an affidavit contains some inadmissible matter, the whole
affidavit need not be stricken or disregarded, a court may strike or disregard the inadmissible part

and consider the rest of the affidavit. See Marty v. State, 122 Idaho 766, 769, 838 P.2d 1384,
1387 (1992).

II.
LEGAL OBJECTIONS
On November 29, 2013, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara Hilliard (the
"Hilliards") filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment. The
Hilliards' Opposition is supported by the Affidavits of Ken Edmonds, Jay Clark, Robert F.
Bennett and James C. Hilliard which contain inadmissible testimony. The below chart sets forth
the objections to evidence that should be stricken from the proffered affidavits.

A.

I

I

Affidavit of Ken Edmonds.

CITE

STATEMENT

OBJECTION

9I 2

I have been retained as an expert by
the Plaintiffs in this case.

Ken Edmonds has not demonstrated
adequate factual foundation for this
statement nor for his qualifications as an
expert to testify in this case.
LR.C.P. 56(e), IRE 602, IRE 702, 705.

9[ 3

Attached hereto and made a part
hereof is a summary analysis by me
of the claim of Mr. Tiegs as set out
in his affidavit.

The attachment to Mr. Edmonds'
affidavit is inadmissible hearsay.
IRE 801(c), 802. Mr. Edmonds has
failed to lay adequate foundation to offer
expert opinion testimony. IRE 702 and
705.

I
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B.

CITE
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Affidavit of Jay Clark.

I

STATEMENT

OBJECTION

<j[ 6

I have read the Affidavit of Frank
Tiegs in Support of Murphy Land
Company, LLC's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Tiegs
Affidavit"). I find several
misstatement of facts as I know
them.

The statement is conclusory and Mr.
Clark's beliefs are in-elevant and
inadmissible. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho
at 782; Shama Resources Ltd., 127 Idaho
at 271; IRE 602.

9I 6(a)

Murphy Land may not have
commenced operation on the farm
until May 2012; however, Lance
Funk either for himself or for
Owyhee Farming Company of
which he and Mr. Tiegs are the
members did grow crops on the
farm in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

This statement lacks adequate factual
foundation, is conclusory, and is
irrelevant. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at
782; IRE 402, 602.

9I 6(b)

Contrary to Tiegs affidavit in
paragraph 11, ground had been
prepared for the planting of crops in
2011 and Lance Funk or Owyhee
Farming Co. did grow potatoes on
the farm in 2011 (approximately
458 acres). Mr. Tiegs indicated that
he would have grown 451.3 acres of
Norkotah potatoes in 2011
I
(paragraph 19(a)).

This statement lacks adequate factual
foundation, is conclusory, and is
irrelevant. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at
782; IRE 402,602.

~[ 6(b)

Mr. Funk grew Shepod y potatoes on
the farm in 2011. The choice of that
kind of potato to grow was his
choice and the choice of Owyhee
Farming Co., not mine. There was
nothing to stop Mr. Funk and/or
Owyhee Farming Co. from growing
Norkotah potatoes on the farm in
2011 rather than Shepody.

This statement lacks adequate factual
foundation, is conclusory, and is
irrelevant. Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at
782; IRE 402, 602.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT' S OBJECTIONS
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g[ 6(c)

I do not believe, based on my many
years of experience on the farm, that
Mr. Tiegs' estimate of yields for
D&S wheat (paragraph 19(b)) are
historically accurate. That
overstates the damages claimed.
Those are high yields and this farm
was not traditionally producing
yields of those amounts.

I

OBJECTION

I

Mr. Clark's beliefs are irrelevant, his
statements are conclusory, lack adequate
factual foundation to establish relevance,
and are inadmissible attempted expert
opinion testimony. Shama Resources,
127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402, 403, 602,
702,705.

'

I

6(d)

I also believe based on my many
years of experience on the farm that
Mr. Tiegs' estimates of costs are
unrealistic. Total costs for the farm
have historically been greater than
what Mr. Tiegs set out in his
affidavit. And many costs, for
example, maintenance and repairs to
a forty (40) year old water system
are omitted. They would be
significant.

Mr. Clark's beliefs are irrelevant, his
statements are conclusory, lack adequate
factual foundation to establish relevance,
and are inadmissible attempted expert
opinion testimony. Shama Resources,
127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402,403,602,
702, 705.

<ff 6(e)

I also believe based on my many
years of experience on the farm that
Mr. Tiegs' estimates of what crops
would have sold for is unrealistic.
For example, his assertion that 2011
Norkotah potatoes would have sold
for $16 per 100 is high. That would
have been near the high point of the
market for such potatoes in 2011.

Mr. Clark's beliefs are irrelevant, his
statements are conclusory, lack adequate
factual foundation to establish relevance,
and are inadmissible attempted expert
opinion testimony. Shama Resources,
127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402, 403, 602,
702, 705.

1[ 7

I also believe that Mr. Tiegs'
projections for the year 2012 to be
similarly wrong in regard to yields,
costs and sales prices. Indeed, Mr.
Tiegs' 2012 actual results in his
affidavit understates the number of
acres actually farmed by Murphy in
2012.

Mr. Clark's beliefs are iITelevant, his
statements are conclusory, lack adequate
factual foundation to establish relevance,
and are inadmissible attempted expert
opinion testimony. Shama Resources,
127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402, 403, 602,
702,705.

Cj[

I

I
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CITE

STATEMENT

1[ 8

Also in regard to Mr. Tiegs' 2012
projections I did nothing to stop
them from growing what, and how
many acres, they wanted that year.

OBJECTION

I The statement is conclusory and

irrelevant. See Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho
at 782; IRE 402.

1[9

In 2012 when Murphy took
possession of the farm I had
approximately $600,000 in hard
costs in preparing the ground and
planting crops for the year 2012.
Murphy did not reimburse me for
those costs and Mr. Tiegs does not
refer to that "windfall" of avoided
costs to Murphy in his calculation of
"damages."

The statement lacks adequate factual
foundation for relevance and is
conclusory. See Hecla Mining, 122
Idaho at 782; IRE 402, 602.

119[sic]

Most importantly, it should be noted
that in both 2011 and 2012 I was
ready, willing and able to allow Mr.
Tiegs, Mr. Funk, Murphy Land Co.
and Owyhee Farming Co. to lease
any of the fields on the farm if they
had paid a rent to do so. They could
have farmed what they wanted,
when they wanted. All they had to
do was ask. I thought I had a right
to the farm; however, I was never
asked to lease all of it to them.
They leased in 2011 and 2012 all of
the farm they wanted for the
growing of the crops they selected
in those years. They did not ask for
more ground. Thus, the argument
Mr. Tiegs makes that Murphy
would have grown 910 acres of
potatoes in 2011 if they had
possession of the fann is inc01Tect;
they could have grown that many
acres of potatoes had they wished to
do so. Indeed, I asked Lance Funk

The statement lacks adequate factual
foundation for relevance, is conclusory,
and references inadmissible hearsay. See
Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 782; IRE
402,602, 80l(c), 802.

I

I,
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CITE

I

STATEMENT

I

OBJECTION

I

I how many acres he wanted to lease.

I
C.

I

He only wished to lease 458 or so
acres not 910 acres.

I

Affidavit of Robert F. Bennett.

CITE

STATEI\1ENT

OBJECTION

(1[4

I learned that Lance Funk had been
a tenant on that farm during the
2010 growing season and so I
approached Mr. Funk to see whether
he would be interested in purchasing
that fann.

Statement lacks adequate factuai
foundation for relevance. IRE 402 and
602.

~[ 5

Mr. Funk expressed his interest in
purchasing that farm, and on
November 1, 2010 he sent me a
letter of intent setting forth the
terms upon which he offered to
make that purchase.

Statement Jacks adequate foundation for
relevance and admissibility and presents
inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402,602 and
801(c), 802.

9I 6

During my discussions with Mr.
Funk he expressed interest in
closing the transaction before the
year end, 2010 in order to take
advantage of a Tax Deferred
Exchange pursuant to Section 1031
of the Internal Revenue Code.

Statement lacks adequate foundation for
relevance and admissibility and presents
inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402, 602 and
801(c), 802.

ens

Due to clerical error, the box for
Seller was inadvertently checked. It
was Buyer, not Seller, who
expressed the intention to do a 1031
Tax Defe1Ted Exchange.

Statement lacks adequate foundation for
relevance and admissibility and presents
inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402, 602 and
801(c), 802.

CJ{9

Before November 5, 2010 each
party to the purchase and sale
agreement had become aware that
there were clouds on the Billiards

Statement is conclusory and lacks
adequate factual foundation for relevance
and admissibility. IRE 402, 602.
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CITE

I

9( 11

<JI

13

D.

II

I

STATEMENT

I

title to Crystal Springs Ranch
caused by the recording by J.P.
Clark of a lease thereof titled "Crop
Share Lease 2010," and by John W.
Clark who recorded a
"Memorandum of Ownership
Interest in Real Prope1ty."
Just before Christmas, I told
Buyer's representative, Tim Tippett,
with whom I had extensive dealings
in negotiating the sale/purchase of
the farm, that if Buyer would not
accept J.P. Clark's lease, the
Hilliards would just have to send the
eamest money back. Mr. Tippett
replied "Oh no, we can't do that,"
because of Buyer's desire to
complete the sale before the year
end, 2010 in order to talce advantage
of the 1031 Tax Deferred Exchange.
I spoke to Sheryl Reyment at
Guaranty Title, Inc. in Mountain
Home, Idaho. She said the $3
million holdback was an amount
just more than the combined claims
of J.P. Clark and John W. Clark
which was an amount which would
satisfy their claims. Thus, I believe
the intention of the parties was to
satisfy the claims of the Clarks.

!
I

I

-o-

-

OBJECTION

I

Statement lacks adequate factual
foundation for relevance and
admissibility and contains inadmissible
hearsay. IRE 402,602 and 801(c), 802.

i

1

The statements lack adequate factual
foundation for relevance and
admissibility; contains inadmissible
hearsay, and Mr. Bennett's beliefs are
in-elevant and inadmissible, and presents
inadmissible parole evidence. Shama
Resources, 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402,
403, 602, 801(c), 802, and Parole
Evidence Rule.

Affidavit of James C. Hilliard.

CITE

STATE:MENT

OBJECTION

~[ 14

The wrong box was checked on the
Form. It was Buyer, not my wife or
me, that intended to do the 1031

The statements are conclusory and lack
adequate factual foundation for relevance
and admissibility. The final statement
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CITE

OBJECTION

Tax Deferred Exchange.
Accordingly, the wrong box was
checked. The box in front of Buyer
should have been checked. Further,
Buyer informed that in order to take
advantage of the Tax Deferred
Exchange Buyer was required to
close the Purchase and Sale
Agreement before the end of the
2010 calendar year .

contains inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402,
403, 602 and 80l(c), 802.

91 17

. . .Although I disputed both claims,
I was aware that, if we proceeded
with the sale, with the worst
possible outcome for my wife and
me, we could transfer clear title to
the Buyer of Crystal Springs Farm
by paying the Clarks a total of
$2,950,000.

Statement is conclusory and lacks
adequate factual foundation for relevance
and admissibility. Hecla Mining, 122
Idaho at 782; IRE 402,403 and 602.

9[ 18

When I learned that Jay P. Clark
had ignored the notice to quit, I
instructed my real estate agent, Bob
Bennett, to tell Buyer's agent, Tim
Tippett, that we would just have to
refund the earnest money Buyer had
deposited. Mr. Bennett later
informed me that Mr. Tippett
replied that Buyer could not do that
because of Buyer's desire to close
the Purchase and Sale Agreement
before year end 2010 in order for
Buyer to take advantage of the 1031
Tax Deferred Exchange.

The statements lack adequate factual
foundation for relevance and
admissibility and contain multiple
inadmissible hearsay. IRE 402, 602 and
801(c), 802.

9[ 20

Thereafter, because we were
unavailable to sign documents, and
we believed that our sole obligations
to Buyers were to provide clear,
unencumbered title to Crystal
Springs Farm and collect rent from

The Hilliards concl usory be] iefs are
irrelevant and inadmissible. Shama
Resources, 127 Idaho at 271; IRE 402.

!

I

! STATEMENT
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CITE

q[ 22

'

1 VJ. \.AJ.. .I.CA.

I

STATEMENT

I

the existing tenant, my wife and I
provided our son, James W.
Hilliard, with a Power of Attorney
to sign Re - 11 Addendum No. 4.

l

My understanding of the $3 million
holdback was to resolve the claims
of the Clarks and to deliver clear
title. I did not then, do not now,
understand the language of
Addendum 4 to require my wife and
me to indemnify the Buyer against
all alleged crop loss, loss of profit,
and attorney fees that Buyer claims
to have incuITed. Re - 11
Addendum No. 4 contains no
language calling for indemnity. It is
devoid of tenns such as "hold
harmless" or Seller "insuring"
Buyer against "loss of profit" or
"crop loss" or "atton1ey fees" or
"cost of litigation." Indeed, there
was never a discussion between
Seller and Buyer about Seller
providing Buyer with indemnity or
insurance against its now claimed
losses and expenses. My
understanding of the language of
Re-11 Addendum No. 4 is that my
wife and I were obligated to do
everything necessary to remove
exceptions 32 and 33 to the Buyer's
Title Insurance Policy, which we
succeeded in doing. But I did not
believe then, nor do I believe now,
that the language of Re-11
Addendum No. 4 required us to
indemnify Buyer for (or insure it
against) its alleged lost profits, crop

I

OBJECTION

I

I

I

Mr. Hilliard's beliefs are inelevant and
inadmissible; the statements are
conclusory; paragraph 37 of the Purchase
and Sale Agreement (entire Agreement)
estabiishes that the Purchase and Sale
Agreement and any addendums,
including Addendum No. 4, is a fully
integrated agreement and its terms cannot
be altered, varied, contradicted or
modified by Parole Evidence; Mr.
Hilliards' "understanding" is
inadmissible Parole Evidence - - the
language in Addendum No. 4 is clear and
unambiguous. Shama Resources, 127
Idaho at 271; IRE 402, and 602; Parole
Evidence Rule.
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OBJECTION

loss or attorney fees which Buyer is
now claiming.
My wife and I as Sellers received no
consideration for the obligation to
deposit $3 million of the $9,500,000
purchase price with Guaranty Title.
The Buyer paid nothing for that
deposit. And, because the Buyer
was required to close the
purchase/sale before the year end
2010 in order to take advantage of
the 1031 Tax Defened Exchange, it
incuned no detriment by closing the
deal. Thus, absolutely no new
consideration was given for the new
Re-11 Addendum No. 4.

Statements are conclusory, constitute
inadmissible legal conclusions, lack
adequate factual foundation for relevance
and inadmissibility as to the statements
about the Buyer and are speculative.
Shama Resources, 127 Idaho at 271;
Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 782, IRE
402, and 602.

... Thus, my wife and I had fulfilled
our obligation to remove the
described exceptions to Buyer's
policy of title insurance, thereby
delivering to Buyer clear title to
Crystal Springs' farm.

The statement is conclusory,
inadmissible legal conclusion, and is
irrelevant. Hecla Mining. 122 Idaho at
782; Shama Resources, 127 Idaho at 271;
IRE 402.

,

III.
CONCLUSION

Based upon each of the foregoing objections, the above-identified testimony and
purported evidence should be stricken and disregarded by the Court from the affidavits in
deciding Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)
vs.
)
)
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
)

Case No. CV-13-03004
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT' S
MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE
THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS
AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT
OF JAY CLARK

)

COMES NOW the above-named Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company,
LLC ("Murphy Land'') by and through its undersigned counsel of record, and respectfully moves
the Court to strike and exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds dated November 27, 2013, and
portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark dated November 29, 2013, which have been submitted by

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF THE
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 1
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Plamtiffs/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara Hilliard (the "Hilliards") in opposition to
Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Murphy Land's Motion to Strike and Exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and P.6(c,
d, e) and 7 should be granted: (1) for the procedural reason that the Court's Order for Scheduling
and Planning dated October 11, 2013 ordered that the last day for Plaintiff to disclose expert
witnesses, together with their opinions and reports was October 11, 2013. The Hilliards have
never made any disclosure of expert witnesses to Murphy Land, nor ever even responded to
Murphy Land's Interrogatory No. 3 requesting information under IRCP Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i)l.
Further, the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, together with the "attachment", is inadmissible as
expert opinion testimony pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), and Idaho Rules of
Evidence 702 and Rule 705, and also because the attachment is inadmissible hearsay IRE 80l(c),
802.
The attempted expert opinion testimony of Jay Clark is inadmissible as well pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and 705.
Neither Mr. Edmunds nor Mr. Clark were disclosed as experts in this case, there has been
no identification of the underlying factual basis supporting either Mr. Edmunds' nor Mr. Clark's
opinions, the purported opinions are based upon unverified and unsupported assumptions and
such opinions are thereby conclusory, speculative and inadmissible under applicable law
applying Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. See Coombs v. Curnow, MD, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d

l The Hilliards response to Interrogatory No. 3 served on October l, 2013 was: "not yet decided." See Affidavit of
Steven F. Schossberger filed concurrently herewith.
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, 509 US 579, 589, 113 S.CL

2786, 2795 (1993)).

This Motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities,
and the Affidavit of Steven F. Schossberger filed concmTently herewith.
DATED THIS

5

day of December, 2013.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

Attorneys for Defend ant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD.

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)
)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT' S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE
THE AFFIDAVIT KEN EDMUNDS AND
PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF
JAY CLARK

)
)

I.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") respectfully
submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Strike and Exclude the Affidavit
of Ken Edmunds, together with the attached purported expert "summary analysis", and the
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Affidavit of Jay Clark, 'll'![ 6(c), (d), (e) and

and to exclude the purported expe1t opinions

proffered therein. Mr. Edmunds and Mr. Clark's affidavits should be stricken and excluded
because the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants have never disclosed either to be an expert witness in
this case, and to date have not provided the information required in Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)4 as requested in Murphy Land's Interrogatory No. 3 propounded to the
Hilliards.
The affidavits and attempted expert witness testimony should also be stricken and
excluded because neither Mr. Edmunds nor Mr. Clark have been qualified as an expert witness to
testify in opposition to the expert testimony offered by Mr. Tiegs regarding the damages suffered
by Murphy Land in the years 2011 and 2012 due to the delay and loss of possession of its
property. Moreover, both affidavits constitute inadmissible expert opinion evidence under
LR.C.P Rule 56(e) and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and 705.

II.

LEGAL ST AND ARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
In deciding whether to strike and exclude the Hilliards attempted offering of expert
witness testimony from Ken Edmunds and Jay Clark in opposition to Murphy Land's Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Court should follow the standard of admissibility required pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which provides that:
Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein
I.R.C.P. 56(e).
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MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT KEN EDMUNDS
AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 2
45522.0004.6253285 I

lL/0/LVLJ

L,V~.Jt

~M

Rule 56(e) is clear that affidavits must contain admissible evidence. See Hecla Mining
Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992). In Hecla Mining,

the Idaho Supreme Court held that affidavits which consist only of conjecture, conclusory
allegations as to ultimate facts, or conclusions of law are to be disregarded. Id. Furthermore,
conclusory statements, statements based on hearsay, statements that lack adequate foundation,
and statements not made on personal knowledge are insufficient. See State v. Shama Resources
Ltd. Partners, 127 Idaho 267,271,899 P.2d 977 (1995). In Shama Resources, the Idaho

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of statements made by an affiant regarding the
knowledge or beliefs of persons other than the affiant. 127 Idaho at 271.
Further, in Sprinkler Irrig. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d 667
(2004), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's action striking plaintiffs expert's
affidavit wherein the affidavit was filled with rambling, nonspecific, inaccurate and unsupported
statements, numerous counts of speculation, unfounded facts and hearsay statements. Id. at 697.
The Idaho Supreme Court provided that the district court properly concluded that the expert's
affidavit degenerated into an argumentative diatribe against the defendant and often lacked the
specificity required by Rule 56(e). Specifically, the court stated, "It is intermittently generaiized,
conclusory, speculative and argumentative. The affidavit includes a significant number of
factual assertions that would not be admissible in evidence, often lacking foundation by failing to
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify regarding the factual allegations." Id.;
see Oates v. Nissan Motor Corp., 126 Idaho 162, 166, 879 P.2d 1095, 1099 (1994) (plaintiff's

expert opinion was excluded under I.R.C.P. 56(e) and Id. R. Evid. 702 as it was wholly
conclusory, merely repeated allegations contained in plaintiffs complaint, and did not set forth
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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specific facts to support his conclusion as required by LR.C.P. 56(e)); see also Corbridge v.

Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986) (affidavit which does not set
forth specific facts but is only conclusory in nature and merely repeats allegations of complaint is
precisely the type of flawed affidavit contemplated by LR.C.P. 56(e)) (emphasis added).
Aside from the fact that the Hilliards never disclosed either Ken Edmunds or Jay Clark as
an expert witness in compliance with the Court's Scheduling Order, or in response to Murphy
Land's Interrogatory No. 3 requesting the information provided in Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(4), the Hilliards have failed to file an affidavit from Mr. Edmunds or Mr. Clark
which would qualify either of them as an expert witness under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, i.e.,
laying the proper foundation for Mr. Edmunds or Mr. Clark's qualifications to testify as an
expert witness on the subject matter of this case, laying the proper foundation of the facts and
data or other information considered by Mr. Edmunds or Mr. Clark in forming either of their
opinions, stating the basis and reasons for the opinions, and setting forth the actual opinions held
by the purported experts.

A.

Mr. Edmunds' and Mr. Clark's purported expert opinions are untimely and
submitted in violation of the Court's Scheduling Order.

Pursuant to the Court's Scheduling Order filed October 1, 2013, the Hilliards were
required to disclose their expert witnesses no later than October 1, 2013. Moreover, on October
2, 2013, the Hilliards served their response to Murphy Land's Intenogatory No. 3, requesting full
disclosure of any expert witnesses, by stating "not yet decided." The Hilliards have never
supplemented said response. Therefore, the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds (with the attachment),
and the portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark attempting to offer expert witness opinions and
testimony should be stricken a.11d excluded by the Court.
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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B.

Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702,
705, and 802, the Affidavits of Ken Edmunds and Jay Clark must be stricken
and excluded by the Court.

With respect to the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, the attachment is being relied upon and or
will be argued in opposition to Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment for the truth of
the matter asserted in an attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary
judgment. The attachment to Mr. Edmunds affidavit is hearsay (l.R.E. 801(c)), and is
inadmissible as evidence in the summary judgment proceeding. (LR .E. 802; IRCP 56(e)).
Furthermore, expert opinion testimony is only admissible when "the expert is a qualified
expert in the field, the evidence will be of assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular
field would reasonably rely upon the same type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his
opinion. and the probative value of the opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect." Coombs v. Curnow, M.D., 148 Idaho 129, 140 (2009) (quoting Ryan v.

Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App. 1992)); see also Id. R. Evid. 702, 703 and
403
"Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible."
Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46-47; Id. R. Evid. 702. Testimony is speculative when it "theorizes about a
matter as to which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Coombs v. Curnow, M.D.,
148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464-65 (2009) (quoting Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561,
565, 97 P.3d 428, 432 (2004)). To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. An expert opinion that is
speculative or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
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assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact that is at issue.
Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, P.A., 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68 (2003); see
Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999). (Emphasis added). This Rule provides
the appropriate test for measuring the reliability of evidence. Id.; see Weekes v. Eastern Idaho

Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007); State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,
962 P.2d 1026 (1998).
Because the trial court has the discretion to determine whether a proper foundation has
been laid for the admission of expert testimony (Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Med. Ctr.,
134 Idaho 46,995 P.2d 816 (2000); Id. R. Evid. 104(a)), the trial court has discretion to
determine both whether the expert is qualified as an expert in the field and whether there is a
scientific basis for the expert's opinion. 138 Idaho at 593. Expert opinion which is speculative,
conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering
its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible as evidence under Id. R. Evict. 702. Ryan v. Beisner,
123 Idaho 42, 46 844 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992). Additionally, expert opinion that merely

suggests possibilities would only invite conjecture and may be property excluded. Bromley
v. Ga,y, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) (excluding testimony of shotgun repair expert

concerning possible causes of misfiring where expert never performed an internal examination of
the weapon and only speculated about possible causes was not en-or).
In determining whether expert testimony is admissible, a court must evaluate "the
expert's ability to explain pertinent scientific principles and to apply those principles to the
formulation of his or her opinion." Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46. Admissibility, therefore, depends on
the validity of the expert's reasoning and methodology, rather than his or her ultimate
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conclusion. Id. Relevant considerations in determining whether the basis of an expert's opinion
is scientifically valid include "whether the theory can be tested and whether it has been subjected
to peer-review and publication." Coombs, supra, 148 Idaho at 141 (quoting Weekes, 143 Idaho
at 838; Coombs citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phann., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993)).
As noted above, both the Affidavits of Ken Edmunds and Jay Clark lack the requisite
foundation to qualify either as an expert witness, or to offer admissible expert testimony, to rebut
the expert testimony and opinions offered by Frank Tiegs in support Murphy Land's Motion for
Summary Judgmenl. Accordingly, the Court should strike and exclude the attachment to Mr.
Edmunds' affidavit, and the Clark affidavit, qrJl6(c), (d), (e) and 7.
Furthermore, under Rule 702, the attachment of Mr. Edmunds, and the beliefs of Mr.
Clark presented in 9I<Jl6(c), (d), (e) and 7 of his affidavit, are speculative and unsubstantiated by
facts and therefore inadmissible as expert testimony. See Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47 (Ct.
App. 1992); See Coombs v. Curnow, M.D., 148 Idaho 129, 140 (2009).

III.

CONCLUSION
The Court is tasked with serving as a "the gate keeper" for expert opinion testimony. The
Comt's rule here is clear because the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, with its attachment, and the
Affidavit of Jay Clark, 1[q[6(c), (d), (e) and 7, constitute inadmissible expert testimony and
hearsay, are also untimely and in violation of the Court's Scheduling Order, and completely
inadmissible under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) and Idaho Rules of Evidence 702 and
705.
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Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Murphy Land respectfully requests that the Court
grant its Motion to Strike and exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds (with attachment), and the
identified p01tions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 8_ day of December, 2013.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

By
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S even F. Schossberger, I
Attorneys for Defendant
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AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK by the method indicated below, and
addressed to each of the following:

M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bam1ock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652

,Z1 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
DE-mail
D Telecopy: 208-343-3282

[Attorney for Plaintiffs]
Weldon S. Wood
Attorney at Law
17 Alvemo Court
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D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

)
)
)
)

vs.

)
)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)

Case No. CV-13-03004
AFFIDA VrT OF STEVEN F.
SCHOSSBERGER RE
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE
THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS
AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT
OF JAY CLARK

)

Steven F. Schossberger, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am counsel of record for Defendant Murphy Land Company, LLC, an Idaho

limited liability company, in the above-entitled action.
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EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF THE
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 1
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I make this affidavit based

own

knowledge and am

to testify hereto if called upon to do so.
3.

A true and correct copy of the Plaintiffs' /Counterdefendants' Response to

Defendant's/Counterclaimant's First Set of Interrogatories, Interrogatory No. 3, served on
October 2, 2013, is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.
4.

To date, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants have not provided the

Defendant/Counterclaimant with a written disclosure of expert witnesses, and have not answered
Interrogatory No. 3 with the information required by I.R.C.P. Rule 26(b)(4).

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER RE
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF
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OF IDAHO
County of Ada
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)
) ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this

.§ih

day of December, 2013.

Notary Public for IdahM.
Residing at ,t9#t~
ttAv
My commission expires 6 -/8'-.2:t:J/ 7
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .h_ day of December, 2013, I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER RE
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND EXCLUDE THE
AFFIDAVIT of KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF IA Y CLARK
by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
[Attorneys for Plaintiffs]

Weldon S. Wood
Attomey at Law
17 Alvemo Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

l)t..u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail
0 Telecopy: 208-343-3282

~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com
0 Telecopy: 650-298-8097

Steven F. SZhossberger

AFFIDAVIT OF STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER RE
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
EXCLUDE THE AFFIDAVIT OF KEN EDMUNDS AND PORTIONS OF
AFFIDAVIT OF JAY CLARK - 4
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M. KARL SHURTLIFFJ
Attorney at Law
W Ba..n_nock, Suite 2.00
P.O. 1652
Boise. Idaho 83 702
Telephone (208) 343-29PO
Fax (208) 343~3282
!
Attornev for the Plaint1's

IN THE DitTRlCT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT
I

1TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

FOR THE ST

JAMES AND BARB~ I-HLLIARD,
I

Plaintiffs,

)
)
)

Case No. CV I3 03004

)

vs.

i

MURPHY LAND

co~ANY, LLC,

DefendanJ.

)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO FIRST SET
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION, AND REQUESTS FOR
ADMISSION TO PLAINTIFF

INTERROGATORIES

allegations in the Compl nt and your defenses to the Counterclaim, by identifying such persons,
I

I

contact information, and tivc a general description of their knowledge regarding this case.

RESPONSE TQ rirrERROOATOR Y NO. l:

I
James C. Hilliard,J5 Alvero Court, Redwood City, California knows of the circumstances
surrounding the executio of the November 5, 2010 Purchase and Sale Agreement and Re-11,
Addendum No. 1 through 4 and the intention of the parties therto; James W, Hilliard, 2100 Park
Central, Suite 100, Pomp;µio Beach, Florida knows of the circumstances surrolU1ding the
I

\
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE Td FIRST SET OF lNTERROGATORJES, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND
REQUESTS FOR ADMlSSCOl'ji • l

1\.u..1. v11

rv.1 u.c

20e

M Karl Shurtliff
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ZUij-l:j::}q-~,:'. 15

..l.l1

p.4

2s2

I

of the Novemper 5,
i
through 4,
the inten~ion

Purchase and sSa1e Agreement and Re-11 Addendum No. I
thereto;

Bennett, 225 E. 66h

l\1ounta:in Home,

I

Idaho, know of the circt4'nstances surrouudjng the execution of the November 5, 2010 Purchase
!

[
I

and Sale Agreement and\ Re-11 Addend urns No. l through 4, and the intention of the parties
thereto and Sheryl Re~6t, 206 S. 3rd E, Mountain Home, Idaho knows of the circumstances
surrounding the executior of the November 5, 2010 Purchase and Sale Agreement and Re-11
Addendums No. 1 throu~ 4, and the intention of the part..ies thereto. In addition, persons on the
Counterclaimants side w!10se contact is weU known to Counterclaimant are: Lance Flirlk; Frank
Tiegs, and Tim Tippet

INTERROGATqR Y N0.2: Please identify all ·witnesses you intend to call at the trial of
this matter and the subje~t matter and substance of the facts to which they will testify.
)

I
I

RESPONSE TO LTERROGATORY N0.2:
Not knov.rn. yet.

Ii

!
NTERROGA1DRY NO .3: Please identify each person you may call as an expert
witness at the trial of this

Ltter;

state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to

testify; state the substanc of tbe opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; state the
underlying facts and data pon which the expert opinions are based; identify all documents upon
which your expert may re~ to express any opinions in this matter; and identify all individuals

!
that your expert may rely (lpon to express any opinion in this matter.

RESPONSE TO $ERROGATORY N0.3:
Not yet decided.

I

PLAfNTfFf'S RESPONSE TO!FlRST SET Of INTERROOATOJ<JES, FPQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION, AND

-----RE_Q_U-ES~

ro-~~!SSIO[ _________ .----·----·
/·

•:,,

J...L.#
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vii
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I
'

Deny.
DATED this---'c.......-day of

cx::r-

I LR-nFJCI<~ . ~
~~

-

.

da~ of
2013, 1hat I served a true
.
and conect copy of the fi ' going do:ument 'lty .raetbod indicated below and addressed to each of

I

the following:
SteYen F. Sclloss
HAWLEY T.RO_x;
ENNIS & HAWLEY, U,P
87? Ma.in S1ree~, ite 1000

Boise, Idaho 83701

M. KARL SHUR1LJFF

rLATN!lfrs FtllS't SET o,

ADMJSSION

ro OErIDIDA

1-I

TEAAOGA TORJes, IUQ UESTS FOR PRODUC7JON, ANO REQUESTS FOR
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FILED

--A.M.;~ :r, S:: P.M,

DEC O6 2013
A~~~RK"
Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5260
Email: sschossberger@hawleytroxell.com
mgordon@hawleytroxell.com

~ifr<.:.>

Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
)
)

I.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land ~mpany, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and
through its undersigned attorneys of record, and pursuant to Rule 56( c) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, submits this Reply Brief in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment filed

with this Court on November 15, 2013.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT • PAGE 1 OF 20
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Memorandum

Support

Motion for Summary Judgment ("Opening

Murphy Land argued that the Addendum unambiguously provided that the Escrow Funds were
to be available to it in the amount of damages suffered by the delay of possession of Crystal
Springs Farm, and that, as a result, the only issue for resolution by this Court is the amount of
such damages. See Opening Brief at pp. 9-12. Murphy Land acknowledged that the amount of
damages is a question of fact, but it put forth evidence, from the affidavit of Frank Tiegs, that
Murphy Land suffered damages well in excess of the three million dollar amount of the Escrow
Funds. Id. at pp. 12-19.
In response, the Hilliards devote most of their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Opposition") to extraneous and unmeritorious arguments based on
affirmative defenses that the Hilliards did not plead and do not now adequately support. The
Hilliards do not dispute the bulk of the material facts, and the small portions of their Opposition
that actually address the real issues in this case, and Murphy Land's arguments regarding those
issues, lack merit.
The Hilliards make a feeble stab at arguing that the Addendum is ambiguous, but they
proffer no reasonable alternative interpretation, nor any authority or logical explar1ation why the
Addendum does not mean what it says. The Addendum is clear.
As to the amount of damages - the only real issue of fact - the Hilliards rely solely on
conclusory, vague affidavit testimony from a non-expert purporting to offer expert opinion. That
testimony, from Jay Clark, is not admissible and should not be considered, for the reasons set
forth in the Motion to Strike file by Murphy Land this same day. Even if it is considered, Mr.
Clark's conclusory assertions are unsupp01ted by any specific facts and are woefully inadequate

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 2 OF 20
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a
delay

issue as to the amount of damages suffered

Land

the

possession of Crystal Springs Farm, let alone any question about whether the amount of

those damages exceeds three million dollars. As a result, Murphy Land is entitled to judgment in
its favor as a matter of law and to a declaration from this Court ordering the release of the
Escrow Funds to Murphy Land.

II. LEGALSTANDARDS
A.

The Party Resisting Summary Judgment has the Burden to Show the Existence of a
Genuine Issue of Material Fact.
Once the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates that no genuine issues of

material fact exist, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of a genuine
issue of material fact. Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, -- Idaho---, 294
P.3d 1111, 1116 (2013). The nonmoving party may not "rest upon mere allegations in the
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial."

Id. (quoting Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394-95, 224 P.3d 458, 461-

62 (2008)). "Under this standard, 'a mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts
is insufficient to withstand summary judgment; there must be sufficient evidence upon which a

jury could reasonably return a verdict resisting the motion."' Kootenai County v. HarrimanSayler, -- Idaho---, 293 P.3d 637,641 (2012) (quoting Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho
802, 806, 229 P.3d 1164, 1168 (2010)). "Further, 'conclusory assertions unsupported by specific
facts are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment."'

Id. (quoting Mareci v. Coeur D'Alene Sch. Dist. No. 271, 150 Idaho 740,744,250 P.3d 791, 795
(2011)) (emphasis added). "Consequently, once the moving party has met its burden, the
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ci,n,P'"''"' party must present affirmative evidence that demonstrates the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact." Id.
B.

The Party Raising an Affirmative Defense has the Burden of Supporting That
Defense in Response to a Motion for Summary Judgment.
In their Opposition, the Hilliards raise numerous affirmative defenses on which they

would bear the burden of proof at trial. As a result, the Hilliards have the burden of supporting
those defenses at the summary judgment stage. Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765,771,215
P.3d 485 (2009) ("a nonmoving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative
defense on a motion for summary judgment").
C.

As the Trier of Fact, this Court Need Not Draw all Inferences in Favor of the
Nonmoving Party.
Because this action is set for a nonjury trial, with this Court as the finder of fact, this

Court is not constrained to draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving pruty. To the contrary,
"when an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is
entitled to aiTive at the most probable inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly
before it and grant summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences."
Bauchman-Kingston P'ship, LP v. Haroldsen, 149 rdaho 87, 90,233 P.3d 18 (2008)

III.
ARGUMENT
The Hilliards' Opposition contains seven different argument headings. While many of
those arguments overlap, in an attempt at clarity, Murphy Land addresses them seriatim.

1.

The Addendum is not an Indemnity Agreement; In any Event, it is Clear,
Unequivocal, and Certain that the Escrow Funds are to be Available to
Compensate Murphy Land for its Damages from Delayed Possession.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 4 OF 20
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The

that "Murphy Land contends that Addendum 4 created an

contractual indemnity obligation requiring the Hilliards to indemnify it for its alleged
lost profit," and that the Addendum lacks the requisite clarity to be an indemnity agreement.
Opposition at 7-8. This argument fails because it mischaracterizes Murphy Land's position and
because it ignores the fact that the relevant language is clear.
Murphy Land did not -- and does not -- contend that the Addendum is an indemnity
agreement requiring the Hilliards to indemnify it. hldeed, neither the word "indemnity" nor any
of its variations appear in Murphy Land's Motion or Opening Brief. Instead, Murphy Land
simply argued that the Addendum means what it says: that the Escrow Funds are to be made
available to Murphy Land for damages suffered from delayed possession of Crystal Springs
Farm. The notion that Murphy Land argued for an "express contractual indemnity obligation" is
nothing more than the Hilliards' spin on Murphy Land's argument.
Moreover, the Hilliards do not establish that, under Idaho law, language imposing
indemnity must be "clear, unequivocal, and certain." The authority on which the Hilliards' rely
does not establish that principle, and it does not help the Hilliards. R. W. Beck & Associates, Inc.
v. Job Line Const. Inc., 122 Idaho 92, 96, 831 P.2d 560,564 (Ct. App. 1992) addresses a

situation in which a third party claimed that it was an indemnitee of a contract between two other
parties, and the court found no such intent in the contract. Under those circumstances, the court
rightly read the contract narrowly.
In any event, even if the Addendum was considered an indemnity agreement, and even if
the Hilliards are right that language imposing an indemnity must be "clear, unequivocal, and
certain," see Opposition at 7, the crucial language of the Addendum meets that test it says,
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unequivocally, and certainly, that the Escrow Funds "shall be available to the extent
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction of the amount of purchaser's damage, if any, for
loss or delay of possession of real estate purchased herein." See Tiegs, Aff., Exh. C. Notably,
nowhere in the Opposition do the Hilliards make any reasoned argument that the foregoing
language is anything other than clear and unequivocal. Rather, they merely attempt -unconvincingly -- to argue that, despite the clarity of that language, it is insufficient to compel
the result that it spells out, namely that the funds are to be used to compensate Murphy Land for
its damages from delayed possession of Crystal Springs Farm.
The Hilliards' reliance on case law stating the general rule that lost profits are generally
not available in contract, see Opposition at 8, is misplaced because that rule applies to claims for
breach of contract and consequential damages flowing from the breach. Here, there is no claim
of breach or of consequential damages. The Escrow Funds were set aside to be made available
to Murphy Land in the amount of its damages from delay in possession. Murphy Land simply
asks this Court, consistent with the plain language of the Addendum, to determine the amount of
its damages from delay in possession, and because Murphy Land is a business, its damages due
to delay are its lost profits from being unable to fully farm Crystal Springs Farm.
2.

To the Extent any Consideration was Needed for the Addendum, it was
Provided Because Murphy Land Agreed to Purchase the Farm Even Though
the Hilliards had not Fulfilled the Conditions Precedent.

Despite filing suit in this Comt to enforce the Addendum and then failing to raise any
issues regarding enforceability of the Addendum in their Reply to Murphy Land's counterclaim.
the Hilliards now contend that the Addendum is unenforceable for failure of consideration.
Opposition at 9-10. Besides the curious timing of the argument, it lacks merit, for four reasons.
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the Hilliards failed to plead failure
8( c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear that failure of consideration is an
affinnative defense that must be pled. Nevertheless, the Hilliards made no mention of the
alleged failure of consideration in their Reply Lo Murphy Land's counterclaim. And their actions
belie their argument: far from claiming that the Addendum was unenforceable for want of
consideration, the Hilliards filed suit in this Court to enforce it. Only now, when forced to
confront the plain language of the Addendum and the undisputed fact that Murphy Land's
damages exceed three million dollars, do the Hilliards shift course and proffer a new theory.
Second, the Hilliards cite no authority for the proposition that the Addendum required
additional consideration. By the terms of both the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the
Addendum, the Addendum was made an "integral part" of that Agreement. See Tiegs Aff., Exh.
B (Agreement), at <j{37; Exh. C (Addendum). There is no dispute that the Hilliards received
consideration in connection with the Purchase and Sale Agreement.
Third, even if the Addendum required separate consideration, the Hilliards have failed to
meet their burden of overcoming the presumption that there was consideration given for the
Addendum. A written instrument such as the Addendum "is presumptive evidence of a
consideration." Best Hill Coalition v. HALKO, LLC, 144 Idaho 813,818, 172 P.3d 1088 (2007)
(citing LC.§ 29-103). "The burden of showing a want of consideration sufficient to support an
instrument lies with the party seeking to invalidate or avoid it. ... Under LC. § 29-104, both the
burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of persuasion rest upon the party
contesting the adequacy of consideration." Id. (citing LC.§ 29-104). Here, the Hilliards'
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presumption

consists merely of conclusory

of no consideration. See Opposition at 9-10. That is insufficient to meet their burden.
Fourth, even if consideration was required, Murphy Land gave consideration to the
Hilliards in co1mection with the Addendum by agreeing to purchase Crystal Springs Farm
despite the failure of conditions precedent. "Consideration includes 'action by the prornisee
which is bargained for and given in exchange for the promise."' Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 141 Idaho 362, 368, 109 P.3d 1104 (2005) (quoting Day v. Mortgage Ins. Corp., 91 ldaho

605,607,428 P.2d 524,526 (1967)). Consideration "may also consist of a 'detriment to the
promisee or a benefit to the prornisor."' Id (quoting Surety Life Ins. Co. v. Rose Chapel
Mortuary, Inc., 95 Idaho 599,603,514 P.2d 594,598 (1973)).

Under the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement, the Hilliards were obligated to
terminate their existing lease with Jay Clark prior to closing, which was set for December 28,
2010. See Tiegs Aff. at <Jl6, Exh. B. Moreover, as James Hilliard acknowledges, the Hilliards
were obligated to provide clear title to Crystal Springs Farm to Murphy Land. See Hilliard Aff.
at ~l 20. As of the original date of closing, December 28, 2010, the Hilliards had not terminated
their lease with Jay Clark, and title to the Farm was clouded by Jay Clark's recorded iease and
Jolm Clark's Memorandum of Ownership Interest. As a result, at the time of closing, Murphy
Land was under no obligation to proceed with the purchase of the Farm -- the Purchase and Sale
Agreement was unenforceable for failure of a condition precedent. In exchange for the Hilliards'
promise to deposit $3,000,000 into escrow to protect it from damages from delays in possession,
Murphy Land promised to move ahead with closing and purchase the Farm for $9,500,000
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presence on the Farm and the

on

- something that it

was not otherwise obligated to do. That is a detriment to Murphy Land. That was consideration.
3.

The Addendum is not Ambiguous.

The Hilliards make a cursory and thoroughly unconvincing argument that the Addendum
is ambiguous, see Opposition at 11-12. In its Opening Brief, Murphy Land argued that the
Addendum means what it says: the Escrow Funds are to compensate Murphy Land for damages
suffered from delayed possession of Crystal Springs Farm. See Opening Brief at pp. 10-12. The
Hilliards do not offer any alternate interpretation of the Addendum, let alone a reasonable
interpretation. Instead, they simply point out the immaterial fact that the Addendum docs not
state "indemnity" or "lost profits."
The Hilliards also argue about what they understood. But their alleged subjective selfserving, post hoc "understanding" is relevant only if the Addendum is ambiguous. It is not, so
their understanding is immaterial, and it cannot render the Addendum ambiguous. Swanson v.
Beco Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748 (2007) ("[a] contract is not rendered
ambiguous on its face because one of the parties thought that the words used had some meaning
that differed from the ordinary meaning of those words").
4.

There was no Mutual Mistake.

The Hilliards next float another novel, un-pled affirmative defense - mutual mistake whose validity is contradicted by their own actions. That argument suffers from the same
infirmities as the Hilliards' argument about failure of consideration: it is an affirmative defense
that was not plead, it is contradictory to the position that the Hilliards took by filing an action
with this Court to enforce the Addendum, and it lacks any merit.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 9 OF 20
45522.0004.6250027 l

12/6/201

:58:34 PM

Karen r v.1 u.1

terse argument

.1.a.

rescission is well

of the mark and falls

short of

meeting their burden. Rescission is proper "where there is a mutual mistake of fact that is
material or fundamental to the contract" O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909,
188 P.3d 846 (2008) (emphasis added). "The party alleging the mutual mistake of fact bears the
burden of proof.. .. The mistake must be common to both parties, and must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence." Id. (citations omitted). The Hilliards do not establish any mistake of
fact, let alone any mistake common to both parties. Instead, they merely argue that they had a
different understanding of the Addendum that is contrary to its plain language. But a post hoc
argument about a different understanding is not a basis for rescission; if it were, nearly every
contract dispute would result in rescission.
5.

The Hilliards' Lost Profits Argument is Misplaced.

The Hilliards' terse argument about lost profits, see Opposition at 13-14, misperceives
the nature of this dispute. The Hilliards cite to case law regarding the foreseeability of
consequential damages in an action for a breach of contract. This is not a suit for a breach of
contract, however, but rather an action to determine the amount of damages per the clear
language of the Addendum. Indeed, Murphy Land makes no claim of breach or for
consequential damages. It merely makes a claim that the Escrow Funds, which were set aside to
be made available to Murphy Land in the amount of its damages from delay in possession, be
disbursed accordingly. To the extent foreseeability is at issue, because Murphy Land is a forprofit business, and it is undisputed that Frank Tiegs informed James Hilliard that Murphy Land
wanted to buy the Farm to farm it itself, it was eminently foreseeable that delayed possession
would result in lost profits to Murphy Land. See Tiegs Aff. at ~[5. Moreover, the Hilliards'
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about foreseeability is

a repackaging

argument about mitigation, which,

for the reasons discussed below, is unsupported.

6.

The Claim for Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing has no
Merit Because the Hilliards Identify no Breach.

The Hilliards' argument that Murphy Land breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, see Opposition at 14-15, is likewise nothing more than a repackaging of their
argument about mitigation. For the reasons discussed below, the argument about mitigation is
unsupp011ed.
Moreover, the claim that Murphy Land breached the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing also fails because the Hilliards did not plead it as an affirmative defense pursuant to

I.R.C.P. 8(c), and in any event they do not identify any contractual covenant that Murphy Land
allegedly breached. See, e.g., McKnight v. Torres, 563 F.3d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 2009) (the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "neither 'alters specific obligations set forth in
the contract' nor 'adds duties independent of the contractual relationship'") (quoting Shawmut

Bank, N.A. v. Kress Assocs., 33 F.3d 1477, 1503 (9th Cir. 1994)); Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,289, 824 P.2d 841. 864 (1991) (A violation of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is "a breach of the contract. It does not result in a cause
of action separate from the breach of contract claims .... ").
Finally, the Hilliards' argument rests on its baseless contention that Murphy Land "chose
to do nothing in mitigation." Opposition at 15. It is undisputed that Murphy Land moved swiftly
to evict Jay Clark and continued to diligently prosecute its action against him until he was finally
evicted on May 2, 2012. See Opening Brief at 17. Moreover, Murphy Land repeatedly
demanded t.1-iat Jay Clark vacate the Farm and attempted to move its farming equipment onto
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Springs Farm, see Tiegs Aff. at 919111,1

Through their sister company, Owyhee

Farming, LLC, the principals in Murphy Land also rented a portion of that farm -- the portion
that Jay Clark had not already planted to alfalfa or wheat or contracted for corn -- for growing
potatoes. Id. at Cfll8. Murphy Land deducted the profits earned by Owyhee Farming from
growing those potatoes from its calculation of damages, thereby lessening its claim against the
Hilliards. Id. As a result, the Hilliards' claim that Murphy Land did "nothing" is simply false.
7.

There is no Genuine Issue Either as to the Amount of the Damages Suffered
by Murphy Land or that Such Amount Exceeds Three Million Dollars.

As to the real issue in this case -- the amount of damages suffered by Murphy Land as a
result of the delayed possession of Crystal Springs Farm -- the Hilliards respond to Murphy
Land's detailed discussion and proof of damage by stating that they "do have a genuine dispute
as to its damage claim." Opposition at 15. But while the Hilliards may believe that there is a
genuine dispute, they fail to put forth sufficient evidence to establish any such dispute. Instead,
the Hilliards rely solely on the affidavit of Jay Clark. But Mr. Clark's affidavit is inadmissible as
purported expert testimony from a non-expert. And even if considered by the this Court, Mr.
Clark's statements on which the Hilliards rely in support of their assertion of a genuine dispute
about damages are a textbook example of "conclusory assertions unsupported by specific facts"
that are insufficient to create a genuine issue and prevent summary judgment from entering for
Murphy Land. See Kootenai County, 293 P.3d at 641 (2012).
On the law, the Hilliards quote extensively from Wing v. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912. 918-19,
684 P.2d 313, 320-21 (Ct App. 1984), in support of their assertion that the fact and measure of
damages for crop loss are questions of fact Murphy Land agrees that Wing conectly states the
law in that regard, and that the measure of damages is a question of fact. However, the Hilliards
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - PAGE 12 OF 20
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not proffer

evidence to create a genuine

the amount

damages.

to clarify, Wing discusses two different issues regarding damages from crop loss -- causation and
the measure of damages. Here, only the latter is at issue.
Although Murphy Land does not technically seek damages for crop loss, the formula
stated by the Wing court for calculating crop loss damages is logical to apply here: the measure
for damages for crop loss "is the difference between the value of the crops actually raised and the
value of the crops that would have been raised under normal conditions." 106 Idaho 919. Of
course, "[t]he amount of damages need only be established to a reasonable degree of certainty.
'Reasonable certainty' does not require mathematical exactitude, but only that the damages be
taken out of the realm of speculation." Sells v. Robinson, 141 Idaho 767, 774, ll8 P.3d 99
(2005).
Murphy Land established its damages to at least a reasonable certainty with evidence of
the amount that Murphy Land would have profited had it been able to farm the entirety of
Crystal Springs Farm in 2011 and 2012, as compared to the crops that it actually farmed, and it
demonstrated that the difference exceeded three million dollars. See Opening Brief at 12-17;
Tiegs Aff. at 1!Cfl 16-22. That evidence is sufficient to meet Murphy Land's burden to establish
the amount of damages. See Mclean v. Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779,783,430 P.2d 670 (1967)
("the testimony of the plaintiff, evincing the gross receipts of the business for comparable
periods, the overhead expenses and estimated profit derived by computation therefrom as a
percentage of gross receipts, all based upon her prior experience in the operation of the business,
was sufficient to enable the jury to determine respondent's loss of profits for the period of
inoperation with reasonable certainty").
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Hilliards

solely on

Clark's

assertions about yield,

price, and cost of certain crops.1 Mr. Clark states that he does not "believe that Mr. Tiegs'
estimate of yields for DNS wheat are historically accurate," that those are "high yields," and that
Crystal Springs Farm "was not traditionally producing yields of those amounts." Clark Aff. at
~[6(c). But Mr. Clark does not disclose whether he ever grew DNS wheat on Crystal Springs
Farm, and he fails to account for any differences in farming practices between him and Murphy
Land. It is reasonable to infer that Frank Tiegs, who operates a large-scale farming operation,
might be able to obtain a better yield than Jay Clark, a former attorney-turned farmer. Mr. Clark
also fails to provide any specific facts about the yield he achieved.
Mr. Clark similarly states that he "believe[s]" that Mr. Tiegs's estimates of costs and
sales prices of crops are "unrealistic." Clark Aff. at <J[6(d), (e). But again, Mr. Clark provides no
specific facts on which his belief is based, nor any specificity about what a "realistic" cost or
sales price estimate might be. Instead, he merely states that the price for Norkotah potatoes
"would have been near the high point of the market for such potatoes in 2011," without any
support for that statement or any explanation why, even if true, Murphy Land would not have
been able to obtain such a price.

1 The Hilliards included in their filing the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds, in which Mr. Edmunds, a
non-disclosed expert, purports to offer expert testimony regarding the amount of damages
suffered by Murphy Land. For the reasons set forth in the Motion to Strike and supporting
documents filed by Murphy Land, Mr. Edmunds' affidavit should not be considered by this
Court. For that reason, and because the Hilliards do not refer to his affidavit in their
Opposition at all, let alone base any argument on it, Murphy Land will not address the
assertions in that affidavit in this Reply.
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Indeed, Mr.

fails to provide

specific facts about yields, costs, or sales prices at

Indeed, as to 2012, he or merely states, without any explanation or supporting facts, that he
"believe[s] that Mr. Tiegs' projections for the year 2012 to be similarly wrong in regard to
yields, costs and sales prices." Clark Aff. at <Jl7. Mr. Clark's statements are nothing more than
"conclusory assertions unsupported by specific facts," and, as a result, they are "insufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment." Kootenai County, 293 P.3d

at 641 (2012).2 Simply put, the Hilliards have not established any genuine issue as to the
amount of damages suffered by Murphy Land.

8.

The Hilliards did not Plead, and do not Adequately Support, the Affirmative
Defense of Mitigation.

The Hilliards final argument is that Murphy Land "egregiously failed to take reasonable
steps to mitigate their damages." Opposition at 19-20. The Hilliards argue that Murphy Land
should have simply rented out the entirety of Crystal Springs Farm from Jay Clark. Even
assuming that the duty to mitigate applies herein, the Hilliards have not met their burden of
supporting that affirmative defense.
"The doctrine of avoidable consequences, or the duty to mitigate, is an affirmative
defense that provides for a reduction in damages where a defendant proves that it would have
been reasonable for the plaintiff to take steps to avoid the full extent of the damages caused by
the defendant's actionable conduct. Where an injured party takes steps to mitigate the damages

2 Mr. Clark also avers that Mr. Tiegs does not refer to the "windfall" of avoided cost to Murphy
Land occasioned by the costs Mr. Clark had allegedly incurred prior to his eviction on May
2, 2012. While Mr. Tiegs indeed does not refer to any "windfall," his calculations for the
alfalfa and white wheat harvested in 2012 reflect lower costs for those crops.
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""""""''"' by another, she is entitled to the costs she reasonably incurs in avoiding those damages.

McCormick lnt'l USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 923-925, 277 P.3d 367(2012) (citations
omitted). The party who invokes this doctrine bears the burden to prove that the "damage could
have been lessened." Whitehouse v. Lange, 128 Idaho 129,136,910 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1996)
( citing Davis v. First Interstate Bank of Idaho, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 170, 765 P .2d 680, 681
(1988). In other words, the defendant "bears the burden of proving that the proposed means of
mitigation were reasonable under the circumstances, could be accomplished at a reasonable cost,
and were within the plaintiffs ability. Proof of the latter of these three requires more than a mere
suggestion that a means of mitigation exists." McCormick, 128 Idaho at 136.
Like the remainder of the Hilliards' arguments, their mitigation argument fails for
multiple reasons.
First, mitigation is an affirmative defense, see McCormick, 128 Idaho at 136, but the
Hilliards did not plead it as required by I.R.C.P. 8(c).
Second, it is not apparent that the doctrine of avoidable consequences applies here. As
the Hilliards note, that doctrine applies in the context of a breach of contract or tort action. See
Opposition at 19. The Hilliards cite no authority supporting the notion that there is a duty to
mitigate in this context. Because they bear the burden of supporting their affirmative defense,
the failure to establish the applicability of the doctrine to this case is alone sufficient to doom the
Hilliards' argument.
Third, even assuming, arguendo, that there is a duty to mitigate in this context, the
Hilliards fail to meet their burden to support the defense. In support, the Hilliards point again to
the affidavit of Jay Clark, this time to Mr. Clark's statement that he was "ready willing and able"
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to

Murphy

lease any of

fields on the

so."

they had paid a rent to

Aff. at 9[4. But these statements amount merely to "mere suggestion that a means of
mitigation exists." McConnick, 128 Idaho at 136. The Hilliards have propounded no evidence
Corn1 indicating that Murphy Land would have suffered less damage had it rented from Mr.
Clark, including no specifics about how much Mr. Clark would have charged to rent the
remainder of Crystal Springs Farm. As a result, they have failed to adequately support their
affinnative defense of mitigation. See Whitehouse, 128 Idaho at 136 (defendant argued that
plaintiff could have "restored [the mare's] fertility, and thereby reduced their damages, by
sending her ... for evaluation by specialists"; court held that defendant did not satisfy his burden
to prove that plaintiffs damages would have been reduced because "he did not present evidence
that such evaluation likely would have led to a cure for the mare's infertility, nor did he show the
probable cost of such testing").
Moreover, Jay Clark's assertions are inconsistent with previous affidavits he has
submitted to this Court. In his most recent affidavit, Mr. Clark takes the position that, in early
2011, Murphy Land could have rented "any of the fields" and "could have farmed what they
wanted, when they wanted": in Mr. Clark's words,

"f a]ll they had to do was ask."

Clark Aff. at

919. But Mr. Clark previously averred that, by early 2011: (1) he had already planted 1204 acres
of Winter Wheat and 1650 acres of alfalfa; (2) he was "required" to plant 142 acres of sugar
beets; (3) he was "under contractual obligation" and "legally obligated" to plant corn in four of
the remaining fields, which corn was "already sold"; (4) that two of the fields were "unavailable"
for growing potatoes because they had been grazed by cattle. See Second Affidavit of Matthew
Gordon filed concunently herewith ("Second Gordon Aff."), ~[3, Exh. B. (Second Affidavit of
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Clark

Case No.

11

900 on March 1, 2011), at <fi7,

13, & 16. Mr.

Clark further averred that, as of February 2011, he had invested approximately $763,880 for the

2011 crop year, and that he expected to gross more than two million dollars from those crops in
2011. See Second Gordon Aff., 9[2, Exh. A (Affidavit of Jay P. Clark filed in Case No. CV-1101900 on February 25, 2011), at 'I[44. Mr. Clark also swore that if Murphy Land had been
permitted to farm additional fields in 2011, it would have resulted in him "being in default for a
number of contracts both to plant and grow crops on the property," and that there would "not be
enough water to go around" if Murphy Land planted crops of its choosing on certain fields. See
Second Gordon Aff., ~[3, Exh. B, at Cj{3F, 17. Most tellingly, Mr. Clark averred that he would not
agree to "let someone else farm land that I intend to farm for a number of years in the future
unless the farming is controlled and monitored by me," in part because "the choice of crops may
very well affect my ability to effectively use the farm in the future." Id. at~[ 23 (emphasis
added). In short, despite Mr. Clark's claims in his most recent affidavit about the supposed ease
of renting from him and his alleged willingness to let Murphy Land farm whatever, wherever it
chose on the Farm, Mr. Clark's contemporaneous statements paint a very different picture.
As discussed eariier, the Hilliards' argument about failure mitigation also ignores the
evidence that Murphy Land aggressively and diligently pursued litigation to remove Jay Clark
from Crystal Springs Fann as soon as possible. That the litigation did not result in his removal
until May 2, 2012 is not the fault of Murphy Land.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. the Hilliards have failed to establish any genuine issue of
material fact that would preclude an award of summary judgment to Murphy Land on all claims
and counterclaims and a declaration ordering that the Escrow Funds be released to Murphy Land.

DATED THIS

--12_ day of December, 2013.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
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P.O. Box 1617
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Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5260
Email: sschossberger@hawleytroxell.com
mgordon@haw leytroxell .com
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)
VS.

)

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW
GORDON

)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
)
limited liability company,
)

Defendant/Countercla imant.

)
)

MATTHEW GORDON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I make this affidavit and the statements herein based upon my personal

knowledge.
2.

I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land

Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") in the above-captioned matter.
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3.

as

A is a true

accurate copy of portions

Affidavit of Jay Clark filed on February 25, 2011 in the District Court for the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, in Case No. CV 2011-01900-M.

4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the Second Affidavit

of Jay Clark filed on March 11, 2011 in the District Couit for the Third Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Owyhee, in Case No. CV 2011-01900-M.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Matthew Gordon

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 6 1h day of December, 2013.

-------Name: Tammy N. Miller
Notary Public
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My commission expires: 05/30/2014

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON - 2
45522.0004.6256890.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of December, 2013. I caused to be served a
tme copy of the foregoing SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON by the method
indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:

[3'u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law

0
0
0
0

816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail
Telecopy: 208-343-3282

[Attorneys for Plaint(ffs]
mJ.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com
0 Telecopy: 650-298-8097

Weldon S. Wood
Attomey at Law
17 Alverno Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

Matthew Gordon
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THOMAS CLARK

FILED

State Bar No. 1329

and FEENEY

___A.r~i!J} M.

Defendants
Jay Clark and John Clark
The Train Station, Suite 201

FEB 2 5 2011
~HARLon·E SHERBURN, CLERK

13th and Main Streets

TFUNAAMAN

P. 0. Drawer 285

Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THrn.D JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC., an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs,
\IS.

Case No. CV 2011-01900-M

AFFIDAVIT OF JAY P. CLARK

)

)

.IA Y P. CLARK; JOHN CLARK; DANIEL
)
MORI and all of the unknown owners and all of)
the unknown claimants to any right, title, estate, )
lien or interest in whole or in part in and to all )
mineral and mineral rights on and in and
)
ingress and egress rights to and from the real
property, which is adverse to Plaintiffs
ownership or a cloud upon Plaintiffs title
lhereto (referred to as DOES 1-50),

)
)
)

)
)

Defendants.

)
)
* * * * * ** * * *

ST ATE OF IDAHO

)

County of

)

) ss.
JAY P. CLARK, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

My full legal name is Jay Phillip Clark. I am a resident of Elmore County, Idaho.

AFFIDAVIT OF JAV P. CLARK ·l-

'A'
----

EXHIBIT

coa~ ORIGINAL

grazing

rent" See page 2

practices is

s

contrary to expressed agreements

the

lease.

41.

Nearly every field on the Ranch is well fenced. There is a feedlot on the Ranch.

There were several hundred cattle were grazing on the Ranch immediately prior to the Plaintiffs

purchasing the Ranch. This all should have made it no surprise to the Plaintiffs that they were
buying a Ranch with a rich tradition of cattle grazing. In addition, Dan Mori grazed the fields in

2009 before and after Lance Funk grew potatoes on the Ranch without anyone making any
complaints about the grazing.
42.

Also attached as Exhibit J is an agreement from myself and Lance Funk from 2009

and from 20 l 0. The 2010 agreement for Mr. Funk and I to grow sugar beets together on the Ranch

specifically incorporates the crop share lease that is the subject of this litigation. Mr. Funk being a
principal of the Plaintiff, for over a year the Plaintiff operated pursuant to said crop share lease.

43.

Since I have no intentions of growing potatoes, cattle grazing would not in anyway

negatively effect my crops. In fact, for the corn that I grew on the Ranch, cattle grazing is necessary
to utilize and diminish excessive crop residue. If the corn fields are not grazed, not only is feed
wasted, but significantly more tillage will be required before those fields will have a suitable seed
bed. Cattle grazing is in no way causes waste upon a farm.
44.

If the Court grants the requested Temporary Restraining Order, I will suffer

significant financial loss. So far I have crops as enumerated above that have been planted in which
I have invested for the 2011 crop year and beyond approximately $763,880. If I am allowed to
harvest those crops, my expected gross will be approximately $2,281,275 in crop year 2011.
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'j

45.

I have twelve (

full time employees on the property and thirteen (13)
the next 30

These

employees

would have been working on the property at that time the Plaintiff was looking at the property for
sale and many would have been on the property at the time of closing of the sale. All of these
employees will lose their employment if the Temporary Restraining Order is granted .
.ft,

DATED This c}S day of Februar
11

;:!t/-

1

Ja

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thls ;)~day .?f February, 2011.
NO! ~RY PUBf:,IC FOR s ~ o ~ o J J~' II ~
Res1dmg at:
ffrnu...,
~ c:'.{,
7
Commission expires:
c:}. - ~ - J;l

c~

,

-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
·i1l
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J5 day of February, 2011, .I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

/

Steven F. Schossberger
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy/(208) 954-5260

rney for Defendants
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THOMAS CLARK
Idaho State Bar No. 1329
CLARK and FEENEY
Attorneys for Defendants
Jay Clark and John Clark
The Train Station, Suite 201
13th and Main Streets
P. 0. Drawer 285
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
Telephone: (208)743-9516
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IN THE DISTR1CT COURT OF TIIE TIIIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF IBE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

11

12

MURPHY LAND COMP AJ.'N, LLC., an Idaho )
limited liability company,
)

13

)

Plaintiff,

14

)
)
)

15

vs.

16

JAY P. CLARK; JOHN CLARK; DANIEL
)
MORI and all of the unknown owners and all of)
the unknown claimants to any right, title, estate, )
lien or interest in whole or in part in and to all )
mineral and mineral rights on and in and
)
ingress and egress rights to and from the real )
property, which is adverse to Plaintiff's
)
ownership or a cloud upon Plaintiff's title
)
thereto (referred to as DOES 1-50),
)
)
Defendants.
)

17
18

19
20
21

22

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JAY P.

CLARK

)

23

24
25

26

SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF JAY P. CLAR.K~tLAW OrFICE:$ OF

EXHIBIT \

g

CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP
I
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C 'K &~:ENEY
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OF IDAHO
2

) ss.

l County of Elmore

)

3

JAY P. CLARK, being first duly sworn upon oath. deposes and states as follows:

4

1.

5

My full legal name is Jay Phillip Clark. I am a resident of Elmore County, Idaho,

and one of the Defendants in the above-captioned matter. I have knowledge of the following facts

6

and am competent to testify to the same.
7

8

2.

The idea of splitting Crystal Springs Fann into various parcels to be shared by the

9

parties is an extremely poor idea without an agreement between the parties to do so and will create

10

numerous issues and disputes between the parties which will only extend the litigation: make the trial

11

much longer and require both sides to retain numerous experts.

12

3.

Some of the issues which can be avoided by not requiring the parties to share the

13
14

15

ranch include the following:
A.

Water issues.

16

i.

There will be disputes over water allocation.

17

ii.

Potential disputes regarding repair of an antiquated system

iii.

Disputes regarding responsibility to repair, maintain tind operate the
water system.

iv.

Potential disputes regarding paying power bills

18

19
20
21

B.

Crop rotation and the affect that tho Plaintiff's choice of crops will have on the ranch

22

in future years for me under the terms of the existing lease with options to renew.
23

24

25

26

SECOND AFFUlAVlT OF JAY P. CLAJU(--2~
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Rental issues as far as how much rent the Plaintiff should pay which would include:

1

whether it be cash or crop rent, and

2

iL

3
4

& EENEY AT

Cl:

11 201

D.

5

the manner in which it is to be calculated.

Damage issues by reason of Plaintiff's use of the farm. By comparison, the lease
adequately addresses the compensation that I am to pay to the Plaintiffs for the use

6

of the property.

7 '

8

E.

Placing litigants who do not get along on the property will increase the likelihood of

9

further problems that will need to be addressed by the Court. The parties inability

10

to get along is evidenced by the fact that Lance Funk still owes me money and has

11

not given a reason for not paying it as mote fully addressed in my prior affidavit and

12

herein.
13
14

F.

Sharing the Fann will result in me being in default for a number of contracts both to

plant and grow crops on the property.

15

16

For these reasons, and others, it would be an extremely poor decision to require the parties to share

17

the Farm.. These issues are more fully developed in the following paragraphs.

18

4.

Plaintiff's claim that it now has a greater claim for ground at the Ranch reserved for

19
20

spring crops then for ground already planted with fall crops assumes that either spring crops are less

21

important than fall crops, or that it intended to use and occupy the remaining 500 or so acres of the

22

Ranch, I would have already done so. The only reason those fields are not already planted to com

23

is because corn will most likely be killed by frost if planted before mid April. According to 2010

24

Idaho Agricultural Statistics, prepared by the Idaho State Department of Agriculture, corn was

25
26
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planted for the 2009
2
3
4

C'

'K & FEEN

year from April

NO,

through June

5395

p
! '

See enclosed Exhibit Al (page 7

above entitled book).
5.

If I had known last fall that my lease on the Ranch would in any way be contingent

upon all fields being planted, I could have also planted those remaining fields in wheat. The

5

Plaintiff planted wheat on their farm near Murphy until December 15, 2010, which is the last day
6
7

to do so under the federally subsidized insurance program. I finished planting the 1204 acres of

8

wheat on November 19, 2010. See the "Planted Acreage Worksheet" dated December 14, 2010,

9

Exhibit D attached to my previous Affidavit.

10

11

6.

As stated in paragraph 28 in my previous affidavit, I am prepared to plant and grnw

around 500 acres of grain corn on the Ranch in fields 257, 258; 275 and 280. By far, the best land

12

on the Ranch suitable for row crops, is the four fields (called ''pivots" because of the automated
13

14

irrigation system on these fields pivot around a center tower) of ground that Plaintiffhas identified

15

as fields 257,258,262, and 263. Com cannot be grown on the majority of the ground on the Ranch

16

since around 1800 acres of the Ranch is irrigated with "hand1inesn or ''wheellines"1 which require

17

that they manually be moved once or twice a day. Since field com often grows over ten feet tall, as

18

it did last year on the Ranch, pivots are the only practical way for irrigation com on the Ranch.

19
20

21
22
23

24

7.

The remaining fields on the R£lllch are fanned and planted according to the field

numbers on the map provided by the Plaintiff as follows:

A.

Wheat The 1204 acres of Winter Wheat is planted in fields 261,262, the field not

labeled but between 258 and 262,263, the southern half of 264,267,268,269, the
fields betv.teen 268 and 269 and the fields not identified to the south of field 287,

25
26
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I
field 270,

1

fields also not identified around and between the fields 277 and 2831 and :field 281.

2
3

, a field not identified to the east of field 271, the comer

B.

4

Alfalfa. Approximately 1650 acres of alfalfa is planted in the north half of field 264,

field 265, field 266, field 272 and two small fields located to south of field 272> field

5

273, three corner fields that adjoin field 273, field 276, field 277, field 278, field 279,

6

field 282, field 283 1 field 284, a field not identified but located directly south of field
7

284, field 285, field 286, field 287, and a field not identified but located just north

8

of field 287.

9

10

c.

11

Sugar Beets. My current contract with Snake River Sugar Company will require me
to plow out most of the alfalfa currently planted in field 278 and field 279 to plant

12

142 acres of sugar beets.

13

14

D.

Field Com I am under contractual obligation and am prepared to plant com in field
257,258,275, and 280.

15

16

E.

Spring Wheat. I intend to plant 80 acres of Spring Wheat in field 2.59.

17

8.

Three of the four pivots that are slated for corn raised sugar beets in 2010 and would

18

therefore be a poor choose for raising sugar beets again in those fields which are fields number 257,

19
258 and 280. The last time another fanner tried to grow ''back to back" sugar beets on the Ranch
20

21

resulted in a terrible crop because of soil diseases like Rhizomania flourished in those conditions.

22

Also, two of those four pivots have already seen potatoes in 2009 and then sugar beets in 2010.

23

Potatoes and sugar beets are very hard on farm ground because they "mine" much of the nutrients

24

out of the soil in a just a couple of years. Giving the soil Ha break", means growing a grass crop,

25

26
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11

corn or wheat, or a legume such as Alfalfa., all of which build up the soil instead of harm the

3

4
5

9.

Fields 275 and field 280 would also be unavailable for the Plaintiff to raise potatoes

since these fields were entirely grazed by cattle during for the past three months. At least Plaintiff's
position has been that potatoes cannot be grown in these two fields pursuit to agricultural standards

6

7
8

as published by GAP.

10.

Com is the most profitable crop of those crops that would be suitable to grow in two

9

of those pivots. Corn in this area can produce a yield nearly twice that of wheat In 2010 Idaho

10

Agricultural Statistics, shows average com yield per acre of 180 bushels for Idaho in 2009. See

11

Exhibit Bl. I produced around 200 bushels of corn per acre on the one pivot of com I grew last

12

year on the Ranch_ Also in 2010 Idaho Agricultural Statistics. shows the average winter wheat yield
13
14

per acre of 111 bushels and average Spring Wheat yield of 90.0 bushels per acre for Owyhee County

15

in 2009. See pages of 23 and 25 of the above entitled book marked as Exhibit Ct. While the

16

current price per bushel for com is around one dollar per bushel less than wheat, the revenue from

17

corn for the Plaintiff's share as landlords of the Ranch would be substantially more than for wheat.

18

11.

The Plaintiff does not have a recent history of growing com so they are not equipped

19

20

or prepared to take advantage of com that has seen nearly a 100 percent increase in price since last

21

year. As I also stated in my previous affidavit, I have already purchased nearly $50,000 in com seed

22

from Forage Complete> a company from Caldwell, which was done on November 9, 2010, well over

23

a month before I had learned that the Plaintiffwas purchasing the Ranch. Because of th.is being an

24

record year for corn, it is extremely doubtful that Plaintiff would be able to procure any of the

25

26
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(

quality corn seed necessary for a good crop at this late stage in the season.
2

12.

I have also prepared and am legally obligated under contract to a contractor. Sid and

3

Tanner Wing who owns Blue Collar Farms agreed to plant the corn crop in fields 257,258,275 and

4

field 280. This is the same contractor who planted my com field last year in field 275.

5

13.

Furthermore, the oorn to be planted in those four pivots is already sold. See Exhibit

6

Dl, a contract for the purchase of my 2011 com crop. Prior to my purchase of com seed in early
7
8

9

10
11

November 2010, I had received verbal conformation from Daniel Mori (Dan) that he would be
willing to purchase my anticipated com crop for 2011 of around 120,000 bushels of corn. As Dan
stated in his affidavit previously filed with the court, he nms a custom cattle feeding operation.

Critical to his operation is that Dan must secure sufficient feed for the approximately 5,000 head of

12

cattle that be expects to feed for 2011.
13

14

14.

The irrigation system at the Ranch includes four independent irrigation systems with

15

around 4,500 horsepower· of electric motors capable of pumping up to 40 million gallons a day. It

16

takes at least fifteen of my employees to effectively manage and operate this system. Essential to

17

its effective operation is the careful planning and coordination of where crops may be grown

18

according to the water needs of the crop and the many limitations of the watering system. Lance

19
20

Funk was allowed to g;ow potatoes in 2009 and sugar beets in 2010 io fields 257 through 264

21

because that was not only the best soil on the Ranch for row crops, but also because that is where

22

the best water system on the Ranch is located.

23
24

25
26
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contrast, the Cottonwood Pumping Station supplies all the water to all fields

1
2

numbered from 275 through 289, around 1070 acres. There would not be enough water to

3

accommodate sugar beets or potatoes in field number 275 and 280, and com could only be grown

4

there if water is significantly restricted to alfalfa fields 277 and 283 during July and August. With

5

new alfalfa stands planted in 2010 in fields 286 through 289, any rationing of water there could ruin

6

the new ~lfalfa. Some of the more mature alfalfa stands already suffered last year by Lance Funk
7
8

9

growing sugar beets in 280, since there was not enough water left over to provide adequate pressure
to water the hay fields in 276 through 279.

10

16.

For 2011, I am required by contract to plant sugar beets in fields 278 and 279.

11

17.

There will not be enough water to go around. Most of the inigation system on the

12

ranch is severely dilapidated on the Ranch in 20 I 1. Jn the Cottonwood Pump Station area, the

13
14

system was not designed adequately to ever water I070 acres. Even if! use great care and only plant

15

corn in those open fields, that com is likely to be hanned by interruptions in water supply. However,

16

com is more resilient than potatoes or sugar beets, especially during critical times of plant

17

development. Also, com will not require as much water as sugar beets until July, and by then, the

18

wheat in field 281 will be finished, which will definitely help pivot field 280. By not baVing to

19

share water, especially within the area watered by the Cottonwood pumping station. crop production
20
21
22

23

24

will still be less than ideal, but I will only have myself to blame for how and when daily decisions
are made as to which crops within those 1070 acres will wither and which ones will wither less.

18.

This is Just one example of many situations on the Ranch that will require a close and

careful cooperation to maximize crop production, a situation that is very unlikely to occur if the

25

26
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forced to share the Ranch while this litigation is pending. This would

-

15135

like

2

spouses being forced to work full time together while they are getting a divorce, a situation likely

3

to greatly enhance the litigation between the parties. With the parties already litigating against each

4

other, rationing water between us would probably require frequent court supervision. Ultimately,

5

the situation would also further burden this court with additional expert witnesses necessary to

6

establish damages because both sides will have damages due to lack of water.
7 '
8

19.

As for the alfalfa stand growing in field 273, that the Plaintiff claims is too mature and

9

ready to take out, it is true I told Lance Funk in mid December 2010 that I would consider leasing

10

that field to him for potatoes in 2011, for cash rent. However, those negotiations were all based on

11

the premise that Lance Funk was accepting my lease as valid, an expectation that was naturally

12

created because no remarks had been made that questioned the validity of my lease for the Ranch.
13

14
15

16

17
18

Also, in December alfalfa hay was still only selling for around $90 per ton, still below the cost of
producing it.
20.

The poor market was also coupled with the fact that the 2010 crop year was one of

t.be worst on record for alfalfa production in Southwest Idaho because of bad weather (many farmers
lost half of their alfalfa crop in 2010 due to bad weather). For example, my records show that field

19

273 produced 891 tons of alfalfa hay during the 2009, while during the year 2010, that same field
20
21

only produced 529 tons. The Plaintiff shows that field to be 128.31 acres, so for 2009 that is 6.94

22

tons per acre and for 2010, due to record bad weather that field produced 4.12 tons per acre. Once

23

again, the 2010 Idaho Agricu!tutal Statistics, shows average alfalfa yield per acre for Owyhee

24

County in 2009 to be 6.00 tons per acre. See Exhibit El (page 40 of above entitled book.) This

25

26
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above the

county ave-rag.:. Far201 l~ the standof rur-a1!aitsclf should be simi1nr lo tho past two y¢U$ and.still
c~pablc of prodll(;ing ut least aver.age or bettt:r yields.

21.

As oftoduy's date. 1am still owi:d by l..ailco Funk su~ar beet revenue from Flcld 27 4,

for my own Sugat Beet crop grown. at the Rnnch in 2010. These are funds that r previously referred
to in parag,mph5 :39 and 40 in my previous affidavit. r have still not received MY 11otiCl.l or any
j1.1st!lic:atfot1 .Crom Lance 1<'unk or the PlaintHl" as to why they are 'Withholding thl)sc funds from me.

22.

In addition to issues ri;ga:rding crop rotation and w.:iti=r ~-e~ there will be a..0:1.irnber

of otfo.:rprcblcms and i~,:;, inch.tding daraagc claims bcc::ausc of di ~putt::: wilh r~cctto a.Uocation
of willi:r. tl1at may arise if the: '?lainlHT is allowed to farm pi;,11,ion!l of tl1~ Crysml Springs farm.

Th~se ru:lditioMl claims w.:iuld include how Phrlntlff is to pe.y rent and th, fair market value of tho

same which would reqt.dTe adclitioilal expert tttSt:imony.

.,_.,,.

1do not agree to Just kt someone else form hmd that 1 intend to farm for a number

ury~,rs in the future unless the farmfo g ii,; .:ontrol.L::d aud monitored by me. For $:'(ample. tho choice

This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, v1Sit http://www.gfi.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __Jl. dayofMarch, 2011, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoi.-,g document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

3
4
5

6

Steven F. Schossberger
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy/(208) 954-5260

7
8

9

~

By Atto~y for Defendants

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23
24

25
26
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M. KARL SHURTLIFF
Attorney at Law

816 West

200

Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
Telephone (208) 343-2900
;Facsimile (208) 343-3282
1

I

IWELDON s. "'00D
!Attorney at law

Idaho State Bar Number IO 15
17 Al verno Court
.Redwood
Citv,
I
• California 94061
Telephone: (650) 743-1079

lax: (650) 298-8097
I

'IAttomevs for Plaintiffs
'

.

'

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDI IAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN A\·o FOR THE CO

TY OF OWYHEE

I

I1JA:\1ES AND BARBARA HILLIARD,
I
Plaintiffs,

f

s.

MURPHY LAND COMPANY.- LLC,
'

I
I

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 13 03004

MOTION T AMEND REPLY TO
COUNTER AIM

)

)

The Plaintiffs move the Court to allow the amendment of eir Reply to Counterclaim
;tiled herein. A proposed Amended Reply is attached hereto.

!

DATED this

i

!
MOTION TO AMEND REPLY TO COUNTERCLAM - 1

I

i

Steven F. Schossberger

HAWLEY TROXELL El\1NIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701

M. KARL SHURTLIFF

:

i

MOTION TO AMEND REPLY TO COUNTERCLAM - 2

Bannock,
1
Idaho 83701-1652
ljelepbone (208) 343-2900
f:ax (208) 343-3282
1~ttomey for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THIRD JUDICI L DISTRICT

i
II

OF THE STATE OF JDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CO

TY OF OWYHEE

i

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

II

)
Case No. CV 3 03004

)

)
)
)

Plaintiff,

I
!
I
vs.

AMENDED
COUNTERC

)

I

MURPHY LAND COMP ANY, LLC,
Idaho Limited Liability Company,

An

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

The Plaintiffs reply to the Counterclaim:

I.
I

i

The allegations of paragraphs 1,2,3,4, first sentence of 5, fir t clause of 6, 11, 12, 13, 14

11 and 18 of the Counterclaim
I

!

are admitted.
i
I

rr

I
I

j

The allegations of paragraphs second and third sentence of , second clause of 6, 7, 8, 9,

I
I

10, 15, 17 and 19 of the Counterclaim are

I

.

denied.
I

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
I
I

Ajl\tfENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCL.AJM - 1

or allegation
are applicable, to
c/aims for relief. In addition, Plaintiffs,

Defendant's

asserting the following dffenses, do not admit that the

I

bfden of proving allegations or denials contained in the defenses i upon them, but to the
c~ntrary, assert that by reason of denial and/or by reason of relevan statutory and judicial
i
aµthority, the burnden of proving the facts relevant to many of the efenses and1or burden or

p~oving the inverse of the allegations contained in many of the defi ses is upon Defendant.
I

Moreover, Plaintiffs do not admit, in asserting in any defense, any

sponsibility or liability but,

I

I

t~ the contrary, specifically deny any and all allegations of responsi ility and liability alleging in
I
I

tfue complaint.

i
i

A.

Estoppel Defendants are barred from maintaining t is action against the Plaintiff

i

based upon the doctrine of estoppel; among other things:
I

I

(1) Defendant purchased the Crystal Springs Farm on December 3 , 2010 knowing that Jay P.
I

d1ark and others were occupying the farm and further knowing that Jay P. Clark had filed with
i

tJe Owyhee County Recorder a purported several year lease of said arm' Indeed, RE-11
I

'

I

Addendum No. 4 between Plaintiffs and Defendant recognized and

ade provision for the

I

a~counting ofrents to be collected from said tenant [Jay P. Clark].

I
I

B.

Waiver.

I

(D Defendant undertook abortive and unsuccessful legal efforts in
i

e District Court for the

Third District in o . .vyhee Count to remove Jay P. Clark from the C 'Stal Springs Farm after
I

I

Defendant purchased said farm on December 30, 2010. By volunte ring to undertake such
I
I
I

rJmoval efforts the Defendant vitiated the need for Plaintiffs to do o and waived any right of

i
~NDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - 2
I

I

Springs Farm made it l gally and

more

'

~fficult for Plaintiffs to obtain legal recourse to have said Jay P.

ark removed from said farm.

I

Indeed, RE-11 Addendum No. 4 suggests at most that Plaintiffs we e to have two (2) exceptions

I

ta the policy of title insurance deleted. (Albeit RE-11 Addendum n

.4 does not with specificity

I
o~ particularity set forth whether the burden of having the exceptio s removed commitment was

I

to be on Plaintiffs (sellers) or Defendant (buyer).
I
2~ One of the principals of Defendant ( Lance Funke) occupied p

of the Crystal Springs Farm

J
I

2011 (and prior years) and farmed said part, thus causing some o the damages Defendant

I

claims in the Counterclaim herein. Principles of equity and fair de ing ought preclude

I

Defendant or some of them from profiting by use of the Crystal Sp ngs Farm in 2011 and also

I

pfofiting by charging a loss of use of said farm to Plaintiffs.
3l Defendant has filed in the United States District Court for the D strict of Idaho (Bankruptcy) a

I

claim for damages against Jay P. Clark in a sum greater than four

·mon dollars. Said claim is

I

iri the Chapter 12 proceeding of said Jay P. Clark (Case >Io.

12-006 9-JDP). Said claim

!

ehcapsulates the same dollars that Defendant asserts (paragraph 17 f Counterclaim) are O\Ving to
'
I

it by Plaintiffs.

(To be sure it is suggested in the Bankruptcy proce ding claim filed against Jay

J. Clark by Defendant that Plaintiffs here indemnified Defendant a ainst any damages they assert
I

akainst Jay P. Clark by virtue of RE-I I Addendum no.4. Plaintiffs o not agree that RE-11
I

I

4ctdendum no. 4 is in any wise an indemnification agreement for th benefit of Defendant). By
pksuing those dollars against Jay P. Clark the Defendant has waiv

and/or abandoned any

II
ctaim they might otherwise have against Plaintiffs. (Again, to bes e Plaintiffs do not concede

I

any such right of claim of Defendant against them.)
!
A!MENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - 3

I

f'"\U~ ._,_,, v '

I
C.

The Plaintiffs allege as additional affirmative defents:
1. Ambiguity of Addendum 4
2. Addendum 4 is a new agreement requiring new c nsideration and there was
none.
3. Mutual Mistake
4. Failure to mitigate damages
5. Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
6. Murphy's claimed damages are excessive

D.

Reservation of Rights. Plaintiff reserves the right t raise additional affirmative

&tenses based upon information obtained during the discovery pro ess.
i

REQUEST FOR COSTS AND ATTORNE
The Plaintiffs' request that they be awarded costs and atto
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment accordingly.

DATED this ___ day of _ _ _ _ _ _, 2013.

M. KARL SHURTL

AlMENDED REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM - 4
!

FEES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on _ _ day

- - - - - - - · 20

, I served a true and

correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by metho indicated below, upon:

Steven F. Schossberger
Matthew Gordon
Hawley Troxell Ennis § Hawley LLP
P.0.1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

[ ] Fa simile
[ ] U.. Mail
[ ] H d delivery

M. KARL SHCRTLI
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FILED

~ . M . _ _.P.M.

OEC 19 2013

fN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)
)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T
MOTION TO EXCLUDE
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS
TESTIMONY AND GRANTING IN
PART
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE AND
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT
TESTIMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY
CLARK, ROBERT BENNETT AND
JAMES HILLIARD

On November t 5, 2013, Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC
("Murphy Land") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 56{c). On November 29, 2013, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara
Hilliard (the "Hilliards") filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T MOTION TO EXCLUDE
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT TESTiMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT
BENNETT AND JAMES HILLIARD- I
45522.0004.6275916. !

the

Ken

F. Bennett and James

C. Hilliard. On December 5, 2013, Murphy Land filed its Motion to Strike and Exclude the
Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark, and filed its Objections to
Evidence and Motion to Strike and Disregard the Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmunds, Jay
Clark, Robert F. Bennett and James C. Hilliard. On December 5, 2013, Murphy Land filed its
Notice of Hearing on the Motions to Exclude and to Strike Plaintiffs Affidavits. Plaintiffs did
not file a written objection to hearing Murphy Land's Motion to Exclude and to Strike PlaintifTs
Affidavits at the hearing scheduled at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment on
December 13, 2013, nor did Plaintiffs file a written objection to Murphy Land's Motions to
Exclude and Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavits.
On February 13, 2013 Karl Shurtliff, counsel for the Hilliards, and Steven F.
Schossberger and Matthew Gordon, counsel for Murphy Land, were present at the hearing. Mr.
Shurtliff objected to proceeding on the Motion to Exclude and Strike, arguing that the motion
was not filed 14 days in advance of the hearing as required by I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3). For the reasons
articulated on the Record, the Court read I.R.C.P. 56(c) together with LR.C.P. 7(b)(3) and
determined that it could go forward with the hearing, as the motion to exclude was filed pursuant
to the I.R.C.P. 56(c) requirements and therefore, the requirements of I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) need not be
complied with, otherwise, the time limits of I.R.C.P. 56(c) would be meaningless. Thereafter,
the Court proceeded with the hearing, although over Mr. Shurtliff s objection.
Pursuant to Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho l, 8-9, 205 P.3d 650, 654-55
(2009), ciling Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 844 P.2d 24 (Ct.App. 1992), prior to ruling on the
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMAN'T MOTION TO EXCLUDE
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY AND
GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S MOTION TO STRIKE AND
DISREGARD THE AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY OF KEN EDMUNDS, JAY CLARK, ROBERT
BENNETT AND JAMES HILLIARD- 2
45522.0004.6275916. I

entertained and ruled upon Murphy Land's objections

Motion for
to the

of

affidavit testimony

Ken Edmunds,

Clark, Robert F. Bennett

and James C. Hilliard. On December 13, 2013, the Court orally entered its rulings on Murphy
Land's Motions to Exclude and to Strike Certain Testimony from the affidavits offered by the

f lilliards in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court's rulings on Murphy
Land's Objections to the Hilliards' evidence stated on the Record on December 13, 2013, are
incorporated by reference herein.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Murphy Land's Motion to Strike
and Exclude the Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark is granted,
and Murphy Land's Motion to Strike and Disregard the Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmunds,
Jay Clark, Robert F. Bennett and James C. Hilliard is granted in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DA TED THIS _ft:day of December, 2013.

oily J. u e y 6
District Judge
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MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' EXPERT WITNESS
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with I.he Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law announced orally at the hearing on
December 13, 2013, which are incorporated herein by reference, the Court rules as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that summary judgment is
granted in favor of Murphy Land as against the Hilliards on all claims and counterclaims, that

Murphy Land is awarded the three million dollars ($3,000,000) that was deposited into escrow
with Guaranty Title, Inc. on December 30, 2010 in connection with the sale of Crystal Springs
Farm, and that the Hilliards' Complaint against Murphy Land be dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED THIS -l3:=day of December, 2013.

District Judge

ORDER ON DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAlMANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. )
)

vs.

)
)

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT/COUNTERCLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

DefendanUCounterclaimant.

)
)

DefendanUCounterclaimant Murphy Land Company. LLC's ("Murphy Land") Motion
for Summary Judgment came on for hearing before this Court on December 13, 2013. Steven F.
Schossberger and Matthew Gordon of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP appeared and
argued for Murphy Land. M. Karl Shurtliff appeared and argued for Plaintiffs/CounterDefendants James and Barbara Hilliard ("Billiards"). Having considered the filings and
arguments of the parties, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and in accordance
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)
vs.
)
)
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an [daho)
limited liability company,
)
)
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004
ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF
FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW TO
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC

Upon consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC, and the Court being fully advised in
the premises, and in accordance with the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law
announced orally at hearing on December 13, 2013:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Guaranty Title, Inc. is authorized and directed to
immediately release and disburse to Murphy Land Company, LLC the three million dollars

ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW TO
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC - I
45522.0004.6275596

deposited

Inc. on

sale of Crystal Springs farm.
SO ORDERED THIS l1_day of December, 2013.

District Ju ge

ORDER DIRECTING RELEASE OF FUNDS HELD IN ESCROW TO
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC -2
45522 0004 62755961
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

JUDGMENT

)
)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company.
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

Pursuant to LR.C.P. 58(a),
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is entered in
favor of Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") as against
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants James and Barbara Hilliard ("Hilliards") on all claims and
counterclaims as follows:
I. Murphy Land is awarded the three million dollars ($3,000,000) deposited into
escrow at Guaranty Title, Inc. on December 30, 2010 in connection with the sale
of Crystal Springs Farm; and

JUDGMENT-I
45522.0004.6275959 l

claims are

2.

m

THIS ~day of December, 2013.

u~

~

MollyJ~;i
District Judge

JUDGMENT- 2
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Attorney at law
Idaho State Bar Number 1015
l 7 Alverno Court
Redwood City, California 94061
Telephone: (650) 743-1079
Fax: (650) 298-8097

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES AND BARBARA HILLIARD,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 13 03004
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT

I.
THE MOTION
Pursuant to Rule 59(e), the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants (Plaintiffs) have moved the
Court to alter or amend (1) the Judgment entered December 19, 2013 herein; (2) the Order
granting Defendant/Counterclaimant's (Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment ~ntered
December 19, 2013; (3) the Order directing release of funds held in Escrow to Murphy Land
Company, LLC entered December 19, 2013 and (4) the Order granting
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 1

Defendant/Counterclaimant' s Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs/Counterdefendant' s expert witness
to

and

December 19, 2013.
II.

THE PREDICATE FOR THE MOTION
With respect the Plaintiffs have moved for relief pursuant to Rule 59(e) in an effort to
suggest to the Court errors that the CoUi-t committed in granting the orders and judgment
referenced above. The purpose of a Rule 59(e) motion as set out in First Security Bank v.
Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 570 P. 2d 276 (1977) and Lowe v. Lynn, 103 Idaho 259, 646 P. 2d 1030
(Ct. App. 1982) is to correct errors of fact or law that occurred and thus avoid the need for appeal
as to those issues. Simply put, the Plaintiffs urge that the Court committed significant error in
reaching conclusions, findings of fact and entering the orders which it has filed herein. Those
errors result in a significant award of monetary damages ($3,000,000.00) to Defendant and
importantly deprived the Plaintiffs of the opportunity to have the facts and apposite law of this
case explicated in a trial on the merits.
While the Court entered four (4) separate orders and/or judgments; all of which are
sought by this motion to be altered or amended, the primary order is the one granting the motion
for summary judgment to Defendant. The others are preliminary to or a result of the motion. The
motion granting summary judgment to Defendant should be altered or amended by being
withdrawn or reversed and the other orders similarly held for naught.
III.

WHAT HAPPENED

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 2

in this case was set for December 2013. On November 4,201
reset

the Court in a
Defendant,

13

to

filed motion for summary judgment.*
On November 15, 2013 the Defendant filed it's motion for summary judgment together
\Vith the affidavit of Frank Tiegs setting forth his calculation of "damages" incurred by
Defendant in the delay of possession of the property which Defendant had purchased from
Plaintiffs on December 30, 2010. Defendant's motion was not timely under Rules 56(c) and
6(e)( 1); Plaintiffs nonetheless responded to the motion in a timely fashion and made no objection
to the failure of the motion to strictly adhere to the time constraints set out by Rules 56(c) and
6(e)(l). Thereafter, on December 5, 2013 (Thursday),Defendant moved to strike and disregard
the affidavit testimony of all four (4) of Plaintiff's affiants (Motion to Exclude/Strike) served by
mail (See Rule 6(e)(l)). In addition to the motion to exclude/strike, the Defendant filed a reply
memorandum to Plaintiffs' response memorandum and also filed an affidavit from its attorneys
consisting of written affidavit testimony proffered in a prior case by one (1) of Plaintiff's affiants
(Jay P. Clark). Rule 56(c) does not provide for reply affidavits.
The motion to exclude/strike was accompanied by a notice of hearing; setting the hearing
on the motion to exclude/strike for the same time as the previously scheduled motion for
summary judgment hearing (December 13, 2013). There was no motion to shorten time filed by
Defendant.
The motion to exclude/strike simply did not comply with the time requirements of Rule

*Of significance is the fact that other than rescheduling the trial date and setting the date for hearing, the motion (to
be filed) for summary judgment, the court did not alter or amend the previously set forth scheduling order which
effectively precluded further pre summary judgment discovery.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 3

is no dispute as to that fact
3

were

on
untimeliness under the Rules a..11d the resulting unfairness/prejudice to Plaintiffs.* Overriding
the Plaintiffs' objection to taking up the motion to exclude/strike the Court examined the
affidavits of Plaintiffs and largely granted the motion to exclude/strike - the effect of which was
to eviscerate the Plaintiffs' affidavits and with them the Plaintiffs testimonial arguments against
Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
Thereafter on the 19th of December 2013, orders and a judgment flowing from the
December 13, 2013 hearing were filed. This motion follows.
IV.

RULE 7(b)(3)(A)
The failure to comply with the time constraints imposed by Rule 7(b)(3)(A) critically and
fundamentally changed the course of litigation and deprived the Plaintiffs of their right to a
determination of the issues of this case based on a thoughtful, thorough and fair exposition of the
real issues of the case. Clearly, the record of the facts underlying this case are less than fully
explicated. The Defendant is likely to argue "no harm- no foul" notwithstanding its failure to
comply with the time constraints of the Rule. If the patent violation of the Rule is not prejudice
per se then Plaintiffs would urge that the violation of the time requirements deprived them of the
opportunity to move the court to allow changes in their affidavits or even additional affidavits to
meet the criticisms set out in the motion to strike/exclude. The motion to redo, modify or expand
upon the affidavits by Plaintiffs would have been made and if allowed would just as surely have

* Counsel for Defendant orally moved to shorten time; that oral motion was not dealt with.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 4

in the change/alteration of Plaintiffs affiants to the extent they would not have been
lack of opportunity is prejudice

court or
as

7(b)(3)(A) is in fact and as well prejudice per se - there being no bona fide reason for non
compliance with such a fundamental Rule of due procedural process.
Rule 7(b)(3)(A) says in no uncertain words that a "written motion" and notice of the
hearing on that motion shall be filed with the Court and served so that it is received no later then
fourteen (14) days before the time specified for the hearing.
Here the motion and notice of the hearing on that motion were filed on December 5,
2013(and served by mail); many days fewer than fourteen (14) days before the hearing. There is
no question as to that fact. See Parkside Schools, Inc. v. Bronco Elite Arts§ Athletes, LLC, 145
Idaho 176 (2008), 177 P.3d at 178 wherein the Supreme Court is discussing Rule 7(b )(3) set out
"It is clear that Parkside failed to comply with applicable provisions of LR.C.P. 7(b)(3) and the
District Court ignored those provisions, abusing the discretion." (emphasis added).
Defendant misled the Court by arguing the proposition that there exists a tension
between Rule 56 and Rule 7 (b)(3)(A) and that adherence to the time requirements of Rule 7
(b)(3)(A) would interfere with the appropriate processing of a motion pursuant to Rule 56. No
such tension exists and the suggestion otherwise caused the Court to error.
A motion to exclude/strike is a motion separate from and independent of a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment. Motions to exclude/strike are not incidents of a Rule 56 motion
and are neither a necessary nor essential part of a Rule 56 motion. Motions to exclude/strike can
be heard in the context of a Rule 56 motion or otherwise. However, a motion to exclude/strike is
not part of a Rule 56 motion. Also, a Rule 56 motion does not include a motion to exclude/strike.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 5

are separate. Arguments that they are bound together and that the failure to consider an
at

a

motion hearing is
to

exclude/strike was caused by the faiiure of Defendant to comply with the rules and caused as
well by Defendant's desire to proceed to a hearing at which Plaintiffs were significantly
disadvantaged by the failure, deliberate or otherwise, of Defendant to comply with a
straightforward, uncomplicated and clear Rule of procedure.
Nothing in the Rules and nothing in the procedural history of this case suggests that the
motion to exclude/strike could not have been properly filed and noticed for hearing without
interference with the motion for summary judgment. Thus, if the motion to exclude/strike were
thought by Defendant's counsel to be critical to a determination of its motion for summary
judgment all that was necessary was to simply vacate and reset the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment and properly set the motion to exclude/strike.
There was no reason that the motion for summary judgment had to be heard on the

13th

of

December, 2013. The argument that the motion to strike/exclude had to be heard on that date as
an absolutely necessary precursor to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment is only that
- argument. There is no basis in law or in fact for the argument. Time as to either motion was not
of the essence. There was clearly time within the existing trial time schedule for the orderly
processing of all motions. Indeed, even if not so, the time schedule should not affect fundamental
fairness to either party. Due process requires fundamental fairness of process.*
The Court erred in accepting the Defendant's argument that adherence to the time

* Indeed, in extraordinary circumstances, a motion to shorten time well might have been in order. However, this was
not a case of extraordinary circumstances. There was no emergent need here to proceed on December I3, 2013 with
either motion, let alone both of them.
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of Rule 7 (b)(3)(A) would interfere with the expedient examination of the Rule 56
the

on

to exclude/strike to come

to
13

to

the

Plaintiffs fundamental fairness in this case and to require Defendant to follow the rules. Rules
designed and intended to promote fairness and to avoid prejudice to one or the other of the
parties.
The clear purpose of Rule 7 (b)(3)(A) is to allow a party the opportunity for and the time
to prepare an orderly, proper and thoughtful response to the proposition put forward by the
proponent of a motion. The fourteen ( 14) day requirement of the rule is to allow the opposing
party that opportunity. Here, the Plaintiffs were deprived of the opportunity afforded them by
Rule 7 (b)(3)(A) to deal with the issues raised by the motion to exclude/strike.
To be sure, Defendant will no doubt argue that a few days notice of the hearing rather
than fourteen (14) days as required by Rule 7(b)(3)(A) on the motion to exclude/strike was all
that Plaintiffs needed to avoid prejudice to them in avoiding or countering the motion to
exclude/strike. Au Contraire. If a few days notice is sufficient or the equivalent of the fourteen
(14) day rule expressed in 7(b)(3)(A) it would have been a simple matter for the rule writers to
say so. They did not. In addition; it is abundantly clear that fourteen (14) days would have
allowed Plaintiffs the opportunity to examine the motion to exclude/strike; examine as well the
bona fides of the motion and to take corrective action to avoid or meet the arguments advanced
by the motion. Thus, with adequate time to prepare, to re-examine the proffered affidavits the
Plaintiffs likely could have determined the need to seek to address the issues raised by the motion
by a motion of their own seeking to remedy the deficiencies in their affidavits raised by the
motion to strike/exclude.
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That opportunity to redress, correct or avoid was denied Plaintiffs by the untimeliness of
had

a few

was

motion
to

motion, study the affidavits and seek such action (for example, a motion to supplement response
affidavits) as would avoid the case being determined on a whole lot less than a complete record.
That lack of opportunity, of time is what Rule 7(b)(3)(A) seeks to avoid. That the Rule
was ignored caused prejudice and undue lack of equal legal positioning to Plaintiffs - it caused as
well an unfair advantage to Defendant. An advantage that would not have been obtained had
Defendant followed the Rule. It would seem to this writer that if prejudice to the Plaintiffs could
not be found facially on Rule 7(b)(3)(A) (See Parkside, supra) and the failure to comply with it
by the Defendant that prejudice in the lack of opportunity to meet the motion by the lack of time
and the unfair advantage to Defendant in not having to contest the issues with Plaintiffs well and
properly prepared and noticed is as patent as are the words of the Rule.

V.
DAMAGES
The affidavit of Frank Tiegs indicated damages well in excess of three million dollars for
the failure of Defendant to have possession of the farm in 2011 and part of 2012. *
Of course it is noted that there was no opportunity to examine the testimony of Mr. Tiegs. His
affidavit and its conclusions were accepted in whole by the Court without Plaintiff being
afforded any opportunity to cross-examine or to examine those numbers and conclusions. Indeed,

* The seeming inconsistency between paragraphs 21 & 22 of Mr. Tiegs' affidavit was not examined. In paragraph 21
he asserts a loss of$3,790,548.50; in paragraph 22 he asserts a loss of$4,333,726.30. The Courts failure to
determine which paragraphs of damage Mr. Tiegs meant to be determined is likely explained by the Defendant's
requesting "only" $3,000,000.00 in damages; a number less then either figure set out in paragraphs 21 or 22. Of
course, a purist might suggest that before damages of$3,000,000.00 are awarded on a Sumn.1.ary Judgment motion
that it might be well to in fact determine what are the damages are in fact. A fact not found by the Court.
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was
to
one iota of supporting data or materials.*
The Court accepted Mr. Tiegs damage numbers of either $3,790,548.80 (paragraph 21) or
$4,333,726.30 (paragraph 22) and asked counsel how much of that the Defendant wanted on the
grant of summary judgment. The Defendant asked for three million dollars and that is what the
Court awarded. All without a hearing, a trial or the opportunity even for argument otherwise. It
was a number thrown out and a number caught Supra.
Leaving aside the issue of how Mr. Tiegs calculated the numbers and the palpably absurd
notion that Defendant would have realized a net profit of over 39% of the purchase price in its
first year of operation of a not historically well managed or well maintained farm the decision to
award that sum requires some reflection.
Three million dollars were placed in an escrow account. That is clear. The purpose of the
three million dollars is contested by the parties; however, the Court found and concluded that the
purpose was solely to pay Defendant damages for delay in possession. The Plaintiffs urge that
finding and conclusion to be in error, as was the order directing the payment of those dollars to
Defendant.

(A)
Firstly, the Plaintiff would suggest that the order directing the release by Guaranty Title
of the funds held in escrow is ultra fines mandati. Guaranty Title is not a party to this case.

* The first questions that Mr. Tiegs might well have been asked were "How many farms do you know of that had a
return on investment of over thirty-nine (39) percent the frrst year they were owned, notwithstanding the condition of
the fann at the time of purchase? Where are they?
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non

ought not be subject to an order of a Court in a case unrelated to it. In
248

1

Supreme

The district court correctly held that it had no personal jurisdiction to grant the motion.
There must be personal jurisdiction over a party before a court may enter an order against
it, whether in a civil or criminal case at 500 (emphasis added).
See also Judge Leonard Hand's
[N]o court can make a decree which will bind any one but a party; a court of equity is as
much so limited as a court of law; it cannot lawfully eajoin the world at large, no matter
how broadly it words its decree. If it assumes to do so, the decree is pro tanto brutum
fulmen, and the persons enjoined are free to ignore it. It is not vested with sovereign
powers to declare conduct unlawful; its jurisdiction is limited to those over whom it gets
personal service, and who therefore can have their day in court. Alemite Mfg. Corp. v.
Staff, 42 F.2d 832, 832-33 (2d Cir.1930).
The order should be set aside.
(B)

The Court in dealing summarily with issues raised at a summary judgment hearing failed
to consider the whole of the issues.
Thus, the Court concluded that the three million dollars escrowed were solely for the
benefit of paying the Defendant damages for loss or delay of possession of the farm.
However, in doing so the Court failed to consider the import on those three million
dollars of the second sentence of the second paragraph of Addendum No. 4: "(2) in the event any
deposited funds remain with Guaranty Title, Inc. after exhaustion of all of seller's remedies and
defenses and of all appeals thereafter with respect to the removal of the title matters disclosed in
the exceptions, the company shall have the option to interplead such funds into a judicial District
Court for the State ofldaho proceeding."
Clearly that sentence anticipates and means that the Plaintiffs (sellers) are to be provided
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the three million dollars

amount of their costs

having the exceptions removed from

judgment awarding all of the three million dollars to Defendant should have been allowed the
opportunity, per addendum 4, to explicate their costs and attorney fees and then, even if
otherwise correct, the judgment in favor of Defendant should have been reduced by the costs and
attorney fees of Plaintiff which would per the clear language of Addendum 4 have come first.
Plaintiffs were denied that opportunity by the Court's entry of judgment without considering its
full impact. Another reason why summary judgment should not have been entered.
Clearly there was a genuine issue of fact as to the entitlement to, and availability of, the
three million dollars. For those reasons alone, if not others, summary judgment should have been
denied.
VI.

JAY CLARK AFFIDAVIT
Notwithstanding, that Rule 56 (c) does not provide for reply affidavits* the Defendant
provided an affidavit of its attorneys which had appended to it affidavit material filed in an
earlier case, not involving these parties, that Defendant asserted contradicted affidavit testimony
of Jay P. Clark filed in this case.
In its oral decision respecting the motion to strike and disregard portions of the affidavit
of Jay Clark, the Court made it clear on the record that it found his affidavit filed in this case to
be contradicted by and inconsistent with the affidavit testimony he had proffered in the earlier

* The first two (2) sentences of Rule 56 (c) speak to affidavits. The third (3) sentence is inapposite to affidavits and
the fourth (4) sentence provides that the moving party may file a reply brief. There is no reference to reply affidavits.
Clearly, had the rule writers intended reply affidavits they could have said so; the other references to affidavits
demonstrate the awareness of affidavits.
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it was

case.

to

holding
weighing

lUvOU'-v

and creditability.

To the degree that the Court was finding that the proffered earlier affidavits of Jay Clark
were contradicting of and inconsistent with the affidavit filed in this case the Court erred in
ignoring the requirements of Rule 613 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence which provide that
extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the
witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded
and an opportunity to interrogate the witness therein. Here neither happened.
A basic tenant of Rule 613 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is that of fairness to the
witness and the other party. The use of prior inconsistent statements is to be part of the
truth finding process of litigation; not a ploy to snare a silenced witness and an unaccounted for
opposite party. Fundamental fairness and common sense provide the basis for Rule 613 witnesses ought be allowed the opportunity to explain their testimony in the context of
seemingly inconsistent prior statements. Here neither the witness nor the Plaintiffs were afforded
that opportunity.
In Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488, 492, 445 P.2d 663, 667 (1968) the Supreme Court
held that upon introduction of evidence which seemingly impeaches or contradicts witness's
testimony, a witness should be permitted reasonable opportunity to explain the impeaching
evidence. The Court noted that "[I]t is settled that upon introduction of evidence which
seemingly impeaches or contradicts a witness's testimony, the witness must be permitted a
reasonable opportunity to explain the impeaching evidence." Openshaw v. Adams, 92 Idaho 488,
492, 445 P.2d 663, 667 (1968).
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purpose

requiring foundation for impeachment is to avoid unfair surprise and
an

to correct

testimony or
see

Idaho Placer Min. Co. v. Green, 14 Idaho 249, 93 P. 954,955 (1908), the Idaho Supreme Court
held that where a written document is offered in evidence to impeach or contradict a witness, it is
error to refuse such witness an opportunity to explain the same.
In addition, the Court clearly evidenced at the December 13, 2013 hearing on the motion
to exclude/strike the testimony of Jay P. Clark that it was weighing the statements contained in
the affidavit filed in this case as contrasted with the testimony put forth by Jay P. Clark in the
affidavits in the earlier, unrelated case.
The trial court should not assess the credibility of affiants. Baxter v. Crane, 135 Idaho
166, 172, 16 P.3d 263 (2000).
Judging credibility is not appropriate during summary judgment proceedings where no
evidentiary hearing has been held. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 249, P.3d
857(2011).
It is not proper for the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the summary
judgment stage when credibility can be tested in court before the trier of fact. Stanley v. Lennox

Indus., Inc., 140 Idaho 785, 102 P.3d 1104 (2004). See also Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168,868
P.2d 496 (Ct. App. l 994)(when ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is not within the
trial court's province to assess the credibility of an affiant or deponent when credibility can be
tested in court before a trier of act); Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668,670,691 P.2d 1283,
1285 (Ct. App. 1984)(even when the court will serve as trier of fact, credibility determinations
"should not be made on summary judgment if credibility can be tested by testimony in court
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(Ct. App.
can be
court
The Court should not have allowed the "prior inconsistent statements" offered by
Defendant to be received absent a real opportunity (for example, a trial on the merits) for the
affiant to explain the seeming inconsistencies and it should not have engaged in weighing the
evidence provided by the various affidavits of Jay P. Clark.* Weighing of evidence at a summary
judgment proceeding is simply out of keeping with the function and purpose of a summary
judgment proceeding. To be sure, the Court also opined that even if Jay Clark would have leased
more of the farm ground to Defendant in year 2011 than he did, that fact was of no moment
because the Defendant had no obligation to lease ground from an improperly holding over tenant
in order to mitigate its damages. The determination that there was no need for Defendant to
mitigate its damages in that manner was a conclusion of law based on a scant, incomplete record.
A record that could not be completed by virtue of the grant of the summary judgment motion. Jay
Clark's affidavit filed in this case raised at least two (2) genuine issues of material facts that
should have precluded Summary Judgment.
First, Jay Clark based on historical and personal knowledge of the "farm" set forth his
view that the claimed possible profits by Mr. Tiegs were grossly exaggerated. Mr. Clark, who
had operated the farm for years, had vastly superior knowledge than did Mr. Tiegs as to what
could have been grown on the farm in 2011 & 2012and what the yields, costs and profits for
those crops would have been. A genuine issue of fact contention as to damages. The Court totally
discounted his testimony in that regard based apparently on its view that he lacked credibility

* This supposes that the earlier affidavits of Jay Clark were properly before the court by virtue of a reply affidavit of
Defendant's attorneys. A suggestion the Plaintiffs do not agree with.
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was an improperly holding over tenant. That is

because of

a

a

fact was

is error.
The second genuine issue of fact raised by Jay Clark in his affidavit in this case was as to
the issue of mitigation. He asserted that he would have leased more of the farm to Defendant in
2011. Thus, allowing mitigation of damages. The Court opined that the Defendant had no
obligation to rent ground from an improperly holding over tenant in order to mitigate damages.
Jay Clark set forth a genuine issue of fact and the Court improperly and without a record
concluded as a matter of law that in these circumstances there was no need to mitigate. That is
not in keeping with a Summary Judgment.
VII.
KEN EDMUND'S AFFIDAVIT
The Court granted Defendant's motion to exclude the affidavit of Plaintiffs' expert Ken
Edmunds. Also, the Court granted the motion to strike and disregard the affidavit testimony of
Ken Edmunds.
Basic to the Court's granting of the motion in regard to Ken Edmund's affidavit was its
apparent conclusion that he was not an expert and that he was not entitled to rely on underlying
data from other sources to reach his conclusions. The Court suggested a "lack of foundation" to
support
several of the conclusions reached by Mr. Edmunds and suggested as well that some of his
conclusions were based on hearsay and thus not admissible.

Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 934 P.2d 20 (1997) suggests that what the court did here
was in error. Thus, the Court here clearly looked at "foundational issues" and used the term

MEMORANDUM 1N SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT- 15

considered and opinions held by Mr. Edmunds.
not
sure,

must

However, the testing of admissibility ought be based on thoughtful analysis of the proffered
testimony; not a summary, cursory, unquestioned view of the proffered testimony in a vacuum of
evidence.
Ken Edmunds' affidavit indicates at page 1 that he was retained as an "expert" by
Plaintiffs. The only basis for concluding otherwise was the argument of counsel for Defendant
and the Court's weighing of the evidence presented in the remainder of Mr. Edmunds' affidavit.

If Mr. Edmunds's expertise was to be questioned, it should have been done in a trial with the
opportunity for laying the foundation for his expertise afforded. That was not done here. Mr.
Edmunds was determined not to be much of an expert based solely on a reading of his affidavit.*
The striking of portions of Mr. Edmunds' affidavit was based on "lack of foundation"
shown in the affidavit. A determination at odds with Hines and contrary to the teaching of Rules
703 and 705 of the Idaho Rules of evidence.
Here the Court apparently determined that Mr. Edmunds was not an expert and thus
Rules 703 and 705 of the Rules of Evidence were not applicable. Had the Court considered Mr.
Edmunds an expert for purposes of reviewing his affidavit, then Rules 703 and 705 would have
been apposite and the stricken materials from his affidavit received based on those rules. By
disregarding Mr. Edmunds as an expert, the Court did not permit him the normal respect of
permitting opinions or inferences by experts without providing the underlying fact or data (Rule

* Indeed, the Defendant was aware of Mr. Edmunds by virtue of Plaintiffs disclosure and his earlier involvement in
other related cases. ff Defendant wished to question his "expertise" the opportunity for deposition/discovery was
well in hand.
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Indeed,

would suggest that if the Court had concerns in that regard that the
a manner

summarily
were to

than weighing the evidence presented by him in the affidavit, which the Court did here, the
opportunity for further foundation as to his challenged expertise should have been provided. A
hearing on a motion for summary judgment is not to be used as a vehicle to inhibit a party from
having its day in court before a trier of fact. If the Court had questions about Mr. Edmunds'
expertise it should have asked those questions - it should not have summarily concluded that he
lacked expertise by looking solely at what he said, or more importantly, did not say in that
affidavit.
But for the fact that the Court gave no credence to the issues raised by Mr. Edwards, the
fact remains that his affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded a
grant of Summary Judgment.

VIII.
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT R. BENNETT
The court determined that several of the statements in the affidavit of Robert F. Bennett
were hearsay and/or lacked foundation and thus would not be admissible. That determination
without granting Plaintiff the opportunity to lay a foundation.
Frankly, the lack of foundation argument seems misplaced. Thus, paragraphs 4, 6, 8 and
11 have as much foundation as do any of the other paragraphs of the affidavit. For example, the
statement (2 )" I am duly licensed as a real tor by the state of Idaho, employed by LeMoyne Realty
and Appraisals, Inc., and I maintain office in Mountain Horne, Idaho" is grounded on no more
"foundation" then, is the statement in paragraph (4) " I learned that Lance Fu11k had been a tena.11t
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on that farm during the 2010 growing season and so I approached Mr. Funk to see whether he
purchasing the farm." Obviously, paragraph 4 could have included,
BEEN
MATTER, THE DATE OF THE CONTACT, THE MEANS OF THE CONTACT AND
WHETHER SOMEONE ELSE WAS PRESENT. THE REST OF THE "FOUNDATION" IS
THERE.
As to paragraph (11) "Just before Christmas, I told Buyer's representative, Tim Tippet,
with whom I had extensive dealings in negotiating the sale/purchase of the farm, that if Buyer
would not accept Jay P. Clark's lease the Hilliards would just have to send the earnest money
back. Mr. Tippet replied "Oh no, we can't do that," because of Buyer's desire to complete the
sale before year end, 2010 in order to take advantage of the 1031 Tax Deferred Exchange."
stricken for "lack of foundation". The Plaintiff would simply suggest that the only foundation
lacking is the means of the communication (telephone, in person, email or whatever and who
else, if anybody, was privy to the conversation). Surely, the opportunity to supply that bit of
information in an effort to get to fact finding would not be inordinate.
The paragraph is important because it demonstrates the incorrectness of the Court's
observation that consideration for Addendum 4 was the going forward with the original purchase
agreement and the earlier down payment. (See Response Brief of Plaintiffs). The statement is not
offered for the truth of the statement that there was an ongoing I 031 exchange in the offing but
rather the state of mind of Defendant in making the statement. Indeed, as Rule 801 (d)(2) would
indicate, the statements of Mr. Tippet as described by Robert Bennett are admissions of a party
opponent in a representative capacity and are thus not hearsay.
The statement set out in paragraph 13 of Mr. Bennett's affidavit ascribed to Sheryl
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of Guaranty

Inc. stricken by the Court as hearsay would similarly not be hearsay

as it was a statement of a representative of the party opponent. Ms. Reyment was representing
transaction

1s no reason

not

representative status for each. *Indeed, Rule 801 based on the likelihood of truth in the statements
a party opponent (representative) would seem to apply to Ms. Reyment's statement.

IX.
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES C. HILLIARD
(A)

The Court did not strike paragraph 17 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit but stated the statement
was "unclear" as a concept of what Addendum 4 was. With respect, the statement in the
paragraph is clear. Mr. Hilliard states that he was aware that he (they) could provide clear title by
paying the Clarks $2,950,000.00. While the Defendant argues that was not the purpose of
Addendum 4, nobody can argue with what Mr. Hilliard thought it was. That he may have been
wrong in that conclusion does not vitiate his reasoning or make it unclear.
Indeed, there is nothing in this record that would indicate that he was wrong in his
conclusion. In mid December 2010 before the sale to Defendant, sellers became aware that if
they paid the Clarks $2,950,000.00 they could convey clear title to Defendant. That fact is simply
not in dispute and is not unclear. The Court is weighing evidence in reaching the conclusion as to
paragraph 17.
(B)

The second sentence of paragraph 18 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit is stricken as hearsay.

* As above, had sufficient time been allowed Plaintiffs to meet the motion to strike/exclude an affidavit from Ms.
Reyment herself might well have been obtained that would have avoided the ascription of hearsay to the statement
found by the court to be hearsay in Mr. Roberts' affidavit.
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statement from Mr. Bennett the Mr. Tippet replied that Buyer could not do that [accept
desire to close ... agreement before

earnest

end

1

offered for the truth of the statement as to the 1031 exchange but rather as to the state of the mind
as to the issue of going forward with the sale and whether there was any "new consideration"
given the Hilliards (paragraph 23). Thus, not hearsay. As to consideration, please see Plaintiffs'
Response Brief.

(C)
A portion of Mr. Hilliard's paragraph 20 is stricken(" ... we believed our sole obligations
to Buyers were to provide clear, unencumbered title to Crystal Springs Farm ... ") because the
court determined it not to be relevant to the intent of Addendum 4.
While the Court would be entitled to its view of what Addendum 4 said or did not say
after a trial on the merits, so would be Mr. Hilliard. That Mr. Hilliard's view and the Court's
view did not agree does not make Mr. Hilliard's view irrelevant - it would make it wrong in the
Court's view.
This is rather simply weighing evidence - a function not in keeping with a motion for
summary judgment.
(D)

While the Court did not strike paragraph 22 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit, it indicated that it
was not relevant unless there was ambiguity in Addendum 4.
Simply put, the Court determined there was no ambiguity in Addendum 4. It could only
reach that conclusion by weighing the evidence. Again; the issue on summary judgment is not
weigbing evidence. If evidence needs be weighed it needs be weighed by a trier of fact. The
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summary judgment is not a trier of

no new
consideration for the obligation to deposit $3,000,000.00 of the $9,500.000.00 purchase
price ... ") was stricken as a "legal conclusion". Again, the Court determined that going forward
with the "deal" and the earlier down payment was consideration for Addendum 4. That was the
Court's view in granting the motion for summary judgment. It was not and is not the view of Mr.
Hilliard. He was stating as a fact that he and his wife received no new consideration for the
obligation to deposit $3,000,000.00 of the purchase price in escrow. That is a simple fact - not a
legal conclusion. The Court concluded as a matter of fact and law, albeit without hearing
evidence, that no new consideration was necessary to support Addendum 4. After a trial and after
full exposition of the issues that might well still be the same conclusion of the Court. However,
that does not change the fact as stated by Mr. Hilliard, that they received "no new consideration".
Indeed, it would appear that the Court was weighing the evidence of consideration and
concluded that weighing by finding adequate consideration in the going forward with the deal
and the earlier payment of a down payment. Again, all without a hearing as to those issues of fact
or law.
The Plaintiffs simply suggest that such weighing of evidence has no place in a motion for
summary judgment.
The question is not whether Mr. Hilliard was right in his conclusion as to a lack of new
consideration for Addendum 4 but rather whether he raised an issue of genuine fact that needed a
mindful, thoughtful and thorough undertaking of the issues by a trier of fact to determine. He did.
Rather than. looking at the statement as raising a fact at issue the Court weighed that statement
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it wanting

fact and in law. A decision, once again, not in the province of the Court

Similarly the Court determined paragraph 26 of Mr. Hilliard's affidavit to be "irrelevant"
unless Addendum 4 was ambiguous; which the Court found (again without trial or presentation
of evidence) it was not.
Paragraph 26 simply recites facts. Those facts are not, nor can they be seriously disputed.
The Court ruled those facts as set out in paragraph 26 to be irrelevant. Irrelevant not facially but
because the Court concluded that there was no ambiguity in Addendum 4 and that therefore the
issue of whether providing clear title was irrelevant because the addendum, in the Court's view
was unambiguous, and only provided for the payment of damages to the buyer on account
of the failure of being able to possess the farm on the date of the purchase and that the provision
of clear title had nothing to do with Addendum 4. *
In any event, the Court's conclusion that Addendum 4 is unambiguous is a finding of fact
or a conclusion of law outside the parameters of a motion for summary judgment. It was fact
finding not a determination of whether there were facts that needed to be found.
CONCLUSION
The Court instead of measuring whether the Plaintiffs' arguments raised genuine issues of
material fact in the face of the motion for Summary judgment indulged the desire of Defendant
and determined instead the merits of the issues raised by Plaintiffs, £g lack of consideration,
mitigation of damages, measure of damages etc, and concluded that they lacked merit and

* Indeed, by granting summary judgment, the Court precluded trial of the cause of damages to Defendant. Thus,
were the damages and delay in possession caused by Plaintiffs or were the damages caused, at least in part, by the
failure of Defendant to appropriately and adequately obtain possession of the farm by moving onto the farm by legal
action (which was tried abortively) or otherwise?
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Boise, Idaho 8376V
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Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5260
Email: sschossberger@hawleytroxell.com
mgordon@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)
VS.

)

Case No. CV-13-03004
AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON
RE REQUEST TO NOTICE HEARING

)
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

Defendant/Counterclairnant.

)
)

MATTHEW GORDON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
l.

I make this affidavit and the statements herein based upon my personal

knowledge.

2.

I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant/Counterclairnant Murphy Land

Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") in the above-captioned matter.

AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON RE REQUEST TO NOTICE
HEARING- I
45522.0004.6344653. l

JJage 3

A is a true

accurate

of an

I sent to

Shurtliff and Weldon S. Wood, counsel for Plaintiffs James and Barbara Hilliard, on
January 13, 2014. I have received no response to that e-mail.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and accurate copy of the Complaint for

interpleader filed by Guaranty Title, Inc. in this Court on January 6, 2014, Case No. CV 2014-06
(without exhibits).
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Matthew Gordon

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Ada

)
) ss.
)

~

:;.:i
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 21:"'st day of January, 2014.

~-

C~_Lz:
Name: Tammy N. Miller
Notary Public
Residing at Boise, Idaho
My commission expires: 05/30/2014

AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON RE REQUEST TO NOTICE
HEARING-2
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 22nd day of January, 2014. I caused to be served a
true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON RE REQUEST TO
NOTICE HEARING by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
[Attorneys for Plaintiffs]

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

Weldon S. Wood
Attorney at Law
17 Al verno Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail

D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail

DE-mail
B'Telecopy: 208-343-3282

DE-mail:

weldon@weldonwood.com

~lecopy: 650-298-8097

Matthew Gordon
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Matthew Gordon
From:

Sent:
To:

Cc:

Subject:

Steve Schossberger
Monday, January
2014 2:15 PM
Karl
(karlshurtliff@gmail.com); weldon
Matthew Gordon
Hilliards / Murphy Land [IWOV-DMSMSG1.FID618370]

Good afternoon Karl and Weldon:
I see that your memorandum in support of motion to alter/amend the Judgment is due Wednesday, 1/15/2014.
We checked with the court today and the next available hearing date with Judge Huskey is February 14, 2014, at 10:30
a.m. in Murphy.
We will be noticing a motion for that day/time.
Please concurrently submit a Notice of Hearing on your motion for 2/14/2014 at 10:30.

Thank you, Steve

STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER

Partner
direct 208.388.4975
mobile 208-830-356 l
fax 208.954.5260
web hawleytroxell.com
email ssch ossberger@hawleytroxell.com
HAWLEY TROXELL
Attorneys and Counselors
This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It contains information that may be confidential, privileged,
attorney work product, or otherwise e,empt from disclosure under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the
employee or agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this
message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us immediately at ZOB.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message.
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ANGELA BARKELL, CLERK
TRINA AMAkVi
Deputy Clerk

340 East t North
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Idaho State Bar No. 1479
111

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
Case No. CV-~~ Q{.p

GUARANTY TITLE, INC., an Idaho
corporation,

COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,

vs.
JAMES C. HILLIARD and BARBARA G.
HILLIARD, husband and wife, and
lvfURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,
Defendants.

For cause of action against the defendants, the plaintiffcomplains and al !eges as follows:

1.

Plaintiff is now and has been during all times mentioned herein a corporation

organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Idaho, with its principal
place of business located in Mountain Home, Elmore County, Idaho.
2.

Plaintiff is authorized by the State of Idaho to do business as a title insurance

company and an escrow company.

3.

Defendants James C. Hilliard and Barbara G. Hilliard are husband and wife, and

are residents of the state of Florida, and are sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Hilliards".

ASSIGNED JlHJC:kE
THOMAS J. RYAN

EXHI~TB
t.J .(

I
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is an

1s

referred to as "Murphy Land".

5.

Hilliards owned real property located in Owyhee County, Idaho, that they sold to

Lance Funk and/or his assignees and which contract for sale was assigned to Murphy Land.
Hilliards and Murphy Land agreed that Plaintiff herein would be the escrow holder concerning
funds involved in their contract for the sale of said real estate.

6.

Billiards and Murphy Land have each transacted business in the state ofidaho as

defined in Idaho Code§ 5-514.

7.

Because of the ownership of real property in the state ofidaho, the sale of said

real property located in the state ofidaho and the placing of funds in escrow with Plaintiff in
the state of Idaho, HiJliards and Murphy Land have subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of
the courts of the state of Idaho.
8.

Venue is proper in this case because the real estate in question is located in

Owyhee County, Idaho, and because Hilliards and Lance Funk andior his assignees agreed in
the RE-11 Addendum No. 4 that is attached hereto as Exhibit E that in the event the funds
mentioned herein that were deposited with Plaintiff remain with the Plaintiff and all remedies,
defenses and appeals therefrom have been exhausted, the Plaintiff can interplead the funds into
a Judicial District Court for the State of Idaho.
9.

James C. Hilliard and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into an agreement

entitled RE-23 Commercial Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated
November 5, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit A and by this reference made
a part hereof, by which James C. Hilliard agreed to sell certain real property located in Owyhee
County, Idaho, to Lance Funk and/or Assignees.

J.. I

L.. L.. I
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11

Funk
2010; granting to

HiHiard a buy-back option on

the real property or a portion of the real property, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit
B and by this reference made a part hereof.
11.

Billiards and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into RE-11 Addendum# 2

dated December 28, 2010, extending the closing date from December 28, 2010, to December
29, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C and by this reference made a part
hereof.
12.

Hilliards and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into RE-11 Addendum# 3

dated December 29, 2010, extending the closing date from December 29, 2010, to December
30, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit D and by this reference made a part
hereof.
13.

Hilliards and Lance Funk and/or Assignees entered into RE-11 Addendum No. 4

dated December 30, 2010, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit E and by this reference
made a part hereof. Pursuant to this agreement, Hilliards deposited Three Million Dollars
($3,000,000.00) from the procee.ds due them from the sale of the property with the Plaintiff
herein as trustee, the receipt of which was acknowledged by Plaintiff. The sum of Three
Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) placed with Plaintiff by Billiards is still in the possession of
Plaintiff.
14.

A dispute has arisen between the defendants Billiards and Murphy Land, which is

evidently the assignee of Lance Funk. Each claims to be entitled to the Three Million Dollars
($3,000,000.00), or a portion thereof, which is being held in escrow by Plaintiff.
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15.

an

against Murphy
and for the

Owyhee,

No.

13-

03004 seeking the Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) being held in escrow by the Plaintiff
herein. Murphy Land filed a counterclaim alleging that it was entitled to the Three Million
DoJlars ($3,000,000.00).
16.

Judgment was entered in Case No. CV-13-03004 on December 19, 2013, in favor

of Murphy Land awarding it the Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) that is being held in
escrow by Plaintiff herein. A copy of said Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit F and by this
reference made a part hereof.
17.

In addition to the Judgment entered in Case No. CV-13-03004, the Court also

entered on December 19, 2013, Order Directing Release of Funds Held in Escrow to Murphy
Land Company, LLC, authorizing and directing Plaintiff herein to immediately release and
disburse to Murphy Land the Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00) being held by Plaintiff
herein. A copy of the Order Directing Release of Funds Held in Escrow to Murphy Land
Company, LLC, is attached hereto as Exhibit G and by this reference made a part hereof.
18.

Plaintiff herein and its attorneys have received correspondence from the attorneys

for Murphy Land requesting that Guaranty Title transfer the Three Million Dollars
($3,000,000.00) being held by it to Murphy Land.
19.

Plaintiff herein and its attorneys have also received correspondence from the

attorneys for the Hilliards demanding that it not comply with the Court's order and threatening
to seek damages from P]aintiff if it does comply with the Court's order. Hilliards insist that the
Court's order is not final and that Plaintiff should not comply with the order.

L ll.lHIU)'

escrow
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at
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been willing to

to

such person or persons as should be lawfully entitled to receive them and to whom Plaintiff

could safely and without hazard to itself pay them. Plaintiff offers to deposit said sum of
money into Court at such time and under such conditions as the Court may order and direct.
21.

Plaintiff is not in collusion with either of defendants touching the matters in

controversy in this cause. Plaintiff is not in any manner indemnified by defendants or either of
them. Plaintiff has not brought this suit in interpleader at the request of the defendants, or
either of them, but has filed of its free will to avoid being harassed and subjected to double
costs and liability and to avoid unnecessary suits.

22.

Plaintiff has employed the law firm of Hall, Friedly & Ward as its attorneys to file

this interpleader action and prosecute it to an end. The Plaintiff requests that the Court award to
it its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred herein pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-32 l,

23.

This action for interpleader is Plaintiffs only means of protecting itself from

litigation in which it has no interest.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:
(a)

Enter an order or a decree requiring defendants to interplead in this cause and to

settle their respective rights to the sum that is now in the possession of Plaintiff;
(b)

Enter an order or a decree authorizing and directing Plaintiff to pay into the Court

or the Clerk of the Court the sum of Three Million Dollars ($3,000,000.00);
( c)

Enter an order or a decree restraining defendants, and each of them, from

commencing in any court any action against Plaintiff in which defendants, or either of them, in
any manner seeks to recover the sum that is now in possession of Plaintiff, or any part of the
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sum, or to recover

sum

any

or

(d)

Enter an order or a decree forever releasing and discharging Plaintiff from all

liability to defendants in this cause on account of the matters relating to this cause;
(e)

Determine the amount ofreasonable attorney fee and costs to be paid to the

attorneys of Plaintiff for services to Plaintiff in this cause and enter an order or a decree
authorizing and directing these attorney's fees and all court costs and expenses incurred by
Plaintiff in this cause be paid out of the above-mentioned sum of Three Million Dollars
($3,000,000.00); and
(f)

Grant such other and further relief as it deems just and proper.

DATED this

ti day of ~ v 7
I

,201-1_.

HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD

By~~:~
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SS,

)
Sheryl Reyment, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that she is the secretary of the
plaintiff named in the foregoing complaint, that she has read said complaint, knows the contents
thereof, and believes the facts therein stated to be true.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
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Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5260
Email: sschoss berger@haw leytroxell .com
mgordon@hawleytroxell.com
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclairnant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)
vs.
)
)
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)

Case No. CV-13-03004
MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT

)

Defendant/Counterclairnant.

)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and
through its undersigned attorneys of record, moves this Court to issue an amended Order
directing the release to Murphy Land of the $3,000,000 deposited with the clerk of the Court by
Guaranty Title, Inc. Oral argument is requested.

MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT- I
45522.0004.6434862. l

C\<1.1. OU

MEMORANDUM

Page 3

HGUIIVO

SUPPORT

MOTION

ISSUE Al\!IENDED ORDER

Murphy Land hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Motion to
Issue an Amended Order ("Motion"). The basis for the Motion is that this Court has already
determined that Murphy Land is entitled to the $3,000,000 held in escrow by Guaranty Title,
Inc., and this Court has previously Ordered that such funds be immediately disbursed and
released to Murphy Land. By this Motion, Murphy Land merely seeks an Amended Order
directing the Clerk of the Court -- rather than Guaranty Title, Inc., the party to whom the
previous Order was directed -- to disburse and release those funds to Murphy Land.
On December 17, 2013, this Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Murphy Land
and awarded Murphy Land the $3,000,000 amount that was, at the time, in the possession of
Guaranty Title, Inc. Also on December 17, 2013, this Court issued an Order authorizing and
directing Guaranty Title, Inc. to immediately release and disburse the $3,000,000 to Murphy
Land. Guaranty Title, Inc. subsequently filed an interpleader action with this Court, and on
February 28, 2014, this Court (Honorable Judge Nye) granted its Motion to Deposit the
$3,000,000 with the Clerk of the Court. Pursuant to that ruling, the $3,000,000 will be deposited
with the Clerk of the Court. As a result, Murphy Land respectfully requests that this Court issue
an Amended Order, consistent with the Court's earlier ruling on Summary Judgment and its
earlier Order to Guaranty Title, Inc., that directs the Clerk of the Court to immediately disburse
and release the $3,000,000 to Murphy Land.

MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT-2
45522 0004.6434862. I

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

~~

By~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclairnant

MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT-3
45522.0004.6434862. I

!-'age~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 28th day of February, 2014, I caused to be served a

Lrue copy of the foregoing MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
[Attorney for Plaintiffs]

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
DE-mail
0 Telecopy: 208-343-3282

Weldon S. Wood
Attorney at Law
17 Alverno Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

D U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com
0 Telecopy: 650-298-8097

Jay R. Friedly
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
[Attorneys for Plaintif!J

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail: jay@hfwlaw.com
0 Telecopy: 208.587.3144

Matthew Gordon

MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM
SUPPORT-4

Oct 26 01

M Karl Shurtliff

p.1

I

I

MAR O6 2014

i

LEAK

I
I

Karl Shurtliff
I
Anomey at Law
• l
816 West Bannock, Suit~ 200
P.O. Box 1652
i·
Boise, Idaho 83701-165
Telephone (208) 343-29 0
Fax (208) 343-3282
,
Attorney for Plaintiffs j
•

,
:

I

IN T J DISTRICT COURT
OF TIIE STAj~E OF IDAHO, IN

JAMES & BARBARA

ILLIARD,

.vs.

I

MURPHY LAND CO!Al'J.Y, LLC,
An Idaho Limited Liabil ty Company,
Defe dant.

oJ

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRI T

ANh FOR THE COUNTY OF O
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

YHEE

Case No. CV 13 03004

RESPONSE TO MOTI01 TO ISSUE

AMENDED ORDER

)
)

I

The Plaintiffs ob ect to the motion of Defendant for an Amended Order·
I

I

1

1

h re~ith.
DATED This __.__

__._day

•

j

o!i~

2014.

I
I

I
I
RESPONSE TO

M. \KARL SHURTLIFF
Attprney for Plaintiffs

I

t.mnf

N TO ISSUE AMENDrD ORDER -1

I

I

I1
I

i
I
I1
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h

1
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M. Karl Shurtliff
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208
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RTIFICATE OF SERVICE
. I hereby certify that
•

od this
I

day of

h9il~ ,

2014,

t I served a true

·and correct copy of the toregoing docwnent by method indicated below and ad essed to each of

I

the followmg:

Steven F. Schos:r:rger
i
HA V/L~Y TROt:~L EJ\.TNIS & HA WLfY, LLP
:
877 Mam Street,~Smte 1000
Boise, Idaho 837
I
I
.
I

I

I
f

I
I

I

i
i

I

I
RESPONSE TO MOT!Or TO ISSUE AMENDEf ORDER -2

I

:

[~]

[ J Facsim le
[ ] Hand

livery

3'7/2014 1.~z·z~

~M

_Fl~Zi.M.
MAR O7 2014

&~~:_:~LL, CLERK

Steven F. Schossberger, ISB No. 5358
Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208. 954.5260
Email: sschossberger@hawleytroxell.com
mgordon@hawleytroxell.com

Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)
)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)

AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON
IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT

)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

MATTHEW GORDON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I make this affidavit and the statements herein based upon my personal

knowledge.
2.

I am one of the attorneys representing Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land

Company, LLC ("Murphy Land") in the above-captioned matter.

AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 1
45522.0004.6450337 l

3/7 20 4 1:32.30 PM

3,

'1ris

Davenport

as

1 is a true

Page 3

accurate

the

s

Transcript of Proceedings for the hearing held in this case on December 13, 2013.
4.

I was present at hearing on February 28, 2014 in the Interpleader Action filed in

this Court by Guaranty Title, Inc., Case No. CV-2014-06, when the Honorable Judge Nye orally
granted Guaranty Title, Inc.' s Motion to Deposit with the Clerk of the Court the $3,000,000 it
held in escrow.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.

Matthew Gordon

AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 2
45522.0004.6450337. l

~111io14 1:32:47 PM

Davenport

20

J"

4-5928
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

try

of March, 2014, I caused to be served a tme
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MAITHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT by the
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
[Attorney for Plaintiffs]

0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail
l".B"ielecopy: 208-343-3282

Weldon S. Wood
Attorney at Law
17 Alvemo Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
D E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com
!!3"felecopy: 650-298-8097

Jay R. Friedly
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
[Attorneys for Plaintiff]

0 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
0 Hand Delivered
0 Overnight Mail
0 E-mail: jay@hfwlaw.com
~copy: 208.587.3144

Matthew Gordon

AFFIDAVIT OF MATTHEW GORDON IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 3
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Page 5

-isty Davenport

1
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Case No.
CV-2013-3004-M

James Hilliard, et al.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Murphy Land Company, LLC,
Defendant.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Held on December 13, 2013, before
Honorable Molly J. Huskey, District Court Judge.

Reported by
Laura L. Whiting
CSR No.
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APPEARANCES
FOR PLAINTIFF HILLIARDS
M. KARL SHURTLIFF
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-2900

FOR DEFENDANT MORPHY LAND COMPANY
STEVEN F. SCHOSSBERGER
MATTHEW P. GORDON
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 344-6000
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3

5

IDAHO

1

1

affidavits. Because in order for me to rule on

2

the summary judgment decision, I have to determine

2
3
4

Friday, December 13, 2013, 1:19 p.m.

5

James and Barbara Hilliard versus Murphy Land

5

6

Company.
MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor, Kari Shurtliff

6

7
8
9

10
11
12

13
14
15
16

THE COURT: Canyon County Case 2013-3004,

representing the Hilliards.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shurtliff.
Mr. Gordon, Mr. Schossberger, here for

3

whether or not there are affidavits either in

4

support or response. So we have to go through the
affidavits in the first instance anyway.

7

don't know if you want to provide additional

8

argument. Let's see lf I have all the filings,

9

and we can break them up and do them one motion at
a time. 1'11 just let you start with whichever
one you want.

10

11

the Murphy Land Company.
MR. GORDON: Yes, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT: It may take me just a minute to

So I have read, Mr. Schossberger -- I

13

MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Thank you, Your Honor.
On the --

gather all of these papers.
Okay. Now, a couple of motions in this

14

MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor --

15

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

case as well. Assuming my list Is correct, there

16

MR. SHURTLIFF: If I may interrupt.

17

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SHURTLIFF: I apologize. But we object,

18

has been a motion for summary judgment filed by
the Defendants. There has been a motion to strike

19

portions of the affidavits filed In response to

20

that motion for summary judgment. And I

21
22

received -- It was filed yesterday; I received it
this morning -- a motion to amend the reply to the

18
19
20
21
22

23

counterclaim.
Is there any other motion pending

23
24

a motion to strike and exclude and all of that,
and that was only flied this week. There's no 14

before the Court that I have not articulated?

25

days notice.

17

24
25

4
1

2
3

4
5

Mr. Shurtliff?
MR. SHURTLIFF: None that I'm aware of, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Schossberger?
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: You mentioned the motion

a

1
2
3

Your Honor, to taking up this motion. There was
no order to shorten time. It was not timely filed
pursuant to rule -- the 14-day rule that was
referenced earlier. Seems apposite to me. It was

6
THE COURT: I don't think they were filed
this week. I think they were filed before, but

4

let me just double-check the stack of stuff here.
Do you have the filing dates handler

5

than I do, Mr. Schossberger?

6

6

to strike. There's two independent motions, one

7

7

8

motion to strike and disregard, and then the -well, to exclude expert opinion, and then the

8

MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Yeah. December 5th.
Yeah, Your Honor, procedurally, we received the
opposition by the Plaintiffs to our motion for

9

other objections to evidence and motion to strike.

9

summary judgment on Monday, December 2nd. And

10

11
12

13

But other than that clarification, no, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, rf I understand this
correctly, Mr. Shurtliff -- well, I wlll just say
this. There ls-· the motion to amend the reply

10

couple days of that, then flied a motion to strike

11

and disregard the motion to exclude, because this

12

hearing was set on the 13th.
So In a summary judgment proceeding,

13

14 has not been noticed up for a hearing, that I have
15 seen.

15

16

16

MR. SHURTLIFF: It was not.
THE COURT: So it Is not before the Court

14 the way that the rules work under Rule 56, In
order to preserve those objections, or to make
those objections prlor to the hearing, It can only

17

be done between when you got the opposition. And

19

for a decision today. So I will note that it's
been filed, but we will not be making any

18
19

then when you get someone's reply, it doesn't
provide for the 14 days.

20

decisions on that at this time.

20

21

22

So again, the court has read all of the
documents. I want to break this into pieces,

23
24
25

gentlemen, only so that I can make sure that I
have a handle on it. We're going to start first
with the motions to strike portions of the

If -- at this time, given this
objection, I would orally move to shorten time and
to have It heard. Mr. Shurtliff has had a -- he
was served on Thursday, the 5th, with It. He's
had it for over a week. There's been no
opposition lodged by the Plaintiff In response to

17

18

ige 3 to 6 of 128

12122
23
24

25

a

-~risty Davenport
1
2
3
4

5
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23
24
25
1

2

3
4
5
6

7
8
9
10

11
12

13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24

25

Page 8

7
either the motion to strike and exclude the expert
or the motion to strike and disregard the
affidavit testimony.
The Court is correct that under the
Ryan v. Beisner and the other court
listed !n the motion to strike, that the
Court must first make a preliminary determination
as to the admissibility of evidence under
Rule 56(e) before it can consider and decide upon
the merits of the summary judgment. And that's
what I would request that the Court do at th is
time.
And further, I would add that the way
that we've laid out the objections, it's very
detailed. It's specific. By citation of
paragraph to statement listing the objection, I
was going to submit based upon the written
paperwork to the Court and the proposed order,
which goes by the specific paragraph, the
statement, the objection, and then the Court's
ruling.
And unless there were any specific
questions the Court had into any specific
objection, I was going to submit that way. And
certainly Mr. Shurtliff having the motion and the

1 significantly -- some time ago. Phone call,
2 couple phone calls, suggestion of reset the motion
3 for summary judgment would have taken care of that
4 problem.
5
I'm not prepared to argue their motions
6 to exclude. What's why we have 7(b)(3). 14 days.
7 Give me an opportunity. I'm not maybe as swift as
8 some folk, but that's what the rule says; and
9 that's what we think it ought to have. And to
10 orally move to shorten time at the -- the minute
11 before the suggested taking up of his -- seems to
12 me to put the Plaintiff here in an awkward and
13 unseemly position to argue motions that are
14 significant.
15
And I'm not suggesting they're not
16 significant, but we're not prepared to argue
17 those, and the rule doesn't seem to suggest that
18 we ought to be. The rule says we have 14 days'
19 notice. We don't. Or an order to shorten time.
20 If there had been an order to shorten time -21 they're familiar with it; had one in the other
22 case. We might have been anticipating what we're
23 doing. But I -- it puts us at significant
24 disadvantage, Your Honor.
25
THE COURT: Well, I'm just looking quickly

8
way that it's styled can certainly present any
argument that he has right now to any of those
specific objections, just like you would have at
the time of a trial.
THE COURT: Okay. So -MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, Your Honor, if 1 may.
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Shurtliff.
MR. SHURTLIFF: I appreciate the quality of
Mr. Schossberger's work and hls motion to exclude
and all of that. But the rather simple fact of
the matter is that Rule 7(b){3} says what it says.
Motions filed 14 days, opportunity for response.
That's procedural due process. That's what that
rule Is all about. It's not about whether
Mr. Shurtliff can, at the last minute, on the last
day, argue because of the well laid out motion.
The simple fact of the matter is, Your
Honor, that if they received a reply, and If they
thought there was something untoward about the
affidavits, then certainly their motions are
appropriate. But there's no law that says they
had to hear the motion for summary Judgment today.
I know it was set, but the motion for
summary judgment doesn't obviate Rule 7(b)(3).
The motion for summary judgment was set

10
1 to see lf there is any case law governing this
2 issue. It would have been appropriate,
3 Mr. Shurtliff, if you were objecting -- it would
4 have been nice to see an objection before today.
5
MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, 1 appreciate that,
6 Your Honor. We got it Monday, and we're here
7 Friday. I -8
THE COURT: Well, the notice of hearing was
9 filed December 5th.
10
MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, we got it Monday.
11 So -- so -- but I -- you know, I -- I recognize we
12 could have flled an objection, but why do you have
13 to object to somebody not following the rules?
14
THE COURT: Well, I think there is a
15 question about whether 7(b) applies to motions to
16 strike affidavits In a reply In a summary judgment
17 proceeding, which is what I'm probably not going
18 to be able to find this quickly. Trying to -19 trying to look at this right now.
20
Mr. Schossberger, when was the motion
21 for summary judgment filed?
22
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: November 15th, 2013.
23
THE COURT: Okay. Notice of hearing was
24 filed November 18th.
25
All right. Here's what the Court Is
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Court will find the motion for
summary judgment was filed November 15th. The
opposition, along with the attached affidavits,
was filed November 29th. The motions to strike -!et me just make sure that's correct.
The memorandum in opposition was filed
November
and that included the affidavits of
Jay Clark, James Hilliard, Robert Bennett, and
Mr. Edmunds, along with a copy of the addendum.
The Defendant's motion to strike and
exclude the affidavit of Ken Edmunds and portions
of the affidavit of Jay Clark was filed
December 5th, as was the motion to strike the
affidavit of Mr. Edmunds. I think it was
Mr. Edmunds, parts of Mr. Hilliard, as I
recollect, parts of Jay Clark. And the reply was
filed 12/6.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: And there was an
additional affiant, Robert Bennett.
THE COURT: Robert Bennett. The Court's
going to look at the rules.
Rule 7(b)(3) says unless otherwise
ordered by the Court, which order may, for cause
shown, be made on ex parte application, or as
specified elsewhere in the rules. Written motion
12
has to be filed with the Court and served so that
it is received no later than 14 days before the
time specified for the hearing. The motion Is
supported by affidavits; it shall be served and
filed no later than seven days before the hearing.
Rule 56(c), motion for summary
judgment. The motion and affidavit and briefs
shall be served at least 28 days before the time
for the hearing. The adverse party can reply, and
if it desires to serve opposing affidavits, it has
to do so 14 days before the date of the hearing.
Shall also serve an answering brief 14 days prior
to the hearing. And then the moving party has
seven days to file any kind of reply brief. Those
deadlines have all been met.
Under 7(b){3)(B), it says when a motion
is supported by affidavits, the affidavits shall
be served with the motion. Any opposing
affidavits have to be filed no later than seven
days.
It does not seem that you can read
7(b)(3) and 56-3 (sic) together, because It would
always require, then, a change in the date of the
summary judgment hearing. Because unless the
affidavits are already on file, they don't come in
~·
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until 14 days before the hearing. And so if they
come in 14 days before the hearing, that
necessarily means we'd have to move the summary
judgment motion hearings. Otherwise there's no
way under 56(c) that you can comply with 7(b){3).
So here's what we're going to do. The
Court's going to go forward on the motion today.
The Court is going to find that when you read
7{b)(3) and Rule 56(c) together, in addition to
the case law requirements that In order to rule on
a motion for summary judgment, the Court has to
first determine whether or not the affidavits
contain admissible evidence, either in support of
or in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.
Those will necessarily, if they're
coming from the adverse party, always come 14
days -- well, unless somebody files in advance,
but they're not required to be filed more than 14
days. Therefore, the Court is going to find that
under Rule 56(c), that a motion to strike
affidavits for purposes of a summary judgment
motion does not fall within the Rule 7(b)(3)
requirement in the absence of any sort of
objection or motion -- objection to the hearing on
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that motion.
That motion was filed December 6th in
this case. There was no objection or opposition
filed to that notice of hearing. The parties are
all here today, prepared to go forward on the
motion for summary judgment. And so we will go
forward with the motion on summary judgment. And
we will start first with the motion to strike the
affidavits.
Mr. Schossberger, which do you wish to
go forward with first?
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Thank you, Your Honor.
The motion to strike and disregard the affidavit
testimony of Ken Edmunds, Jay Clark,
Robert Bennett, and James C. Hilliard, I will
submit, based upon the written memorandum and the
order to the Court.
And on the second motion to strike and
exclude the affidavit of Ken Edmunds with the
attachment, and then portions of the affidavit of
Jay Clark, that's submitted based upon the rules,
as argued to the Court, that the affidavit
evidence needs to be admissible under Rule 56(e).
The affidavit of Ken Edmunds saying I've been
retained as an expert witness does not satisfy
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that requirement of Rule 56(e). It also doesn't
with Idaho Rule of Evidence 702.
Furthermore, Plaintiffs should be
the Court at this juncture from
disclosing an expert witness, because
didn't
comply with the Court's scheduling order. They've
never disclosed an expert witness prior to just
submitting these affidavits.
They were issued an Interrogatory No. 3
that asked the Rule 26(b)(4) requirements, which
also are in connection with Idaho Rule of Evidence
705, saying if you have an expert witness, tell me
who he Is, his or her qualifications, all the
facts, data, basis for your opinions, what records
are you relying upon, et cetera.
The response to Interrogatory No. 3,
which was provided back in early October, was not
yet decided. There's been no supplemental answer
ever provided by the Plaintiffs at Interrogatory
No. 3.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 705 specifically
states that if you have propounded an
interrogatory, seeking the requirements of
26(b)(4), that the expert must disclose all of
that information prior to being able to testify.

16
The affidavit of Ken Edmunds, clearly he has not
2 been properly disclosed, he is not qualified in
3 the affidavit as an expert, and the attachment to
4 his affidavit Is pure hearsay and should be
5 excluded.
6
And then the same arguments are
7 advanced with respect to the identified portions
8 of Jay Clark's affidavit found in paragraph 6(c),
9 d, e, and paragraph 7, where he's purporting to
10 offer hls beliefs as having farmed on the property
11 and make expert opinions. Those also don't
12 qualify under Rule 702 and should be excluded.
13 Thank you.
14
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Schossberger.
15
Mr. Shurtliff, we will start with the
16 Court's concern about why this Individual -- well,
17 Mr. Edmunds, potentially Mr. Bennett, and
18 Mr. Clark, to the extent you're proffering him as
19 an expert, why those have not been disclosed
20 pursuant to the Court's schedul!ng order.
21
MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor, as to
22 Mr. Edmunds, I think that there was a notice of
1 23
disclosure of a rebuttal witness flied.
I 24
THE COURT: That doesn't -- disclosure of a
25 rebuttal witness

1
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Page 10

17
1 disclosure for an expert.
2
MR. SHURTLIFF: Disclosure of a rebuttal
3 expert witness in regard to and in opposition to
4 Mr. Tiegs, Your Honor. The Plaintiff's case
5 didn't require, doesn't necessitate, won't have an
6 expert witness on his behalf in his case in chief.
7 The only need for an expert from this side of the
8 table ls in rebuttal to Mr. Tiegs' alleged
9 expertise. That's what Mr. Edmunds was Indicated
10 to be.
11
THE COURT: And when was that disclosure
12 made?
13
MR. SHURTLIFF: I believe -- well, I don't
14 have a copy of the Repository with me, but I think
15 that was on or about October the 29th. I think,
16 Your Honor, in addition -17
THE CLERK: There was a dlsclosure rebuttal
18 expert filed October 29th.
19
THE COURT: Okay. And what -- what -- I'm
20 sorry, Mr. Shurtliff. And as part of that
21 disclosure, what was flied?
22
MR. SHURTLIFF: Just that we would -- his
23 name, identification, and a CV.
24
THE COURT: Okay.
25
MR. SHURTLIFF: And we -- because at that

18
1 time we didn't know exactly what -2
THE COURT: Okay.
3
MR. SHURTLIFF: -- what we would do. So we
4 did it.
5
Now, in addition, the suggestion that
6 we didn't supplement the interrogatory's correct,
7 as far as it goes. But not supplementing an
B Interrogatory, as the Court knows, you're supposed
9 to seasonably reconcile your information as you
10 glean It. We haven't done it, I'll concede that,
11 but been doing other things. But that's for
12 trial. That doesn't say you have to do It in
13 advance of filing an affidavit for summary -- in
14 response to a summary judgment.
15
So I think, Your Honor, the -- it's -16 I think It's a little bit disingenuous, frankly.
17 And I don't like that word particularly, but I
18 think ft's a little bit disingenuous to suggest
19 that Mr. Edmunds wasn't known to Murphy Land In
20 the context of this case. We filed It; we noticed
21 it. What else would he be for? So they had since
22 October 29th to examine him, depose him. There's
23 been no request for any information from him or
24 whatever.
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21

he just says he's an expert, well, his CV was
1 missing?
attached. He is an expert. I think he -- I think
2
MR. SHURTLIFF: Not in that affidavit, Your
he testified in an earlier case here as an expert.
3 Honor.
So he's not an unknown commodity.
4
THE COURT: Okay. Now, my question relates
Now, you might not like his expertise,
5 to this, Mr. Shurtliff. As I look at Mr. Edmund's
and I can understand all that, but that goes to
' 5
It says he served as a business consultant
cross examination. That's one of the reasons we
7 since 1987 after leaving International accounting
ought to have trials, Instead of summary judgment
8 firms to form h!s own practice, and he's worked
motions, In my opinion. But that's just an
9 with various businesses and industries, with a
opinion.
10 primary focus on high net worth individuals and
But if you don't -- they knew where he
11 their investments. He's advised on debt mezzanine
was -- they knew who he was, where he was coming 12 and equity financing structures, Including initial
from, and what he had to say. And we set it out
13 public offerings.
in an affidavit. He said, I am an expert.
14
As I go on and read that paragraph, as
Now, Mr. Schossberger says, well, that
15 I look at his summary, I'm unclear. I was just -ain't enough. Well, lf you don't think he's an
16 eventually the question I'm going to ask you, I'm
expert, take his deposition or put him on the
17 unclear about his expertise in farming.
stand and have him testify and take him apart.
18
MR. SHURTLIFF: I would -- I would think,
But anybody can be an expert, as the Court knows,
19 Your Honor, that the unclarity of his expertise in
experience, scientific knowledge, whatever. He
20 farming would be correct. But the expertise Is In
21 looking at the underlying date of the information
said, I'm an expert. If you don't think he is,
dispute it. But there's nothing in the record
22 and materials and relating them, collating them,
that would suggest he isn't.
23 and putting them together. It's not -- I don't
And so, Your Honor, his report that he
24 think he is an expert in farming. He's an expert
attached with his affidavit in reply to the
25 in numbers, and in dealing with numbers, and in

20
2

-5928

summary judgment motion is that of an expert. If
you don't like it, cross examine him, depose hlm,
whatever. But you don't disregard ft because he
didn't elicit -- you didn't elicit some maglc
words from him as to his, quote unquote,
expertise. He Is an expert until this Court -this Court, not Mr. Schossberger; not me -- this
Court determines otherwise. And that hasn't been
done.
Mr. Edmunds is an expert, his affidavit
is that of an expert, his report Is that of an
expert, and It should be received.
THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff, I just have a
couple of questions for you.
MR. SHURTLIFF: Sure.
THE COURT: Just find the pieces of paper
here to ask them to you. And I'm sorry I'm not
more organized.
Okay. Now, I'm looking at Mr. Edmund's
affidavit. And the only information that I have
in the affidavit -- it's really very short. He
makes the affidavit based on his knowledge. He's
been retained as an expert. And then attached ls
the summary analysis. Is there -- is there any
other Information from Mr. Edmunds that
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getting to source of numbers and those sorts of
things.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SHURTLIFF: So I would agree with the
Court that he probably couldn't grow a Shepody
potato from any other kind, but I think he knows
numbers and the abillty to get to the numbers as
to those matters.
THE COURT: Okay. And so, for example, as
I'm looking at the summary, it appears that he got
some of his Information from external sources,
such as information from the University of Idaho.
Where is that foundational material -- I know
there's a lot of documents here, and I may have
missed it. Has the underlying foundation for his
summary -- have I missed it somewhere ln the
record?
MR. SHURTLIFF: No, you have not, Your
Honor. It was not asked for. And I think under
the rules of evidence, It would be an appropriate
matter to examine Into an expert's underlying
lnformatlon and data and sources to determine
their quality and so forth. But I don't think
It's necessary that it be laid out in advance of
that Inquiry. Rule 703, rules of
seem
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to support that -- or seems to suggest that to me,
at least. That's my reading.
THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at 705. So
appears that he can testify without
disclosure unless the Court requires otherwise, or
under the rules of discovery, those Items
were either requested and/or disclosed. So I
would turn to Mr. Schossberger or Mr. Gordon. Has
the Defendant inquired about -- through any
discovery requests if there's going to be any
experts for the basis or foundation of their
opinions?
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Yes, Your Honor. As
provided to the Court, attached to my affidavit
regarding this motion to strike, Mr. Shurtliff
served the response to the first set of
interrogatories, request for production, request
for admission on October 2nd. And I have provided
to the Court a copy of the response to
Interrogatory No. 3.
Interrogatory No. 3 states: Please
identify each person you may call as an expert
witness at the trial of this matter. State the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to
testify. State the substance of the opinions to
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which the expert is expected to testify. State
the underlying facts and data upon which the
expert opinions are based. rdentify ail documents
upon which your expert may rely to express any
opinions in this matter. And identify all
individuals that your expert may rely upon to
express any opinion in this matter. Response not
yet decided.
Also In request for production No. 3:
Please produce a complete file of any expert
retained by you for this litigation, and expected
to testify at trial, including all bills,
correspondence, emails, drafts, notes, research
documents, materials relied upon, and each report
of the expert's findings, opinions, or conclusions
thereon.
Response to production No. 3:
Objection, attorney/client privilege. However, an
appropriate response to a pretrial order. These
materials will be supplied. To be sure, these
materials have not as of yet been fully coilected.
THE COURT: Now, October 2nd is before the
disclosure of the expert on October 28th or 29th,
whenever that was. So it appears -· and I guess
I'm trying to understand, Mr. Shurtliff. How come
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the basis upon which Mr. Edmunds is basing his
opinion has not been disclosed to the Defendants?
MR. SHURTLIFF: I suppose, Your Honor, that
the -- that the answer is It hasn't, pursuant to
the interrogatory. But the affidavit and the
report were provided In the context of the summary
judgment motion, which are a little bit different.
So I would suggest, Your Honor, that we're kind of
backing away -- the Interrogatory needs to be
supplemented.
THE COURT: Mm-hmm.
MR. SHURTLIFF: When?
THE COURT: Well, my -- my expectation would
be that it's at the time that the experts -perhaps even if not when the expert is disclosed,
although I certainly think that's best practice,
if you have it, I would imagine certainly by
November 27th when you want to proffer an expert
opinion that you should be complying with the
interrogatory requests.
MR. SHURTLIFF: December, I think. But
the -- 29th. Well, the -- I respect your
position, but r don't know that I agree with ft,
Your Honor. You know, there's only so much one
can do, and I think the purpose of the
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interrogatory, the purpose of the discovery, the
purpose of the rules, are so that we have
knowledge. We know what's happened. We're not
shocked. We're not surprised. We're not
ambushed.
Well, is there any shock, surprise, or
ambush? l don't think so. They were provided
Mr. Edmund's affidavit. They never·· they moved
to strike. They didn't move to ask for the
underlying data, information, or facts, or the
persons at the University of Idaho with whom he
spoke. They never noticed up a quick deposition.
So I ·- again, there's only so much
anybody can do. But that could have been done.
And I don't know that the failure to supplement
the interrogatory in a seasonably, timely manner,
is critical to an affidavit In a summary judgment
motion. We've got two more months before the
trial.
THE COURT: Well, we don't really have two
months when you take out sort of the Christmas
holiday season. We have six weeks.
MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, some people don't
celebrate that.
THE COURT:
the Court
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session for most of those days.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Your Honor, I'd just
additionally add for the record that the Court's
order dated October 11th, 2013, in
4 and
required both the Plaintiff
Defendant to disclose expert witnesses,
together with their opinions and reports. So that
was an express requirement from the Court, not
just identify who the person is and attach a CV,
but together with their opinions and reports. And
that was not done; never has been done.
THE COURT: By what date, Mr. Schossberger?
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: The Plaintiff was to
disclose expert witnesses, together with their
opinions and reports, by October 11, 2013. The
last day for Defendant to disclose rebuttal
experts, together with their opinions and reports,
is October 25, 2013.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, I can say in that
regard, Your Honor, that by October 25th or the
earlier date, the facts or opinion -- we had
Identified Mr. Edmunds as an expert, and that was
it.
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MR. SHURTLIFF: Wasn't no more.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, let me go back a
lfttle bit, because the Court sent out a
stipulation for pretrial scheduling, The Court
sent out an order for pretrial conference on
September 5th. The Court also noticed that in
that document that it would be sending out a
stipulation that the parties had ten days or else
the Court would be setting the deadlines.
The Court got a letter from the
Defendant's attorney in this case indicating that
he had done this stipulation, that they'd tried to
reach you, Mr. Shurtliff. Didn't get a response.
So the Court entered an order for purposes of
pretrial planning, and we did that on
October 15th, is when we had the last hearing.
And so we thereafter issued the dates that were
there.
Now, that order required that any and
all experts be disclosed by the dates given, and
that one of the sanctions for them is exclusion of
the experts. There's a couple of competing issues
at stake here. One of them is that the parties
have a complete and fair opportunity to be heard
on the merits of their case, all of the parties.
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And there is another that parties should not be
prejudiced by the action or inaction of a -- one
of the other parties.
This case was reset in October from, I
believe, a January to a February setting. And
Court required, and it appears that the parties
all got copies, that experts were to be disclosed
by October 11th for the Plaintiff, and by
October 29th for the Defendant.
It appears that the Plaintiff has
disclosed a rebuttal expert. They did that on
October 29th. But to date there has still been
nothing complying with the Court's order to
disclose all of the documents that be complied
with. The Court is therefore, for failing to
comply with the Court's scheduling order, I am
going to strike the summary of Mr. Edmunds.
Alternatively, the Court would strike any and all
pieces of hearsay Information in that document,
and we will go through it as follows.
Starting with the beginning of the -start with the first paragraph, the Court is going
to assume -- that may be incorrect, but I'm going
to do it nonetheless -- that that information is
obtained from the affidavit of Frank Tiegs. And

30
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I'm just going to double check that.
So we're going to assume that that
information comes from the affidavit of Mr. Tiegs,
which Is something that, if I were not otherwise
excluding the summary, would be admissible. The
second paragraph, the first sentence will be
stricken on the grounds that it's hearsay. It's
relying upon information from a third source not
yet disclosed. And therefore, the second sentence
has no foundational basis. That would also be
stricken.
MR. SHURTLIFF: I'm sorry. You lost me,
Your Honor, where you were.
THE COURT: The Kenneth D. Edmunds
attachment to affidavit. I'm on the second
paragraph.
MR. SHURTLIFF: Loss of income 2011? Or a
more typical rent per acre.
THE COURT: A more typical -- yeah, I'm
there.
MR. SHURTLIFF: Okay. I'm sorry.
THE COURT: A more typical rent per acre.
The Court Is going to strike that, lack of
foundation and hearsay. And therefore, that
second
renders lack of
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beginning therefore Tiegs. So in sum
the second paragraph is stricken.
I don't find anything particularly
objectionable in the third paragraph under loss of
rents, because it doesn't seem, really, to be
much. Under loss of income 2011,
Mr. Schossberger, on the last sentence, first
paragraph that begins this plan Indicates a net
Income, I could not -- and again, I apologize if
I've missed It -- the net income of $810,000 from
the related company, is that in Mr. Tiegs'
affidavit? Because I can't find that number.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: We're looking, Your
Honor.
It doesn't look like these numbers on
Mr. Edmunds' attachment are a match to the numbers
testified to by Mr. Tiegs.
THE COURT: The Court Is going to strike
that sentence, the second sentence, first
paragraph, under loss of income 2011. It does not
appear to be based on the affidavit of Mr. Tiegs.
There Is no indication of where that Information
was derived. Therefore, there is a lack of
factual foundation. It would not be admissible as
it Is listed at tria I.

1 in this case. It was filed with
2 Mr. Schossberger's reply -- I'm sorry. It was -3
MR. SHURTLIFF: Indeed, that's correct.
4
THE COURT: Sonry, it was -- let me find it.
5
MR. SHURTLIFF: By Mr. Schossberger.
S
THE COURT: I don't believe it It may
7 have been Mr. Gordon. I just can't remember which
8 of them filed with It.
MR. GORDON: Your Honor, it was filed with
9
10 the second affidavit of Matthew Gordon,
11 December 6th.
12
THE COURT: That's what I thought. The
13 second affidavit contains an earlier affidavit by
14 Mr. Clark, wherein Mr. Clark makes -- testifies
15 that he was not willing to share the land with
16 Mr. Tiegs, that it would have been unworkable to
17 have the parties working the iand together, and so
18 although in his affidavit as part of this motion
19 for summary judgment he indicates he was willing
20 to lease the land. The earlier affidavit filed by
21 Mr. Clark indicates that, in fact, that was not
22 what he was willing to do.
23
Secondly, and we haven't gotten to this
24 yet, but there is no requirement that -- that I
25 could find that Murphy Land was required to lease

32
In the third paragraph, it claims that,
second sentence, Tiegs asserts these potatoes, due
to early harvesting, would have sold for a
higher-than-market average price of $320 per ton.
I'm trying to determine -- the Court is going to
strike the words higher than market average price.
There is nothing in this affidavit that indicates
that that is a higher than market price. There Is
no factual support attached to this affidavit.
There is nothing in Mr. Tiegs' affidavit. So it
is unclear from where Mr. Edmunds derived that
information. Therefore, It is hearsay and/or not
factually supported.
The Court is going to strike under the
third paragraph the sentence it appears that the
timing is such that he could have obtained
alternative land. That appears to be speculative.
It also appears to be refuted by an affidavit by
Mr. Clark that he was not going to be willing to
work with other Individuals, So there does not
appear to be -MR. SHURTLIFF: Which affidavit Is that,
Your Honor? That's -- that's not an affidavit In
th is case.
THE COURT; There is, actually, an affidavit

1 the land from the individual who wrongfully chose
2 not to vacate in order to mitigate their losses.
3 So we will be striking that paragraph. Therefore,
4 we will also be striking the last sentence on the
5 first page of the summary that begins the net
6 income, because that no longer has any factual
7 support.
8
On the loss of income 2012, first
9 paragraph, it's the third sentence. It begins:
10 This farm has historically been known as a less
11 productive farm. The Court Is going to strike
12 everything thereafter. There is nothing In
13 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit that indicates the farm is
14 less productive due to the rocky soil. There is
15 nothing in Mr. Tiegs' affidavit that indicates it
16 has higher than normal operating costs, and
17 therefore his loss calculation is not accurate.
18
Again, Mr. Edmunds says that his
19 affidavit is based only on his review of Mr. Tiegs
20 there -- and he does not Indicate he has relied on
21 any other Information to reach this conclusion.
22
Then we go to other Issues. We will
23 strike the second sentence, in light of the lack
24 of foundation for his summary and loss of income
25 2012. We will also strike the remainder of that
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paragraph. We have no factual Information about
what the University of Idaho uses, whether they're
entitled to any kind of subsidy because they're a
public institution. There simply is lack of
foundation and/or hearsay to justify that
paragraph.
Simiiariy, with the second paragraph,
starting with the sentence based on the University
of Idaho crop information, the remainder of that
will be stricken. There's a lack of factual
foundation and/or hearsay.
The Court is going to strike the 2013
operating results. There's been no foundation
laid that that would be a -- although there is a
conclusory statement It may be a better and more
reliable estimate. There's no factual foundation
to explain why it would be a more factual
foundation. So on alternative grounds, the Court
is striking the affidavit of Mr. Edmunds.
Now, we'll go through the Mr. Bennett
affidavit. And I apologize that this Is taking so
long, gentlemen.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Before we do that, Your
Honor, If we could -- on the affidavit of
Jay Clark, was it inconsistent to also address

36
proffered and purported expert opinions objected
2 to In paragraph 6(c), d, e, and 7? Is the Court
3 so inclined?
4
THE COURT: Yes. I just need to find that
5 affidavit. I had Mr. Bennett's affidavit In front
6 of me, which is why I was going to go with that
7 one.
8
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Okay.
9
THE COURT: Okay. We can go with
10 Mr. Clark's affidavit. It is subsection -- or
11 paragraph 6. Starting with paragraph 6, to the
12 extent Mr. Clark Is being offered as an expert,
13 the Court is going to strike his affidavit in its
14 entirety. He has not been disclosed as an expert.
15 To the extent he is a layperson, then there will
16 be a different standard and will allow the
17 affidavit as to a layperson.
18
Starting with paragraph 6, starting
19 with subsection A, I don't -- I think the two
20 sentences in the initial paragraph 6 may
21 potentially remain. The Court ls going to strike
22 subsection A. The Court cannot find the relevance
23 of whether or not there were related farming
24 companies that farmed on that property during
25 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012.
1
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Now, the Court is going to note
specifically that any farming that occurred on
2011, 2012, the Court is not going to allow
Mr. Clark to rely on that. It has been determined
that he was wrongfully in possession of that
property during that time frame. In fact, that he
is now going to use his wrongful possession as a
basis to defeat the motions, the Court is not
going to permit.
So the Court finds no objection to the
statement Murphy Land may not have commenced
operation until May 2012. The Court is going to
strike the remainder. There is no basis of
knowledge. It's not clear where the foundation
for that is coming from. The Court also finds it
to be irrelevant.
Subsection B, to the extent it requires
an expert -- it requires expert testimony under
702, 705, the Court will strike it. Mr. Clark has
not been disclosed as an expert.
Now, separately, he may simply be the
Individual who farmed It, and may have separate
knowledge. But the Court finds that whether or
not the ground had been prepared for planting of
crops in 2011, and whether the Owyhee Farming

38
1 Company grew those crops, Is Irrelevant.
2
Yes, Mr. Shurtliff?
3
MR. SHURTLIFF: His -- he was the farmer.
4 He was there. He knows the ground had been
5 prepared for the planting of crops. He -- B is
6 based on his personal knowledge, Your Honor. And
7 then the last paragraph, the last sentence,
8 Mr. Tiegs indicated he -- that's based on
9 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit.
10
THE COURT: Yes, and I -11
MR. SHURTLIFF: That's -- that doesn't call
12 for any expertise or anything. Anybody could read
13 Tiegs', Mr. Tiegs' affidavit in that regard. And
14 Mr. Clark knew the facts that predicate B.
15
THE COURT: Yes, but the reason that he knew
16 the facts that predicated B Is that he was
17 unwilling to vacate the property, despite being
18 told to do so. Now -19
MR. SHURTLIFF: But that -- Your Honor, that
20 makes him a bad person. That doesn't make him a
21 bad witness. That doesnt make his knowledge
22 Irrelevant. It makes him a bad person that didn't
23 vacate the property. But he vacated It when he
24 was -- when this Court told him to vacate it. So
25 I -- with due respect, Your Honor, r -- I don't
of 35 sheets
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think that just being a bad person negates your
ability to be a witness.
THE COURT: Well, and I think we need to

here. The Court is not saying that
Mr. Clark is a bad person. What the Court is
Is that Mr. Clark is not going to be
able -- to coin a phrase that the Court finds -doesn't use frequently either, disingenuous, to
claim based on his withholding that he now has
personal knowledge. But you do raise some
legitimate points.
Mr, Schossberger, if you'd like to
respond.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: If we're talking about
paragraph 6(b), I think that the evidence before
the Court in the Defendant's motion for summary

11
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2011, and the acreages, I believe, 458 acres. So

19

20

20

24

that's -- that's a fact that's been put into the
record.
Mr. Clark's statement that, contrary to
Tiegs' affidavit, in paragraph 11, ground had been
prepared for the planting of crops in 2011, does

25

lack an adequate factual foundation, and is
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conclusory 1 and doesn't show any relevance as to
the Import of that statement.
TI-iE COURT: Okay. Here is the contradiction
in the two. Mr. Tiegs' affidavit says that
Mr. Clark's continued presence on the farm
prevented Murphy Land from entering it and
preparing It for the planting of crops in 2011.
He Is saying that ground had been prepared for the
planting of crops.
Now, the Court Is going to strike that
first part, up until the Owyhee Farming Company.
The Court is striking contrary to Tiegs'
affidavit, ground had been prepared for the
planting of crops in 2011. That's not what the
affidavit says. The affidavit says that
Mr. Clark's presence prevented Murphy Land from
entering and preparing It. There Is no dispute
that Murphy Land was prevented from preparing the
land in the way Murphy Land wished to do so in
2011.
Therefore, the Court is going to -- the
fact that Mr. Clark may have prepared the land
does not refute the paragraph 11. So the Court is
going to strike that first sentence. The Court
will allow to remain, starting Owyhee Farming
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MR. SCHOSSBERGER: That's correct. Owyhee
Farming grew Shepody potatoes in 2011. Yeah, the
reference to Mr. Funk is not correct.
THE COURT: Okay. So the Court is going to
strike Mr. Funk, because It may be that it was not
Mr. Funk personally. The conclusory statement,
there was nothing to stop Mr. Funk and/or Owyhee
Farming Company from growing Norkotah potatoes on
the farm in 2011 rather than Shepody, perhaps I'm
not understanding the -- well -- what Mr. Funk
and/or Owyhee Farming Company did, the Court is
having a difficult time understanding the
relevance as to whether or not Mr. -- I'm sorry,
Murphy Land could get on and farm in the way that
they felt was appropriate.

42

40
1

Page 16

2 The Court will also allow the statement, Mr. Tiegs
3 indicated he would have grown 451.3 acres of
4 Norkotah potatoes, because that is premised on the
5 statement of Mr. Tiegs.
6
New, in the second part of that,
1 Mr. Funk grew Shepody potatoes on the farm in
8 2011, Mr. Schossberger, that does appear to be a
9 fact in front of the Court. Perhaps not Mr. Funk
10 Individually, but his farming company.

18

21
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1 Company did grow potatoes on the farm in 2011.

judgment is -- which is undisputed -- is that
Owyhee Farming did grow potatoes on the farm in

17
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If I'm understanding correctly,
Mr. Shurtliff, it is the position of the Hilliards
that because Mr. Tiegs and/or Mr. Funk had other
farming entitles that were farming at the time,
that the proceeds from those other farming
entities should have been used to offset the
damages for Murphy Land not being able to access.
Is that correct?
MR. SHURTLIFF: I don't think so, Your

Honor.
11
THE COURT: Okay. Then what ls the
12 relevance about whether or not unrelated farming
13 companies had the ability to grow whatever crop it
14 is they grew on those lands?
15
MR. SHURTLIFF: Because Mr. Tiegs in his
16 affidavit would Indicate that he would have grown
17 the others, the Norkotah potatoes. And quite
18 frankly, Your Honor, I think what the relevance
19 here ls that they could have grown, Funk and/or
20 Owyhee, which is a part of Murphy -21
THE COURT: Well, it isn't part of Murphy.
22 It's a separate company.
23
MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, It's -- I understand.
24 But It's the same people, same business. They
25 could -- they could have grown that more
10
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expensive, more profitable potato, If they'd
wanted to, is what Mr. Clark ts saying. They

3

didn

1
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MR. SHURTLIFF: And he -- and Mr. Tiegs then
goes on at great lengths -7
THE COURT: Starting In paragraph 19.
8
MR. SHURTLIFF: -- to make a real profit on
9 those potatoes that weren't grown.
10
THE COURT: So this paragraph is used to
11 refute the paragraph of paragraph 19 of Mr. Tiegs,
12 when they're looking at similar farming companies
13 to determine the amount of profit that was made
14 and/or lost.
15
MR. SHURTLIFF: Or that -- or that they
16 couldn't have grown them there. Or that -17
THE COURT: Well, what's his -18
MR. SHURTLIFF: Or that they could. Because
19 quite frankly, Your Honor, see, we've never had an
20 opportunity to cross examine Mr. Tiegs on his -21
THE COURT: Right, but Mr. Shurtliff -22
MR. SHURTLIFF: -- on his affidavit.
23
THE COURT: But here's my question. What is
24 Mr. Clark's basis of knowledge for the last
25 sentence of paragraph B, that there was nothing to
5
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stop Mr. Funk and/or Owyhee Farming from growing
Norkotah potatoes on the farm fn 2011, rather than
Shepody? What is his basis of knowledge for that?
MR. SHURTLIFF: His personal knowledge.
THE COURT: Is it based on conversations
with Mr. Funk? Is it just -MR. SHURTLIFF: No. He was there. He saw
it. He knew. He knew the condition of the
ground, the condition of the farm, the
circumstances, the time, the season.
THE COURT: The Court's going to strike
that. There Is no basis that Mr. Clark has any
knowledge about Mr. Funk or Owyhee Farming
Company. I think it is perhaps an
overgeneralizatlon to say there is nothing to stop
him from growing the potatoes. He -- unless he's
had conversations with Mr. Funk which are not
alleged or alluded to here, Mr. Funk's and Owyhee
Farming Company's planting choices, I don't know
what personal knowledge that's demonstrated here
that Mr. Clark would have about their choice to
farm one product or another.
Subsection C of Mr. Clark's affidavit
Is going to be -- his statement that their
estimates are not historically accurate and

-5928
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THE COURT: And I suppose --

208-

overstates damages is going to be stricken. He
has not identified why those yields are high, how
they overstate the damages, and whether -- and the
basis of knowledge and/or the factual support for
the claim that it wasn't traditionally producing
yields of that amount
The Court is also going to strike
subsection D -MR. SHURTLIFF: You're striking the last
sentence of C?
THE COURT: Yes. I'm also going to strike
paragraph D. I do think that Mr. Clark may have
had the knowledge to document what costs for the
farm would have been, Just like he may have had
the experience to document subsection C, what the
yields would be. But the Court finds that In
these portions of the affidavits, that
documentation is absent. And therefore, there is
a lack of factual support for the statement that
the estimate of costs are unrealistic. It Is
Insufficient to simply say the total costs have
historically been greater, without documenting
what those costs have been.
And to say, for -- also many costs, for
example, maintenance and repair have been omitted,
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it ls insufficient that provides -- there Is
Insufficient factual support In this affidavit to
support that conclusion, and there is insufficient
factual support to support the conclusion that
those costs would be significant. And therefore,
the Court is going to strike section D of the
affidavit as well.
In subsection E, again, I thlnk that
Mr. Clark perhaps has sufficient experience In the
farm to estimate what crops would sell for. In
this particular Instance, he has falled to provide
that factual support as part of the affidavit. So
the Court is going to strike, In the second
sentence, the conclusion Norkotah -- that he would
have sold the Norkotah potatoes for $16 per
hundred Is high. The Court Is going to strike
that. There's no foundation for that.
There -- it's -- the next sentence Is
based on hearsay, that that would be the high
point of the market. Now, Mr. Clark may have
personal knowledge of what the high point of the
market was In 2011. It's not alleged he has
personal knowledge of that. And there's no
Indication that the potatoes, even if that would
have been the high point, there's no factual basis
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in this affidavit to support the conclusion that
the potatoes could not have been sold for that
amount.

The same with subsection 7.
belief that the projections for year
2012 is similarly wrong. There's no factual
support in this affidavit to come to that
conclusion. Without the factual support for that
statement, that statement wouid not be admissible,
and therefore it will be stricken.
The Court is going to strike
paragraph 8 also, In regards to Mr. Tiegs and hls
2012 projections, that he did nothing to stop them
Mr.

20
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we could argue that had Mr. Clark vacated, he
could have avoided $600,000 in hard costs, but I
that's neither here nor there.
MR. SHURTLIFF: I think it's irrelevant.
THE COURT: And the Court -MR. SHURT'uFF: Because -- because the
question is what's the damage, if any.
THE COURT: Correct. That's true,
Mr. Shurtliff.

22
23
24

from growing what and how many acres they wanted
that year. That is not factually supported. It
is by Mr. Clark's presence on the land that
stopped them from growing what they wanted and the
number of acres. There is no support for the
statement that Mr. Clark did nothing to stop them
from growing what they wanted to grow in 2012. As
I recollect, he was not removed from the property
until May.
Paragraph 9: 2012 when Murphy took
possession of the farm, he had approximately

MR. SHURTLIFF: Not the benefit to
Mr. Clark.
12
THE COURT: But the Court finds that there
13 is not factual support for the claim that there
14 were $600,000 in hard costs. There is simply a
15 number and a conclusion. There is no underlying
16 factual support for that number. Therefore, the
17 Court finds there is insufficient factual support
18 for that.
19
That statement that there were $600,000
20 In hard costs, as exists In this affidavit,
21 without additional testimony, would not be
22 admissible at trial. I'm limited to looking at
23 the affidavits that I have In front of me and
24 determining, In and of themselves, whether those

25

$600,000 in hard costs in preparing the ground and

25

10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17

18
19
20

21

10

11

48
1
2
3
4

5

6

7
8
9

10
11

12
13

14
15

16

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

planting crops for the year 2012. The Court Is
going to strike that paragraph. There Is no
documentation of what those costs would be. It's
further in the record that Mr. Clark knew in 2012
that he -- that there was legal action to remove
him from the property. He doesn't get to stay on
the property and then claim he's somehow harmed by
his wrongful holdover. So the Court is -MR. SHURTLIFF: No, I don't -- if I may.
THE COURT: You may, Mr. Shurtliff.
MR. SHURTLIFF: I don't think he's
claiming -- 1 don't think that says he was harmed.
I think It was saying Mr. Tiegs and Murphy Land
would benefit.
THE COURT: Well, he says they did not
reimburse him for those costs.
MR. SHURTLIFF: That's rlght. And so if you
go through an accounting, if they weren't
reimbursed for those costs, then those costs
accrued to their benefit. And that's -- that's
$600,000 of benefit that's seem!ngly unaccounted
for.
THE COURT: Well, there's no documentation
of whether there was $600,000 worth of hard costs
and what that $600,000 costs were for.
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trial. Without appropriate foundation, that
statement would not be admissible at trial, and
the Court is therefore going to strike it from the
affidavit.
MR. SHURTLIFF: And that's the reason we
ought to have a trial, so we can get to the
underlying predicates for these things. That's
why we have trials, Your Honor. If there's a
question about -- Mr. Clark says I had $600,000.
It is conclusory. Most of what we say rs.
THE COURT: Well, then Mr. -MR. SHURTLIFF: So -- If you don't -- if we
don't buy it, put him on the stand and don't buy
It. But -THE COURT: Well -- but that's not the
standard. To refute a motion for summary
judgment, the opposing party has to do more than
make conclusory allegations. They have to allege
specific facts to defeat the claims that have been
raised in summary judgment. That would -MR. SHURTLIFF: That would be relevant at
trial.
THE COURT: That would be relevant, that
would be admissible at trial. In this particular
case, Mr. Clark in this affidavit, and then

;:s 1 1 1 z u l "l

I : 4 1 : 4 9 PM

r~risty Davenport

208-

r 1

-5928

Page 19

51
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virtue of the Hilllards, have not specifically

2
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53

alleged sufficient facts to defeat the claims that
have been raised, as relates to the expenses for

1
2

Mr. Funk, he expressed Interest in closing the
transaction before year end. There Is adequate

3

4

damages in this case. The Court is not reqUired

4

foundation
I mean, sorry, inadequate foundation
for this. Again, each of these statements in

5

to scour the record to look for the underlying

5

these affidavits have to be independently

6

factual support. This affidavit simply doesn't
sufficient factual support for the

6

admissible at trial. The purpose of these

7

affidavits Is not to make general allegations that

8

are then followed up at trlal with all of the
adequate foundation.

7

8
9

conclusions that it Is making.
We will go next to Mr. Bennett's

9

10
11

affidavit.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Is this paragraph 9, Your

10
11
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Honor?
THE COURT: Yes. Actually --
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13

MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Yeah, second paragraph 9.
THE COURT: Yeah, we could go to
Mr. Bennett's. That's fine.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Okay.
THE COURT: Actually, on Mr. Bennett's, my

There is no foundation in this
affidavit about when the discussions took place,
the basis of closing, the reason for a particular
date of closing. The Court is going to strike

15

paragraph 6 for lack of adequate foundation.
Similarly, with paragraph 8, 1 think

16

Mr. Bennett may have had adequate knowledge about

17
18

this. He may have been present at the time of the
closing. He may have had independent knowledge

14

understanding was you started with paragraph 4.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Correct.

19

about this, but there Is simply lack of foundation

20

to indicate this was a clerical error. So the

THE COURT: Paragraph 4, there's no basis of
knowledge of how Mr. Bennett learned that Mr. Funk

21
22

Court is going to strike.
And It seems unfair to attribute that

had been a tenant. The Court is unclear where his
knowledge comes from. If It is something he is
told by a third party, it would be based on

23
24
25

motivation to the seller when we don't have any
evidence for that either, so the Court is going to
strike paragraph 8 for lack of adequate

52

54

1

hearsay, would potentially not be admissible.

1

foundation. It also appears to rely on hearsay.

2

Therefore, the Court Is going to strike It for

2

3

3

4

lack of actual -- adequate factual foundation,
and/or based on hearsay. It's entirely unclear

4

Paragraph 9 is based on hearsay. The
Court's going to strike it for that reason.
Paragraph 11 is also based on hearsay.

5

where that information comes from.

5

It's a conversation with another individual, and

The Court will allow paragraph 5. It

6

lt contains Information about what that other

7

appears to be based on personal knowledge. There

7

8

is a letter that was sent to Mr. Bennett, who
would therefore have personal knowledge. I

8

individual would say. Therefore it's a hearsay
statement. The Court is going to strike It.

6

9
10

9

MR. SHURTLIFF: Your Honor, in that regard,

understand the letter itself would perhaps be

10
11

I would suggest that it's not hearsay. There's an
exception. Mr. Tippett was well engaged In the --

12

hearsay. But it does set forth adequate grounds
of personal knowledge that the Court will not

12

as a representative of Murphy Land in dealing with

13

strlke paragraph 5.

13

14

MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Your Honor, I'll only
supplement, I guess, my objection in response to
that, In terms of there's no foundation for when

15

Mr. Bennett, had many conversations about this
matter. Murphy Land LLC, it's a -- doesn't have
an Individual capacity. It was working through
Its agent. Mr. Tippett was an agent. Had

11
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Mr. Funk expressed his interest In purchasing that
farm to Mr. Bennett, where they were, who was
present. Just saying he told me at some point in

time, if that was at a trial, I'd object and say
lack of foundation and inquire further.
THE COURT: The Court understands that,
Mr. Schossberger. The Court's going to leave it
in.
Paragraph 6, based on discussions with
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14

16
17
18

authority, apparent authority.
THE COURT: How do we know Mr. Tippett was

19

the buyer's agent?

20

MR. SHURTLIFF: Mr. -- I think Mr. Bennett
says so.
THE COURT: Well, but how does Mr. Bennett
know that Mr. Tippett is the buyer's agent?

I 21

22

23
24
25

MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, because they were
negotiating the sale on buying this farm, Your
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Honor.
2
THE COURT: And where does it say that in
l this affidavit, that he has independent knowledge
4 that Mr. Tippett is the buyer's representative?
5
MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, I
think he

1

6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18

19
20
21

22
23
24

25

THE COURT: Then there's lack of adequate
foundation. The Court is going to strike
paragraph 11.
Similarly, with paragraph 13,
Sheryl Reyment's comments are certalnly hearsay.
Her belief about what the parties believed is
double hearsay. The Court is going to strike
paragraph 13.
Finally, the affidavit of Mr. Hilliard,
starting with paragraph 14. The Court does find

that I think Mr. Hilliard perhaps of everyone
would know his own intent on whether or not he
intended to purchase the property. The Court will
allow paragraph 14 to stand. If there is an issue
with the -- the Court -- the Court's going to
leave paragraph 14 in there. Mr. Hililard would
have Independent knowledge about the intent of the
parties at the time of the sale.
Paragraph 17. The Court -- the Court

1
3

4
5
6

7

8
9
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14
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16

17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24

25

struggles with this section, because really, this
requires -- it's unclear to the extent that this
is Mr. Hilliard's interpretation of the addendum.
His interpretation where the language is clear is
irrelevant, or whether this was an acknowledgement
by Mr. Hilliard that if things didn't go well, he
would have to pay the $3 million.
So I'm not -- I don't think that -- the
Court is not going to strike this. However, the
Court Is not going to allow it as a legal
interpretation about the consequences of the
addendum regarding the $3 mlllion that was put
into the account.
Okay. Paragraph 18, we've got a couple
layers of hearsay there. The Court is going to
strike everything starting with the sentence
Mr. Bennett, because Mr. Bennett Is telling him
what Mr. Tippett said. That's hearsay, two levels
of hearsay. It's going to be stricken.
Again, with paragraph 20, the
statement: We believed our sole obligation was to
provide clear, unencumbered title. To the extent
that is a legal interpretation of the addendum,
It's irrelevant, and the Court would strike it.
To the extent it is simply Hilliard's belief that
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Page 20
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1 he had to provide clear, unencumbered title, I
2 think it is perhaps relevant as to his intent. So
J the Court is not going to
Court
4 is not going to allow Mr. Hilliard's
5 interpretation of the addendum to be controlling
6 if the Court finds that the language of that
7 addendum is clear and unambiguous.
8
Paragraph 23, Mr. Hilliard's -9

MR. SCHOSSBERGER: 22, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Did I miss one? 22? I did. My
a po log ies.
22. The Court Is going to -- again, 22
13 and 23 -- well, we'll stay with 22.
14 Mr. Hilliard's understanding or legal
15 interpretation of the addendum is not controlling.
16 Because we don't get to the intent of the parties
17 if the language of the contract is clear and
18 unambiguous.
19
His -- the fact that he understood that
20 to resolve only the claims of the Clark Is
21 Irrelevant to the legal Interpretation of the
22 contact language in this case. The Court -- to
23 the extent this evidence is Mr. HIiiiard's
24 understanding, the Court will not strike It.
25
But again, the Court will not use this
10

11
12

56
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paragraph as controlling the interpretation of the
addendum to the contract if the Court finds that
the addendum Is clear and unambiguous. This
paragraph would only become relevant if the Court
finds that we have to divine the intent of the
parties to resolve any ambiguities in the
addendum.
Paragraph 23, the first sentence is a
legal concluslon. I don't think that Mr. Hilliard
Is in a position to make a legal conclusion about
whether or not he received consideration. And so
to the extent that paragraph 23 contains a legal
conclusion about whether or not the Hilliards
received consideration for the execution of that
addendum, the Court is going to strike that.
In paragraph 26, Mr. Hllllard's
conclusion that he believed he had fulfilled the
obligation to remove the described exceptions -and I believe that was the two liens, thereby
delivering a clear title -- to the extent he has
personal knowiedge that the described exceptions
were removed, the Court will allow it to stay.
To the extent this paragraph is to be
read as any binding legal authority that the Court
would be required to follow, the Court declines to
Hi of 35 sheets
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1

strike that. Whether or not the exceptions were

1

2
3

fulfilled is a -- I think a different question
than the question the Court Is being asked to

2
3

4

under the summary judgment motion. And so

4

Jay Clark was to be terminated. And this Is on
the first page of the purchase and sale agreement,
Exhibit B to the Tiegs' affidavit at page ML776.
It's undisputed that as closing
approached, it became apparent that Jay Clark was

not going to be leaving the property, or did not

5

the Court would find it Irrelevant to that

5

6

purpose.

6

7

To the extent it slmpiy reflects
Mr. Hilliard's understanding, it's -- he's welcome

7

Intend to leave the property quietly. And that

8
9

to have his understanding, but it would not be

8
9

the parties then extended the closing date a
couple times, and then executed addendum No. 4,

10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17
18

19
20

binding on the Court unless the Court finds that
it is not a clear and unambiguous contract.

10

which is the particular contract language at Issue

11

Now that we've gone through the
affidavits, Mr. Schossberger, do you wish to argue

12
13

here before this court.
It's undisputed that the purchase of
the farm closed an December 30th, 2010, alter

your motion for summary judgment?
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Your Honor, I've been

14
15

execution of addendum No. 4, and at that time the
exceptions to tltle regarding Jay Clark's lease,

suffering a cold. My voice isn't so good, so I'm

16

going to let Mr. Gordon argue.
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Gordon.

17

purported lease, and John Clark's purported
memorandum of ownership, remained as exceptions of

18

title as of December 30th, 2010.

19
20

It's undisputed that Jay Clark still
retained possession of the farm, and -- on

21
22

December 30th, and that he refused to vacate,
despite multiple notices from Murphy Land, and

23
24

also prior notices from the Hilliards as well.
It's undisputed that Murphy land and

25

the Hilliards both sued Jay Clark to remove him

MR. GORDON: Thank you, Your Honor.
There are basically two questions for

21

this Court to address in this motion for summary

22

23
24

judgment. The first question: Does the addendum
mean what it says? Is it clear and unambiguous
about its language, that the escrow funds are to

25

be used and to be made available to compensate

60
1
2

Murphy Land for its damages suffered as a result
of loss or delay of possession of Crystal Springs

62
1

from the farm. Murphy Land went through extensive

2

efforts in this Court to get him off as quickly as
possible, and continued on, finally moving for

3

Farm? The second issue is is there a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether or not
Murphy Land suffered in excess of $3 million in

4

8

damages?
The answer to the first question Is
yes, the addendum means what it says. The answer

9

to the second question is no, there Is no genuine

9

3

4
5
6

7

10
11

12
13
14

15
16

Issue of material fact.
Let's start with the -- what I believe
are the undisputed facts that are relevant here.
It's undisputed that Frank Tiegs entered Into
negotiations to purchase the farm on behalf of
Murphy Land. That he Informed the Hilllards that
Murphy Land Company was Interested in purchasing
the farm to farm It. They didn't want Jay Clark
on there. They didn't want him as a tenant.

5

summary judgment, following hlm into bankruptcy,
and moving for immediate relief from stay to come

6

back to this Court to finally get a writ of

7

possession, and that Jay Clark was finally removed
by the Owyhee County sheriff on May 2nd, 2012.

8
10

11

It's also undisputed that up until that
time, May 2nd, 2012, Murphy Land was prevented
from entering Crystal Springs Farm and farming it

15

according to the plans that it had set forth when
it purchased that property.
Now, the legal standard on motions for
summary judgment is, of course, well known by this

16

Court. But there are four principles that I think

17

12
13
14

It's undisputed that they signed a

19

are particularly relevant, a couple of which have
already been mentioned by this Court In Its
rulings on the motions to strike the affidavit.

20
21
22
23

One that has not been mentioned that I
think Is particularly relevant is that whereas
here this action will be tried by the Court as the
factfinder, Instead of by a jury, the trial court

!4

purchase and sale agreement on November 5th, 2010,
for closing as
December 28th. It's undisputed that an express
condition of that purchase and sale agreement was
that the lease with Jay Clark was to be

is

terminated; the Hilliards' existing lease with

24
25

as the trier of fact ls entitled to arrive at the
most probable Inferences based upon the

17

18
19
20

21

22
!3

that set the deadline
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evidence properly before it, and grant summary
judgment, despite the possibility of conflicting
inferences. Th is is from the Idaho Supreme Court
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP, 149
87 at
90.
l don't know that there are any
conflicting inferences in thls case, Your Honor,
but to the extent this Court finds any conflicting
lnferences 1 that does not constrain it from
granting summary judgment In favor of Murphy Land.
The second thing, the second principle
that is particularly relevant, which was alluded
to earlier by this Court, is that in order to
survive summary judgment, a nonmoving party's case
must be anchored in, quote, something more than
speculation. And that's G&M Farms versus Funk
Irrigation Company, 119 Idaho 514 at 517.
The third principal is that a mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to
the facts Is not sufficient to create a genuine
issue for purposes of summary judgment. Again,
this is the Idaho Supreme Court speaking, In
Marchand, M-a-r-c-h-a-n-d, versus JEM Sportwear,
143 Idaho 458 at 458, 459.
And finally, conclusory assertions

2

3
4

5
6

7
8
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17
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20

1

21
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unsupported by specific facts are insufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment. This was the Idaho Supreme
Court speaking last year in Kootenai County versus
Harriman-Sayler, 293 P.3d, 637 at 641.
With those prlnciples in mind, Your
Honor, let's talk about the first issue. The
first Issue Is the language of the addendum.
Murphy Land submits that the language of the
addendum means exactly what it says. It's not
ambiguous, and there has been no reasonable
conflicting Interpretation offered by the
Hllliards here.
The critical language of that addendum
says, quote, upon completion of such litigation
and appeals, these funds shall be avallable to the
extent determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction of the amount of purchaser's damage,
if any, for loss or delay of possession of real
estate purchased herein.
Now, the first clause of that has a
contingency regarding the completion of litigation
and appeals. Both sides agree that contingency
has been waived when the Hilliards decided to flle
a lawsuit in this Court. Both sides agree that
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this is a court of competent jurisdiction. What's
left for the Court to do is to decide what ls the
amount of purchaser's damage, if any, for loss or
delay of possession of Crystal Springs Farm.
The language is clear. It's plain.
It's unambiguous. It means what It says.
In response, the Hilliards offer up a
cursory response. They say that the language ls
ambiguous -- and this is at pages 11 and 12, their
response brief. They claim that the language of
the addendum is ambiguous, because it does not use
the terms indemnity. It doesn't speak of, quote,
lost profits. So Mr. Hilliard says, I didn't
understand that I was indemnifying Murphy Land for
its lost profits.
Two critical problems with this
response. Number one, the Hilliards fail to
articulate any conflicting interpretation of the
language, let alone any conflicting interpretation
that ls reasonable. And as a matter of law, an
ambiguous contract ls one that is reasonably
subject to conflicting interpretations. That's
from the Idaho Supreme Court earlier this year In
Boise Mode, LLC case at 294 P.3d, 1111 at page
1120.

66

64
1

20

1
2
3

4

s
6

7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14

15
16

17
18

19
20
21

22
23

24
25

So thene has to be a reasonable
conflicting Interpretation. The Hilllards have
offered none, Your Honor, and I would submit that
there is none. The language is very clear on
this.
Second, as the -- as the Court alluded
to in its rulings on the motions to strike, the
Hllliards' subjective understanding of what the
addendum means is irrelevant to a determination of
whether or not the contract is ambiguous.
Certainly If the Court determines that It's
ambiguous, then we can look at Intent. But on
this initial look, is the contract ambiguous or
unambiguous, whether -- any subjective
understanding offered up by the Hllllards is
simply irrelevant to that.
And the Idaho Supreme Court's very
clear about this in Swanson versus Beco
Construction Company, 145 Idaho 59 at 63. Quote,
a contract ls not rendered ambiguous on Its face
because one of the parties thought that the words
used had some meaning that differed from the
ordinary meanings of those words. So the
Hilliards' response on the question of ambiguity
is simply ineffectual, Your Honor, and the
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language -- the Court can take a look at lt, and
I'm sure it has, and determine that the language
means what it says.
I 4
Now we get to the second issue: What
s is the amount of damages? Certainly that Is a
6 question of fact. Certainly that is a question of
' 7 material fact. But the question here at the
8 summary judgment stage, is there -- is there any
9 genuine dispute as to the amount of damages. And
10 these are particularly the amount of damages for
11 delay of possession.
12
And there Is no genuine Issue as to the
13 amount at all. The Hilliards have falled to
14 create a genuine issue, to raise a genuine issue,
15 and certainly they have failed to create -- or
16 raise a genulne issue as to whether or not the
17 damages exceeded the amount of the escrow funds,
18 $3 million. And that's relevant, because what's
19 being sought In this case is the release of those
20 escrow funds.
21
Murphy Land, of course, had the burden
22 to put forth evidence of what those damage -- of
23 what those damages were. And Murphy Land has done
24 that. They've established to a reasonable
25 certainty that it suffered well In excess of
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68
$3 million in damages. The best estimate Is
approximately $4.3 million, as set forth In the
3 memorandum and in the affidavit of Frank Tiegs.
4
Now, this Is done based on two legal
5 principles. The first one is -- and this is from
6 the Wing v. Hulet case, talking about damages for
7 crop loss. And it doesn't exactly apply In this
8 context, Your Honor, because that situation's
9 where crops are harmed or damaged, and that's not
10 the claim here. But what the Wing v. Hulet case
11 says is a measure for damages for crop loss Is the
12 difference between the value of the crops actually
13 raised and the value of the crops that would have
14 been raised under normal conditions. That's at
15 106 Idaho 919.
16
In this case, Murphy Land says, we
17 would have raised X, Y, and Z crops, but for the
18 fact that we were prevented from entering and
19 farming the land according to our plan. So
20 it's ~- I think the measure for damages is still
21 calculated the same way, even though it's speaking
22 about crop loss in a different context than we
23 have here.
24
The second legal principal is that the
i 25 amount of damages here does not need to be

70

1

1

2
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established to a mathematical certitude. And this
Is from the Idaho Supreme Court, Sells v.
Robinson, 141 Idaho 767 at 774, where the Court
said the amount of damages need only be
established to a reasonable degree of certainty.
Reasonable certainty does not require mathematical
exactitude, but only that the damages be taken out
of the realm of speculation.
The Frank Tiegs affidavit and the
documents, the extensive documents supporting that
affidavit establish to a reasonable certainty that
the damages to Murphy Land from being prevented
from entering and farming Crystal Springs Farm in
the manner that it wanted to until May 2nd,
2007 -- excuse me, 2012, were approximately
$4.3 mill!on, and certainly exceeded $3 million.
Now, Mr. Tiegs is a long-time farmer
and businessman, as he sets forth In his -- his
summary of his background attached as Exhibit A to
his affidavit. And of particular relevance, he
says in there that he farms over 100,000 acres a
year in Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, and this -much of the supporting data that -- the data that
supports Mr. Tiegs• affidavit, of course, comes
from farms in proximity to the Crystal Springs

3

4
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Farm here In southern Idaho.
Mr. Tiegs sets forth projections for
each of his farm plans for the years 2011 and
2012. And those projections are based on his
experience and on data from comparable farms.
Let's start with 2011, Your Honor. In
2011, there's no dispute that Murphy Land Company
was kept off of Crystal Springs Farm for the
entirety of 2011, with the exception, which I'll
discuss, that Owyhee Farming Company, LLC, sister
company of Murphy Land Company, was able to
release certain property on the farm and grow
potatoes there.
Mr. Tiegs sets forth his plan for how
he would have farmed Crystal Springs Farm. This
Is -- the summary is Exhibit El to his affidavit
at page ML326. And it shows that he estimated
that he would have made just north of $3 million,
had he been able to farm the farm how he wanted
to. The details of that are on Exhibit El at
Murphy Land -- or I'm sorry, ML328-331, attached
to Mr. Tiegs' affidavit.
Those numbers are supported by actual
numbers from comparable farms in 2011. In fact,
the actual numbers from comparable farms show
19 of 35 sheets
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1

if anything, Mr. Tiegs' estimate was

1

potatoes.

2

conservative. When you use the actual numbers

2

That amount, the $800,000, has been

3

from comparable farms In southern Idaho, you see

3

deducted From the loss calculation that Mr. Tiegs

4

that

4

does for Murphy

5

Owyhee Farming

6

separate entities, because

7

same people, it seems equitable that the profits

5

the actual loss estimate is dose -- is about
mllfion. And this is summarized at paragraph

6

7

and apply those to Mr. negs' fann plan,

19E

Mr. Tiegs' affidavit.

And I won't -- I won't take the Court

8

9

10
11
12
13
14

through each one of those crops, unless the Court

recognizing that even though
and Murphy Land Company are
owned

the

8

made by Owyhee Farming on that -- on that property

9

should be deducted from the claimed loss profits

would like me to. But just to give an example,

10

of Murphy Land. So that's been done, Your Honor,

the first crop that Mr. negs discusses Is the

11

In the calculations, and that's discussed at

Norkotah potatoes. And if you look at his

12

paragraph 19 and paragraph 19E of Mr. Tiegs'

estimate and then the actual numbers for Norkotah

13

affidavit.

potatoes grown at the B. Wolf circles, just on the

14

2012, it's undisputed that -- that
Murphy Land was not able to enter and take
possession, full possession of the farm until

15

other side of C.J. Strike Reservoir from Crystal

15

16

Springs Farm, you see that using those numbers

16

17

from the B. Wolf farm results in a higher loss of

17

May 2nd of that year. And because of that delayed

18

about $360,000 more than Mr. Tiegs' estimate.

18

possession, not surprisingly, they were not able

19

to grow the crops that they wanted to, according

Mr. negs estimated 20 tons per acre,

19

20

and a sale price of $320 per ton. This is in his

21
22
23

$1.6 million net revenue from growing those

plan, Exhibit El at page 328. Estimated about
potatoes.
The data from the B. Wolf circles shows

24
25

20 to the plans, according to their plan for that
21 year. Exhibit E2 is the actual plan for that
22 year, and the actual farming data from 2012 is in
23 Exhibit E.

that during 2011, Owyhee Farming Company, which

Paragraph 20 of Mr. Tiegs' affidavit

24
25

details the calculation of loss for 2012, and it's

74

72

1 supported by Exhibits I and K through P.
2
In 2012, Mr. Tiegs estimated a 600 --

1

was farming over at B. Wolf circles, got a yield

2

or 20.828 tons

3

Mr. Tiegs estimated for Crystal Springs Farm, and

3

approximately $684,000 loss. If you use actual

4

sold those for $308.05 cents per ton, slightly

4

numbers, it's slightly less in 2012, about

5

less than Mr. Tiegs estimated for Crystal Springs

5

$632,000.

6

Farm. And if you apply the actual -- those

6

7

numbers with actual cost numbers from the B. Wolf

7

B

circles, to Mr. Tiegs' plan for Crystal Springs

8

Mr. negs' affidavit and the supporting data, the

9

Farm, you show net revenue from Norkotah potatoes

9

total loss to Murphy Land, ln terms of its loss

10

per acre, so slightly more than

in 2011 of close

11

to $2 million.

And Mr. Tiegs goes through the same

Using the actual numbers from
comparable farms In 2011 and 2012, based on

10

profits for those two years, Is approximately

11

$4.3 million.

12

thing with each of the other crops that he

12

13

Intended to farm, or that Murphy Land intended to

13

14

farm at Crystal Springs Farm in 2011: The DNS

14

correlates with the date that the exceptions were

15

wheat, the corn, the alfalfa. These are in

15

removed, that date, I don't believe, Is

Even if we use the date of March 28th,
2012, instead of May 2nd, 2012, because that

16

paragraphs 198, 19C, and 190 of Mr. Tiegs'

16

particularly relevant. The question Is when was

17

affidavit, and supported by data in Exhibits G, H,

17

Murphy Land's delay in possession, when did that

18

and J.

18

end. But even if you use that date, the numbers

19

still far exceed $3 mrllion. Indeed, they exceed
$3 million Just 1n 2011 alone.

19

Now, as I mentioned before, Owyhee

20

Farming Company was able to lease approximately

20

21
22

450 acres of land at Crystal Springs Farm in 2011

21

from Mr. Clark. Actually, the lease was with

22

Mr. negs' damage calculations is set forth at

23
24
25

Clark's Crystal Springs Ranch, LLC. As set forth

23

pages 15 to 18 of Its memorandum. As has been

in Mr. Tiegs' affidavit, Owyhee Farming Company

24

discussed already by the Court in ruling on the

netted approximately $800,000 from farming those

25

motions to strike, those are -- it relies on the
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1
2
3

affidavit of Jay Clark, and in particular, the
statements that it relies upon, that -- r'm sorry,
that Hilliards rely upon. Those are conclusory

4

assertions, and based on statements that this
Court
now found to be inadmissible.
Even If they had -- even If the Court
had found them to be admissible, they've simply
failed to raise genuine issues of material fact as
to the amount of damages at all, and secondly, as
to whether the amount of damages exceeds
$3 million.
Now, the Hilliards have already
admitted that they have no personal knowledge to
dispute Frank Tiegs' damages calculations. And
you can see this in Exhibit J to the first
affidavit of Matthew Gordon, the response to
request for admission No. 8 and No. 9.
And instead, the response here relies
entirely upon the affidavit of Jay Clark. For the
reasons already discussed by this court, those
particular statements are inadmisslble. Even if
they were considered, they are nothing more than
condusory assertions unsupported by specific
facts. Under the law, they are insufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact precluding
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summary adjustment. That's, again, from the
Kootenai County case, 293 P.3d at 641.
THE COURT: Mr. Gordon, I'm going to
interrupt you just for a minute, so I'm dear.
MR. GORDON: Please, sure.
THE COURT: Is your client seeking the
$4.3 million, or simply a release of the
$3 mlllion In escrow?
MR. GORDON: In this -- In this case, Your
Honor, my client is seeking a release of the
$3 million in escrow, plus, of course, any
Interest that's accrued during the time that it
was In escrow, which I'm not aware of. But no, in
this declaratory judgment action, seeking the
release of the $3 million in escrow.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. GORDON: In sum, on the question of
damages, Your Honor, Murphy land's established the
amount of damages to a reasonable certainty, based
on specific facts supported by data, supported by
Mr. Tiegs' affidavit, and the Hllliards have done
nothing to create, raise a genuine Issue of
material fact as to that amount. Instead, what
the Hilliards have done, Your Honor, is they've
taken basically a kitchen sink approach. And
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they've thrown out a number of arguments in reply,
or In response, many of which are inconsistent
with the posltion that the Hllliards previously
took in this case, and all of which are
unsupported by law or fact.
So they begin with several -- asserting
various unappl!ed affirmative defenses: The
failure of consideration, mutual mistake, failure
to mitigate. None of these, In addition -- In
addition to being not pied, none of these is
adequately supported. And let's be very clear.
It is the Hilliards' burden at this stage to
adequately support any affirmative defenses they
raise. And this is Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho
765 at 771.
They first -- the Hilllards first taik
about the failure of consideration and mutual
mistake. And they seek a rescission of the
addendum, Your Honor. I don't know that this
quite rises to the level of judicial estoppel,
because the Court has not entered any ruling based
on the prior position that the Hilliards took, but
it's certainly inconsistent with the Hilliards'
action in filing a complaint with this Court to
enforce the addendum.
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Nowhere in that complaint does the -does the Hilliards hint at anything that the -that the addendum might be unenforceable, or that
it should be rescinded. And let's keep in mind,
we are now approaching almost three years since
that addendum was executed. Almost three years
since the Hilliards put the $3 million Into
escrow. And now for the first time In a response
to motion for summary judgment for which they are
unable to raise any genuine issue of material
fact, they raise these issues about, well, that
should be rescinded.
But even setting that aside, Your
Honor, neither one of these arguments has any
merit. Even if consideration was required for
this addendum -- and I don't think that the
Hilliards have met their burden to establish that
it was required, because If you look at the
language of the addendum and you look at the
language of the agreement, and you see that It's
ail one Integrated agreement.
But even if separate consideratlon was
required for this addendum, there was more than
adequate consideration given here. Murphy land
was not obligated to go forward with the terms of
21 of 35 sheets
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1

1

2

the purchase and sale agreement on December 30th,
2010, because an express condition of that
3 purchase and sale agreement had not been met.
4 That express condition was Jay Clark's lease to
5 terminated.
6
So the consideration -- and in addition
7 to that, the title was not clear, because Mr. -8 Mr. Jay Clark and Mr. John Clark's exceptions -9 recorded instruments were -- showed up as
10 exceptions to title.
11
The consideration that Murphy Land gave
12 for this addendum was they said, okay, we will go
13 ahead and purchase the property. In exchange for
14 you -- notwithstanding that we don't have,
15 notwithstanding that we would be in violation of
16 the purchase and sale agreement if we walked away
17 at this point, in exchange for the $3 million In
18 escrow to protect us from damages.
19
As to the mutual mistake of fact, Your
20 Honor, there's -- I don't think there's even an
21
allegation, a genuine allegation in the response
22 that there was a mutual mistake of fact. What the
23 response talks about is a mistake, an alleged
24 mistake of understanding by Mr. Hilliard. That's
25 not -- that's not sufficient for rescission.
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Rescission happens on a mutual mistake of fact.
There's no evidence whatsoever of any mutual
mistake of fact.
As to the mitigation defense, Your
Honor, this Idaho Supreme Court is clear that this
is an affirmative defense that requires more than
a, quote, mere suggestion. This is from the
McCormick Internation USA, Inc. case, 152 Idaho
920 at 924, just last year from the Idaho Supreme
Court.
Now, this Court has already noted that
it's -- that It's unclear that there's any
affirmative obligation on a party such as Murphy
Land to try and rent out ground from somebody who
is trespassing on its property. And certainly I
would agree that the Hilliards have not
established -- and again, it's their burden -they have not supported their defense with
anything indicating that Murphy Land would have
had an obligation to do that.
And here there Is, even setting that
aside, there is only the mere suggestion that the
McCormick International court talked about, and
that's in Jay Clark's affidavit, stating that he
was willing and able to rent the rest of Crystal
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Springs Farm to Murphy land. That's what the
Hilliards based their mitigation defense on.
Of course, there's nothing specific in
Mr. Clark's affidavit. Nothing about the terms on
which he would have rented it Nothing indicating
that had he so rented it, it would have resulted
in less damages to Murphy Land. There is not a
single specific fact In there about what lt would
have cost Murphy Land to rent that iand from him,
if, In fact, he actually had been willing to rent
to it.
And as this Court earlier noted, this
is contrary to sworn statements by Mr. Clark that
he has previously made to this Court that were
provided as attachments to the second affidavit of
Matthew Gordon in which he talked about all the
crops that he had already planted, all the monies
he had put into those crops, and that it wouldn't
be workable to share those -- to share the farm
with somebody else, and that, contrary to his
statement, that Murphy Land could have grown
anything they wanted, anywhere they wanted, at any
time they wanted. He wasn't agreeable to that.
He wanted to closely monitor anything that was
grown on -- from that farm.
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Finally, the Hilliards talk about
this -- they raise an argument about indemnity,
and they raise an argument about lost profits.
Neither of these has merits, Your Honor. The
Hilliards mischaracterized the nature of this
dispute.
This is not a suit for a breach of
indemnity agreement. This ls not a suit for a
breach of contract seeking consequential damages.
This ls a suit that says look at the addendum.
The addendum says these monies are to be made
available in the amount of damages suffered by
Murphy Land for delay of possession.
What are those damages? The addendum
is clear. Murphy land is a business. Its damages
in this case are lost profits. Murphy Land has
put forth adequate evidence to meet its burden to
establish to a reasonable certainty what those
damages are. The Hllliards have done nothing in
response to raise a genuine Issue.
For that reason, Your Honor, summary
judgment should enter in favor of Murphy Land
Company and a declaration ordering that the escrow
funds be released to Murphy Land Company. If this
Court has any questions, I'd be happy to stand for
22 of 35 sheets
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those.
THE COURT: I do not.
MR. GORDON. Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Shurtliff, we've been
going for a solid two hours and 15 minutes. At
some
we're going to have to take a break,
because I talk fast, and my poor court reporter Is
doing her level best to keep up. You can choose.
If you'd like to have a break now, we'll take a
ten-minute recess, or I can do it after you have
completed your argument. It's up to you, sir.
MR. SHURTLIFF: I would just as soon go
ahead, but -THE COURT; Then that's perfectly fine.
MR. SHURTLIFF: If Madam Reporter's all
right -- she can do it.
THE COURT: She can do rt. She can do it,
so you go ahead.
MR. SHURTLIFF: She nodded her head saying
she can do it.
It's not an indemnity case. It's not a
contract case. It's a case that just $3 million
laying there, and we want It. What's the
predicate for us wanting lt? Not a contract. Not
an indemnity. Not a tort. We're not suing
84
because somebody committed a crime. What's the
predicate? Told us what it Isn't. What Is it?
It springs from -- and I concede this,
Your Honor -- addendum 4. Addendum 4 -- and, you
know, Your Honor, Mr. Gordon said a lot of
undisputed things. And there's cursory and all
this. But undisputed -- it's undisputed that
addendum 4 was before the closing of the farm.
Where in this record is that undisputed? I don't
know that it's terribly important.
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this: Are
the Hllliards disputing that addendum 4 was
executed -- let me ask you this: What ls your
client's position about whether or not the
addendum was executed before or after closing?
MR. SHURTLIFF: Our position is, Your Honor,
with some effort, we've been unable to determine
that.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SHURTLIFF: We can't even find the
author of addendum 4, who drafted it, when and
where. It's -- just seems to have sprung from no
place on or about the 30th of December 2010, or
some ear!ler iterations of it.
THE COURT: Okay.
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1
MR. SHURTLIFF: So Your Honor, I don't know
2 what it is, if it isn't a contract or an indemnity
3 or a breach or a tort or something. I'm just old
4 fashioned. I like to know why we're here. It's a
S given that we're here, according to Murphy,
e because the language says unambiguously, the money
7 will be here. Well, I suggest, Your Honor, that
8 addendum 4 is not quite as unambiguous as one
9 would think it Is and one would assert that it is.
10
Addendum 4 is not the most artfully
11 drafted piece of work that has been done. The
12 paragraph -- the first paragraph of it is quite
13 unrelated than the second paragraph of It, the
14 paragraph that gets us here and gets Murphy
15 wanting the money.
16
They talk about -- first paragraph
17 talks about the leading exceptions, 32 and 33.
18 And it goes on at length about the requirement to
19 do so. And that's where the money was deposited.
20 Deposited In there. And then they talk about some
21 more rent monies and get those.
22
These funds shall be held in trust
23 pending issuance of an endorsement to the buyer's
24 policy of a title Insurance, deleting exceptions
25 32 and 33, currently shown on the commitment for
86
1 title Insurance. Period. Disbursements of such
2 portions of such deposited funds may be made in
3 the following manner, with the written direction
4 to both the seller and the buyer. In exchange for
5 such documentation as the title company deems
6 sufficient, or In the event of any deposited funds
7 remain with guaranteed title after exhaustion of
8 all of seller's remedies and defenses, and of all
9 appeals therefrom, with respect to the removal of
10 the title matters, the company shall have the
11 option to lnterpiead such funds Into a judicial
12 court proceeding.
13
THE COURT: Are you -14
MR. SHURTLIFF: New paragraph.
15
THE COURT: Okay. I'm with you. I was just
18 tracking where you were at. Go ahead.
17
MR. SHURTLIFF: That's the first paragraph.
18 And, you know, I don't know If we put a lot of
19 value on more words than less, but there are a
20 whole lot more words in paragraph 1 than there are
21 in 2.
22
Upon completion of such litigation and
23 appeals. Well, obviously that refers to the
above, or I would -- shouldn't say obviously. I
like obviously. Or -- I don't !Ike a lot of
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23
24

words. But it would seem to me that it refers to
the lltlgat!on and appeals concerning the removal
of the title exceptions.
The funds shall be available to the
extent determined by a court of competent
risdiction -- which this one
we think -- of
the amount of purchaser's damage, if any, for loss
or delay of possession. Well, that paragraph
doesn't say lost profits. Doesn't say loss of
farming opportunity, loss of bad guy holding over.
It says damages, if any.
Now, if the word damages were self
defining, this Court, lawyers and everybody else,
would have a whole lot less work to do. And
insurance policies would be a whole lot shorter
than they are. The word damages in addendum 4
must mean something. But what? It doesn't say.
Damages, lost profit? Damages Including
attorney's fees for abortive attempts to get a bad
guy off the farm? Damages for the cost of driving
to and from Murphy? What is damages? Didn't say.
They took all this time, spent all this effort,
and didn't define it.
If any. If any. Obvlously at the time

25

that the addendum 4 was entered into, there was a
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December 30th on that deadline.
5
So ordinarily buyers assume a piece of
6 property subject to the lease that's on that
7 property. But here, Mr. Hilliard had indicated,
8 In his buy/sell agreement, that he would take care
9 of those issues. Couldn't, by December 30th, so
10 we need to do something.
11
Did Mr. HIiiiard and Mrs. Hilliard, by
12 signing addendum 4, agree to pay damages to Murphy
13 Land for ten years if Mr. Clark's ten-year lease
14
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question whether there would be damages.
Otherwise, why do we put "if any" in the
provision? If any.
In this case we're here, and
Mr. Gordon, Mr. Schossberger, and Murphy assert
that the damage issue Is crystal clear as to -because we're a business, It's Jost profit. Well,
there's many ways of determining what damages are.
Damages are of many kind and variety. Like
potatoes, I think. So we need to define it with a
little more precision than what was defined in
addendum 4.
What does such litigation mean? And I
appreciate -- I know the Court's going through the
affidavits of everybody. And the Court's
suggestion as to Mr. Hilliard's affidavit, that
what he thought addendum 4 was is not controlling.
I accept that notion, the Court's view In that
regard. But it was undisputed, his notion of what
It was. That is, to take care of the title
deficiency problems.
Was he suggesting that he would be -what if -- what if the -- because remember, Judge,
at the time, December 30th, 2010, Mr. Clark was on
the
Mr. Clark had not indicated any
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had been upheld? What reasonable person would do
that?
And in that regard, Your Honor,
reasonableness. Reasonableness. And I applaud
the work of Mr. Schossberger and Mr. Gordon in

24

getting this today. They're doing good work.
They've made significant progress In getting to a
position where Mr. Tiegs wlll never have to stand
cross examination on his "if I had had the farm."
"I estimate that." "Based on this." "Based on
that." "I would have made." "I could have made."

25

Conclusory? It's all conclusory.
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prodivity to leave. The farm, the sale was
coming down, whether we want to track it to a need
to fulfill a 1031 or not, it was coming down to
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Another word I worry about sometimes, because most
of what we do Is conclusory.
Mr. Tiegs has an affidavit f!Hed
with -- replete with all kinds of small print from
other places, other farms, other entities. But
you read his affidavit, and it's I estimate, I
prepared, if I had. If that's not speculation, I
don't know what the word speculation means. "If
I'd had." "If I'd had." "I estimate." There's

nothing concrete about that.
11
Your Honor, addendum 4 is not -- I
12 don't know that it's ambiguous. That's why we
13 have judges. I think that we can't read ft
14 without reading the whole of it. We can't read
15 just that paragraph upon completion of such
16 litigation. We need to kind of think about what
17 such litigation means and the context of the whole
18 of the addendum 4.
19
What are damages? And what is, In the
20 context of this case, these facts, these parties,
21 what is delay In possession? On December 30th,
22 2010, they dosed the deal. They knew there was
23 going to be a delay in possession, because
24 Jay Clark was on the farm. Thereafter
Land came down here to
10
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and filed a lawsuit trying to get Jay Clark off
the farm -- didn't succeed -- In the year 2011.
Mr. Hilliard and Mrs. Hilliard flied a
lawsuit against Mr. Clark, and It took a while.
And
this Court determined that Mr.
be there, and that his lease was no
and he should leave. And ultimately the
Court entered an order tefling him to get off, and
he finally got off.
But Your Honor, those are all facts
that ought to be fleshed out In trial. This is -and you know 1 I appreciate -- I appreciate that we
go through affidavits and strike this and strike
that, and we should have done this, and we should
have done that. But the essence of all that we
do, the essence of our purpose, is to achieve a
just result in the context of the facts of the
case, and in the context of what Is and what
isn't.
And in this case, Your Honor, you're
being asked -- you're being asked to decide
summarily a $3 million case, without any
opportunity for exposition of all the Issues,
without any opportunity for examination of
Mr. Tiegs, which might take a minute, given the --
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given the quality of his small print. His "I
estimates" and "if I'd had. 11 He needs to be
examined as to the bona fides of his contentions.
That's what a trial would do, and that's what we
ought to have, Your Honor. We ought to have a
fulf exposition, given the limitations this
Court's Imposed. And that's -- that's as It
should be.
But Your Honor, it's not clear. It's
not ipso facto. There are issues. What Mr. Tiegs
and Mr. Funk, Murphy Land Company, through the
good offlces of Mr. Re -- or Mr. Schossberger and
Mr. Gordon -- are trying to do Is avoid that full
exposition of Issues. Because what they want you
to do, Your Honor, Is to do something that every
farmer In this state knows, Mr. Tiegs knows
without saying, anybody knows: You don't buy a
farm for nine-and-a-half million dollars and pay
for It in two years. You don't suffer a
40 percent net profit on your Investment. And
that's what his damages would suggest.
That's -- if we just look at the
number -- that number alone, nine-and-a-half
million dollars for a farm. One would have to
assume, although it's not in the record,
that
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1 was an arm's length transaction arrived at by a
2 willlng buyer and a willing seller negotiating a
J fair
for a piece of property,
4 nine-and-a-half million dollars. And Mr. Tiegs
5 wants to
us, tell you, and they want you to
a tell Mr. HIiiiard and Mrs. Hilliard, that, oh, he
7 would have made $4.3 million profit lf he'd had
8 possession of the farm In 2011? Two years plus to
9 pay for the farm? It don't happen. It's not
10 reasonable. It's speculative.
11
It's -- it's -- on its face, Your
12 Honor, I don't -- I apologize for the quality of
13 our affidavits In response, but on its face It's
14 untenable. You don't do that. There ain't a
15 farmer in Owyhee County that would tell you I can
16 pay for my farm in two-and-a-half years. It
17 don't -- It don't happen.
18
And I don't care how well done it Is,
19 Mr. Tiegs' affidavit is, and I don't care whether
20 he grows 100,000 acres or 100 acres. The validity
21 of his argument that, oh, If I'd had the farm -22 if I had had the farm ln 2011, I had a crop plan.
23
Wefl, when did he have the crop plan,
24 Your Honor? Let's be reasonable here. Did he
25 have the crop plan before he bought the farm,
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December the 30th, 2010? Hardly. When did he
develop this crop plan that becomes the predicate
and basis for his affidavit? I'd like to ask him.
They're telling me I shouldn't have that
opportunity.
If I'd had the farm, I would have grown
400-plus acres of the best potato that you could
grow at the highest price and a great yield. And
you -- we can strike all we want about
countervalllng arguments in regard to price and
numbers, but his price and numbers are good.
400-plus acres.
At the same tlme, Mr. Funk, his partner
In Murphy Land, had leased 458 acres from
Mr. Clark for 2011, and was growing Shepody
potatoes, a lesser valued potato. Why? I don't
know. Never been able to ask anybody.
He had a 3,000, more or less, acre
farm. You can't grow potatoes every year on every
acre. All the farmers know that. So where were
those 900 acres that would have been devoted to
farm ff I'd had to farm? He doesn't say which
field.
And this farm is laid out In fields,
and different areas1
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different pivots and different kinds of irrigation
systems. So where were those 900 acres? They're
not identified. Were there 900 acres capable of
growing Shepody and Norkotah potatoes in 2011, if
I'd had the farm? Speculation. Is it reasonable.
What they -- what the -- the legal
arguments and all I appreciate. The bottom line
Your Honor, is addendum 4 so absolutely clear,
notwithstanding the -- according to the
Defendants, counter-claimants that It's not a
contract, complaint, dispute, or an indemnity
contract -· is it so clear that there's no
argument as to its intent, purpose, and how it
ought to be Interpreted?
And secondarily, whether it's so clear,
based on an unexamined, un-critiqued, conclusory
affidavit of a very successful farmer that he
would have suffered damages in an amount that Is
unreasonable and untenable on their faces. Just
because he couched it in good language and maybe
met a better -- the better test of what he based
it on, doesn't make it valid. What makes it valid
is the reality of the underlying proofs. And that
we ought to examine at a trial, Your Honor.
And the suggestion that this is, oh,

97
1
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11
12
13

14

15

16
17
18

19
20
21

22

23
24

25

relief they request would avoid us coming back in
February. But is that what we're about, avoiding
the full exposition of the Issues, giving
everybody the opportunity to fully and -- step up
and support their positions? If we get to ask
about the Ifs and the estimates and the
speculation and the reasonableness of Mr. Tiegs'
affidavit supporting his damage claim?
1 would suggest that the purpose of
Rule 56 is to cut through things. And some things
don't need to be cut through. Some things need to
be explored, and I would suggest that this is one
of them, especially the issue of damages, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Shurtliff.
We're going to take -- we'll come back
at quarter till, however many minutes that is.
Seven. So we will be back, and court will be in
recess for seven minutes.
(A recess was taken from 3:38 p.m. to 3:45 p.m.)
THE COURT: Back on the record, Owyhee
County Case 2013-03004, James and Barbara Hilliard
versus Murphy Land.
Mr. Gordon, any response?
MR. GORDON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

96
1
2
3

4

5

6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19

!O
11
2

3
I,

i

Just an open and shut case, that the Murphy -that the Hilllards' argument are all untoward and
cursory, no dispute, they're flimsy, without
merit -- that lost profits, because we're a
business, is what was meant by addendum 4 when lt
used the word damages? Where is that stated? Why
didn't it say so? Why isn't it articulated? They
use one page for addendum 4. They have two or
three pages for signature pages. Why didn't they
flesh it out?
It's not -- it's not a -- the
language -- addendum 4 is not a paragon of good
writing, I would submit, Your Honor, and it's not
quite as easy as we're having suggested here
today. There's more to it than that. And the
more to It ought to be examined at a trial where
the people get to explain what it was, what it is,
and what it Isn't. If It ain't a contract, it's
not a breach of contract case, what Is it? A case
over found money? It's not found money. It's
$3 million that belongs to somebody that's been in
escrow.
And Your Honor, I appreciate that we're
here today in December, and that motions for
summary judgment giving the counter-claimants the

e 95 to 98 of 128

Page 30

98
1 I'll keep it brief.
2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
1 21

22
23
24

25

What we've heard from counsel for the
Hilliards is argument. Argument, speculation.
Notably devoid from anything that counsel for
Mr. -- for the Hilllards said was any citation to
anything in the record that would create a genuine
issue of material fact as to the amount of damages
here.
Instead, what we got was an argument
from counsel basically against summary judgment as
a tool that this Court can use to get to the heart
of the matter and to cut down on things that don't
need to go to trial. Counsel's entitled to
express his opinions about summary judgment, I
suppose, but it's not relevant, Your Honor, and
there was nothing in there that says here is the
genuine issue of material fact.
Counsel didn't even mention any of the
affirmative defenses that were raised or any of
the other arguments. Instead, counsel basically
said: I don't like summary judgmenti we need to
go to triaL Wei!, summary judgment serves a
purpose.
Summary judgment's purpose, as counsel
admitted, is to cut through things, so that 1ly

3/7/2014 1:50·12 PM

hristy Davenport
99

1
2

3
4
S
6
?
8

9
10
11
12

13

14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23

24

25

cases where there is a genuine Issue of disputed
material fact actually go to trial. And that's
not this case, Your Honor. And counsel has
to nothing indicating otherwise.
Counsel talked about the addendum. And
counsel says that Murphy Land claims that this ls
not a contract case, that the addendum is not a
contract. That is not accurate. Of course it's a
contract. We're talking about -- we cite
authority talking about interpreting contracts and
how to deal with contracts. The addendum is a
contract. It's part of the purchase and sale
agreement.
Of course this is a dispute about a
contract. The point was that this ls not a suit
for a breach of contract, where we talk about
things like consequential damages. This ls a
dispute to enforce a contract and to determine
what does the contract say and what are the amount
of the damages that the contract causes.
Counsel says what does damages mean?
Damages means damages, Your Honor. There's -there's no limitation on what the damages are.
And counsel seems to suggest that damages needs to
specify exactly what damages are going to be

considered In determining the amount of damages
suffered by delay of possession.
3
There's no requirement for that. The
4 contract, the addendum means what it says. It
5 says damages. Murphy Land has put on competent
6 evidence of the amount of the damages, and despite
7 counsel's grand statements about summary judgment
8 and about Mr. Tiegs, and his attack on Mr. negs'
9 credibility and his reasonableness, and his
10 suggestions that Mr. Tiegs ls being somehow less
11 than forthright, counsel pointed to not a single
12 thing In Mr. Tiegs' affidavit that he could attack
13 wlth any specificity. Nothing saying that this
14 specific fact is unsupported or unsubstantiated.
15 Because it rs, Your Honor. It is.
16
And counsel says, well, Mr. Tiegs says
17 if I'd been able to farm the farm. And he says
18 It's speculation, because he says "If." Well, of
19 course he says If I'd been able to farm the farm,
20 according to the -- to my farm plans. That's what
21 you do ln a situation where somebody's prevented
22 from doing something. You have to talk about what
23 would have happened otherwise. But that doesn't
24 mean the calculation of damages Is speculation.
25
As discussed earlier, damages needs to
1
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be established to a reasonable certainty. That
does not require mathematical exactitude. It
that it be taken out of the realm of
speculation.
Mr. Tiegs' affidavit is based upon
numbers supported by comparable, actuai
numbers from the same crops grown at comparable
farms. And those numbers actually show that, If
anything, Mr. Tiegs underestimated the amount of
profit he would have made.
Counsel says, well, we need to go to
trial. We need to examine Mr. Tiegs. I didn't
have a chance to -- to get to dispute any of these
things.
That's what depositions are for, Your
Honor. Counsel had the opportunity to depose
Mr. Tiegs. He chose not to. Counsel deposed
Mr. Funk. There was not a single reference to
Mr. Funk's deposition in the papers opposing
summary judgment. Counsel's had that opportunity.
Your Honor, counsel's statements were
unsupported by the record. They mentioned many
things that were not in front of this Court.
Counsel's statements speculated about many, many
other things, but they didn't address the heart of

102
the issue: Is the contract, is the addendum No. 4
ambiguous?
Counsel himself says I don't know, I
3
4 don't know that it's not ambiguous. But he never
5 offered a reasonable conflicting interpretation as
6 to what damages might mean. He's talked about
7 what does such litigation mean? Your Honor, the
8 Hllllards have admitted that they've waived that
9 such litigation contingency. And this was
10 mentioned In our initial moving papers, and It's
11 In the affidavit of Matthew Gordon, Exhibit J,
12 response to request for admission No. 11. They
13 waived that by fillng this lawsuit.
Counsel didn't give any confllctlng
14
15 interpretation of what the addendum means.
16 Counsel didn't give any specific facts that raise
17 a genuine Issue as to the amount of damages.
18 There's nothing preventing summary judgment from
19 entering In favor of Murphy Land and a declaration
20 ordering the release of the escrow funds to Murphy
21 Land Company.
22
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gordon. One more
23 question.
24
MR. GORDON: Yes, Your Honor?
25
THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff did say it was -~
1

2
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it was not -- it was disputed whether or not
addendum 4 was executed prior to the closing of
the company. Could you point me to those
documents in the record, please?
MR. GORDON: Yes. Thank you for -- I meant
to address that, and I simply forgot, so I
the Court
that to my
attention.
First of all, this has never been an
issue raised In this litigation. I'm not sure -certainly the Hilliards haven't raised this. I
was surprised by Mr. Shurtliff's assertion.
Number two, I'm not sure that -- I don't
understand the relevance of that.
But paragraph 20 of Mr. Hilliard's
affidavit I believe addresses this,
Mr. Shurtliff's own claim. This is at page 5 of
his affidavit. It says -- Mr. HIiiiard says: My
wife and I provided our son, James W. Hilliard,
with a power of attorney to sign RE11, addendum
No. 4. That document was executed on
December 30th, 2010.
It's also addressed in Mr. Tiegs'
affidavit at paragraph 7, discussing the addendum
No. 4. In paragraph 8 it's discussed where the

1

4

Mr. Shurtliff or his clients have ever said

5

anything about disputing the timing of the
addendum.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: Well, additionally we
know, Your Honor, because the $3 million was
piaced Into escrow by the Hilliards at the time of
closing. That's undisputed, the $3 million
remains with Guaranty Title Company. So it had to
be pursuant to addendum No. 4 given to the title
company.
THE COURT: And -MR. SHURTLIFF: Well, that doesn't answer
the question -- and I don't know that it's a big
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104
warranty deed that conveyed title was on
December 30, 2010, as well.
3
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
4
MR. GORDON: You're welcome. Any further
5 questions, Your Honor?
6
THE COURT: No.
7
MR. GORDON: Thank you.
THE COURT: So it tells me that the -- I'm
8
9 looking at Mr. Hilliard's affidavit. Does -10 maybe I'm not understanding. It appears that both
11 the addendum 4 that was -- I don't think there's
12 any dispute that was executed on December 30th,
13 2010. But didn't the closing also take place on
14 2010 -- r mean, December 30th?
15
MR. GORDON: That's my understanding, Your
16 Honor, correct.
17
THE COURT: And so how do we know which one
18 was first? We just know they were both executed
19 the same day?
20
MR. GORDON: They were executed the same
day. My understanding is that they were
1 21
22 executed -- that it wouldn't have -- that the
23 dosing was not going to occur without the
24 execution of addendum No. 4. But this -- this
25 is -- there's nothing In the record that I'm aware
1

2
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3 representation about this was the first that
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question, but Your Honor, as a matter of fact, I
think the recorder's records would Indicate the
power of attorney was filed after the warranty
here In Owyhee County on the 30th of December
2010. Now, I don't know what that -- but the
power to sign addendum 4 was given to the son.
And so I don't -- you know, I don't know who
slgned what when.
THE COURT: Well, it's clear that --

106
MR. SHURTLIFF: And I'm not going to
represent to the Court that I do know.
THE COURT: rt does say that -- I mean, it's
clear that addendum 4 was executed on
December 30th, regardless of when the power of
attorney was filed. l mean, I think it's clear
that the power of attorney was executed prior to
the signing by the son, or I imagine we would have
that as an Issue ln the case. The Hllliards, are
they disputing, Mr. Shurtliff, that the $3 million
was placed in the escrow fund at closing?
MR. SHURTLIFF: I think not, Your Honor. It
was -- the money -- the funds were transferred for
the purchase of the property, and this was just
withheld from -- part of it went to pay a first
mortgage and some other things, and so I think it
was Just part of the parceling out by the title
company.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think the
standards for summary judgment are well known by
the parties. f'ii put them on the record just in
case. Under Rule 56(c), if the pleadings and
depositions and admissions, including any
affidavits, show there's no genuine issue of
material fact, then the moving party is entitled
28 of
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to summary judgment as a matter of law.
If there is conflicting information,
there generally Is not granted a motion for
summary judgment, unless the Court is the trier of
and then the Court can resolve issues of
credibility. We don't have to take all claims
favor of the nonmov!ng party.
The opposing party can't merely rest on
speculation or a scintilla of evidence. Once the
moving party establishes that there is not a
genuine issue of material fact, the burden shi~s
to the nonmovlng party to establish the genuine
issue of material fact.
If the Plaintiff fails to submit
evidence sufficient to establish that element of
the claim, or to establish the genuine issue of
material fact, then summary judgment is to be
granted. The party against whom summary judgment
is sought cannot rest on allegations. They have
to come forward and produce evidence by way of
affidavit or deposition to contradict the
assertions of the moving party.
The facts the Court is finding is as
follows: That in 2010, Tiegs and Funk began
negotiating with the Hllliards to buy a farm that

1 addendum No. 4. The reason the Court is finding
2 that that was executed prior to closing is that as
3 a term and condition of the dosing, the
4 $3 m!lllon was placed into escrow. Wouldn't go
5 into escrow unless that had been a term and
6 condition of the closing
7
After executing the addendum, the sale
8 of the farm closed and the Hilliards transferred
9 fee simple to Murphy Land on December 30th,
10 2013 -- 2010, excuse me. At that time, Mr. Clark
11 indicated he would not vacate unless he would
12 pay -- was paid $2 mlllion, and his father was
13 paid $950,000. As a result of a lawsuit,
14 Mr. Clark was ultimately evicted in May 2012.
15
The issue in this case ls the second
16 paragraph of addendum 4. It says: Upon
17 completion of such litigation and appeals, these
18 funds, referencing the $3 million, shall be
19 available, to the extent determined by a court of
20 competent jurisdiction, of the amount of
21 purchaser's damage, If any, for loss or delay of
22 possession of real estate purchased herein.
23
The Court will also note that this
24 lawsuit was initiated by the Hilliards seeking to
25 enforce addendum 4. There was no claim by the
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108
was owned by the HilHards that Jay Clark was
2 leasing. It is also clear that either Tiegs in
3 his 1ndivldual capacity or as a representative of
4 the farm made it very clear to the Hilliards that,
5 as part of that sale, they did not want Mr. Clark
6 on the property, that they wanted Mr. Clark off
7 the property, that they intended to farm It
8 themselves, and they did not wish Mr. Clark to be
9 that farmer for them. It's also clear that the
10 Hilliarcls Indicated that they would make sure
11 Mr. Clark was off the property.
12
November 5th, 2010, Murphy and
13 Hilliards execute a purchase and sale agreement.
14 One of the express terms was that the seller's
15 existing lease with Jay Clark be terminated. And
16 it was understood that that lease would be
17 terminated prior to closing.
18
Closing would be on or before
19 December 28th, 2010. As It got closer to
20 December 28th, it was clear that Mr. Clark was not
21 going to vacate, and so the closing date was
22 extended from December 28th to December 29th.
23
It appears that sometime either the
24 29th or the 30th, 1 -- it's not entirely clear -25 sometime prior to closing, the parties executed
1
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Hflllards that that addendum was unclear. In
fact, their claim is that the language of
addendum 4 is clear, and that the funds should be
disbursed to them, pursuant to addendum 4, under
the language -- the clear language of the
addendum.
The Hllliards now argue that the term
Is ambiguous. They have various arguments, one of
which is that they believed It only would apply to
their obligation to pass clear title. We also
heard today that It perhaps is ambiguous because
it Isn't clear what the damage Is.
The Court finds that the language of
that is clear and unambiguous. There has been no
legitimate dispute by the Hilliards that It's not
clear. I think they are particularly bound by
their complaint In this case, where they ask that
the monies be disbursed to -- pursuant to that
addendum. But nonetheless, even if that were not
the case, they have not articulated any basis upon
which the Court could find that that language is
ambiguous.
There is no ambiguity to the phrase,
the amount of purchasers damage, if any, for loss
or delay of possession of real estate purchased
35 sheets
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herein. If there's any dispute, the Hi!liards
have only advanced a dispute over the term damage,
not for the loss or delay of possession of the
real estate
herein.
As noted by Mr. Shurtllff, It was clear
at the time of closing that Mr. Clark was not
going to vacate the property, and it ls equally
clear that the purchasers wished to have some
protection for his refusal to vacate, and to
protect or to provide reimbursement for 3ny
damages they suffered as a result for the loss or
the delay of possession of the real property.
The Court further finds that the
Hilliards' subjective Interpretation of that
phrase does not render the contract ambiguous.
The Court will cite to Belk versus Martin, 136
Idaho 652. The Court wlll also cite to Swanson
versus Beco Construction, 145 Idaho 59: The
party's failure to determine the ordinary meaning
of the words used in the contract does not make it
ambiguous.
It was clear that the Hilliards
believed that this would apply to some kind of
damage. The damage they anticipated perhaps was
that of clear title, but certainly the parties
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were contemplating there would be some damages
Incurred here. The fact that they were unclear
about what those damages would be does not render
the word damage ambiguous, nor is there any
question about the clarity of the phrase loss or
delay of possession of the real property
purchased.
It's also, to this Court's way of
thinking, that Murphy Land made It dear that they
wanted to farm the property. They wanted to
engage in a business. That profits from that
business would be clearly foreseeable as damages.
And It makes no sense that the Hililards would now
argue that the inability to use the property for
the purpose that it was purchased for would not be
a damage. If you look at the common law
meaning -- the common meaning of the word damage,
it includes rendering something valueless or
unable to be used for its intended purpose.
The Court finds that this is not an
lndemnity contract. There's not required to be
the terms hold harmless or indemnity. And as the
word damages clearly contemplates lost profits,
the Court is going to find there Is no genuine
issue of material fact about the clarity of the
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1 term in the second paragraph in addendum 4. And
2 therefore, as a matter of law, Defendants are
entitled to summary judgment about the plain and
unambiguous ianguage, and that the funds will be
5 used to determine the amount of damage, if any,
6 for loss of possession.
7
Now, the Hilliards argue that there is
8 no consideration given for the addendum. The
9 Court finds that that is incorrect for two
10 reasons. The first ls that this addendum is
11 Incorporated into the purchase and sale agreement,
12 so the consideration that was sufficient for the
13 purchase and sale agreement is also sufficient
14 consideration for the addendum.
15
Similarly, to the extent there needs to
16 be separate consideration, that separate
17 consideration was going forward with the contract.
18 On December 30th, the sell -- the sellers could
19 not fulfill condition precedent, which was the
20 removal of Mr. Clark. The consideration by the
21 buyers, then, was to go forward with this
22 contract, in light of the seller's failure to meet
23 the conditions precedent. So there was both
24 independent consideration, but because this was
25 part of the initial contract, purchase and sale
3

4

112
1

20

114
1 agreement, there does not need to be a separate
consideration.
The Hilllards also argue there is
4 mutual mistake, because there was no meeting of
5 the minds about the Interpretation of what that
6 clause or that paragraph of this agreement meant.
7 If there are two different interpretations, for
8 example, each party Interprets this language
9 differently, we do not have a mutual mistake.
10 What we have then are two unilateral mistakes. A
11 mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the
12 time of contracting, share a misconception about
13 an assurnptlon or vital fact upon which they base
14 the bargain.
15
There is no common misconception about
16 a fact. For example, they both didn't
17 misunderstand the property they were buying. In
18 this case, there Is a disagreement about the legal
19 interpretation of a clause. There lsn't even a
20 factual dispute at issue here. And therefore,
21 mutual mistake is not a ground upon which there Is
22 sufficient evidence to defeat the motion far
23 summary judgment.
24
Now, the question of damages, then,
25 typically is one for which there is a genuine
2

3
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issue of material fact. However, in this case,
the Court is finding that profits were a
reasonably foreseeable damage. There ls no
issue that that would not be -- there is
no reading of this contract, and none has been
proffered by the Plaintiffs in this case, that
lost
would not have been a damage under
this contract.
I simply find there Js no way this

contract could be read, that phrase could be read,
in light of the very clear language by Murphy,
12 that they intended to farm this and they wanted to
13 farm it themselves, that the amount -- the
14 foreseeability of profits as damages raises a
15 genuine issue of material fact.
16
In this case, the Hilliards were on
17 notice, and they agreed that they would be liable
18 for any damages. Now, it is unfortunate that
19 perhaps they didn't read this more carefully. It
20 is perhaps unfortunate that the language Is as
21 broad as it is. But the Hilliards' failure to
22 determine the common meaning of the word damages
23 does not mean they are then not liable for the
24 enforcement of that clause under the contract.
25
The Court has found no authority, none
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has been proffered by the Plaintiffs in this case,
that ln terms of mitigation, one, that Mr. Tiegs'
facts are unsupported. I certainly understand the
disagreement that this case should be resolved
through trial, rather than through summary
judgment. But in order to defeat the motion for
summary judgment, the Hilliards had to allege
specific facts that would raise a genuine issue of
material fact about the factual basis and the
conclusions of Mr. Tiegs about damages.
There would be -- there -- the Court
has had no authority given to it that in order to
mitigate those damages, Murphy Land would be
required to rent that property it already owned
from an individual who was trespassing.
The Court also would note in the
affidavit filed by Mr. Clark in this case,
although he indicates he was ready, willing, and
able to rent any portion of the property for any
purpose, I would note that the affidavit dated
March 11th, 2011, Indicates -- and I will read !t:
The idea of splitting Crystal Springs Farm Into
various parcels to be shared by the parties is an
extremely poor idea without an agreement between
the parties to do so, and will create numerous
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Issues and disputes between the parties.
He recognize -- he argued that there
would be disputes over water allocation, there
would be disputes over who had to repair what.
There would be issues with his abrlity to effect
crop rotation and his ability to choose the crops.
Damage issues by reasons of Plaintiff's use of the
farm. Putting litigants who do not get along on
property will Increase the likelihood of further
problems.
So it does not appear, in fact, that
Mr. Clark was ready, willing, and able to rent
that property, and there has been no genuine issue
of material fact that tnat would have sufficiently
mitigated the damages. So the Plaintiffs have not
established that there was that particular duty to
mitigate, nor have they established by affidavits
the amount of mitigation that would have been
done.
In terms of the amount of damages,
initially there Is a question of fact about those
amount of damages, but Plaintiffs have failed to
sufflciently refute the amount of damages alleged.
Because based on the lack of factual support for
the affidavits, there simply is nothing that

118
disputes the conclusions that Mr. Tiegs has come
to.
3
The fact that some of the parties
4 believed those conclusions to be speculative, or
5 believed to be inaccurate, is not sufficient
6 factual foundation, nor is ft admissible evidence
7 that would defeat the motion for summary judgment.
8
Therefore, the Court finds that there
9 Is no genuine issue of material fact ln this case.
10 As a matter of law, the Defendants are entitled to
11 summary judgment. The Court ls going to issue an
12 order for summary judgment. The Court is going to
13 order that the funds that are currently held In
14 escrow be disbursed to the Defendants. The Court
15 ls going to require the Defendants to draft those
16 orders, as well as orders that reflect the Court's
17 earlier rulings on the motions to strike
18 affidavits.
19
Do you have any questions, Mr. Gordon?
MR. GORDON: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
20
I 21
THE COURT: Mr. Schossberger?
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: No, Your Honor. Thank
22
23 you.
24
THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff?
25
MR. SHURTLIFF: I don't have any questions,
1

2
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Your Honor. I have a comment. I think it's -you know, I -- I can understand English. I
understand the Court's ruling.
But I stress again my failure to
understand the process by which we get here
That
Ignoring rule of civil procedure 7(b),
to read It in parity with 56 in some
time constraints that were artificially set forth.
They're not set forth by rule; they were set forth
by the scheduling of this summary judgment
proceeding.
I think we were prejudiced by the
decision to go forward with a motion to strike
those affidavits, which the Court heard,
determined, and has now utilized as a basis -part of the basis for its decision ln this case.
I further take exception to some of the
other parts of the decision, but I -- I strongly
take exception to the notion that you can reach
into a file by an affidavit, attaching an
affidavit from an earlier case, when the Rule 56
doesn't provide for reply affidavits that suggest
reply briefs.
That was a reply affidavit, not a reply
brief, that brings us to Mr. Clark's earlier
120
affidavits upon which the Court significantly
relies to find that his testimony in this case is
untoward and of limited -- and of no value,
because it was significantly conflicted, in the
Court's opinion, by a reading of the earlier
affidavit. I think that's highly prejudicial to
the Plaintiffs In this case, and significantly at
odds with the rules of procedure that don't allow
for reply affidavits.
And secondly, that it's re -- going
back to another case. Without notice or
opportunity to examine all of the issues
surrounding that, I think it's highly prejudicial.
And in any event, I respect the Court's opinion
and decision, and I appreciate the Court's time.
THE COURT: Mr. Shurtliff, I think those are
legitimate points. I understand your need to make
a record. I think we will further clarify the
record. The Court struck the affidavits on
alternative grounds. You, Mr. Shurtliff, had the
opportunity to participate in the stipulation for
scheduling the deadline for motions In this case.
You were sent a copy of the order. You were sent
a copy of the stipulation. There was no response
to that stipulation, so the Court entered an order
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1 indicating deadlines of which you received a copy.
2
Those expert affidavits were not
3 disclosed In accordance with those deadlines.
4 Those deadlines are in place so that we can have
5 an orderly process by which, when cases get set
6 for a trial, both sides, both of the parties, as
7 well as the Court, can rely on those dates, in
B terms of preparation. It is unfair to one side to
9 require them to be held to those deadlines, and
10 yet allow another party to disregard those
11 deadlines, but receive the benefit of disregarding
12 those deadlines by providing information at a
13 later date.
14
In terms of reading Rule 7 in
15 conformity with Rule 56, the Court has read those,
16 to the extent they can, in parity. It doesn't
17 seem appropriate that one rule would completely
18 annihilate or render meaningless the rule for
19 summary judgment. If Rule 7 controls, then we
20 will never be able to schedule summary judgment
21 motions under the timelines that are scheduled In
22 that summary Judgment rule under Rule 56. The
23 Court is going with Rule 56 and finding that those
24 motions to strike, as part of the summary
25 judgment, are subject to the summary judgment
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rules under 56, and not under Rule 7.
I also want to make clear that the
Court is not ruling on this motion in summary
judgment simply because it wishes to avoid a trlal
in February. This Court Is available. This Court
is happy to do trials on any regularly scheduled
date. The Court tries to put in sufficient
preparation in advance of every motion hearing so
that when the parties come to court, they have a
court that is familiar with the issues and are not
wasting their time when they come to court. That
being the case, the expectation of this Court is
that the parties come equally prepared for the
issues that they wish to argue.
The Court does not make the law as It
relates to the requirements for affidavits for
summary judgment purposes. The Court does not
make the law as it relates to what the standards
for summary judgment is. I can certainly
understand the desire of Mr. and Mrs. Hilliard to
have an opportunity to take this case to trial.
But I would note It was Mr. and Mrs. Hiliiard that
initiated this case by asking for enforcement of
that addendum to the contract.
As l previously said, while there may
32
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have been knowledge for the affidavits, the

1

that -- the purpose for which the farm was

2

affidavits in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, in this Court's opinion, were inadequate

2

3

purchased.
And so the Court has made its

to defeat the motion. If this case Is appealed
and a court tells me differently, the Court will
hear this again, and somebody will have told me
that did something wrong, and they'll tell me
how to do It correctly, and 1'11 do my best to do
it correctly the next time I have it, if I have
it.
But this Court is not making this
motion simply to avoid a trial, It's not the way
of this Court's practice. Nor Is this Court
making this ruling because it believes any of the
parties involved here are bad individuals. The
fact that the Hilliards are prejudiced by the
conflicting affidavits of Mr. Clark, the Court
thought about that, and noted that at trial --

4

The Court will await those orders. The Court

5

understands you need to make a record,
Mr. Shurtliff. I certainly do not hold that

3
4
5
6
7

I:
10
11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18

19
20

21
22
23
24

25

6
8

against you.
MR. SHURTLIFF: I appreciate that. And fn

9

that regard, Your Honor, I would take some

1

10

11

12
13
14

15

exception to the -- any reliance on a scheduling
order. That scheduling order, If the Court wlll
recall, was set out In anticipation of a
December 2nd, 2013, trial. That scheduling order
wasn't changed at all after the trial date was
moved.

16

One would anticipate It -- some notion

17

18

of changing the scheduling order to conform with
new opportunities. So the suggestion that, oh,

because this Is a court trial, this Court would be
required to assess the credibility of Mr. Clark.

19
20

yeah, we could have taken depositions and so
forth, apparently everybody thinks we were bound

MR. SHURTLIFF: After examination, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: After examination.
MR. SHURTLIFF: Which there hasn't been.
THE COURT: Well, there has been -- there

21

by the old scheduling order and not a new one, and
so --

22
23

THE COURT: The parties were bound by the

24

scheduling order, and none of the parties moved

25

to, as I see in other cases, stipulate to change

124

126

1

has been testimony rendered by Mr. Clark, pursuant

2
4

to those affidavits. And the Court is entitled to
view that testimony in the fashion that It has
been given. The Court finds that there is simply

4

can only conclude that the parties understood
those deadlines and were prepared to be bound by

5

conflicting testimony about Mr. Clark's

5

those deadlines.

6

willingness to allow these individuals on the
land, and that Is evidenced as -- as indicated In
the affidavit

6

3

7
8
9

It Is also evidenced and indicated by

1
2
3

those deadlines. There was no motion to be
relieved from those deadlines, and so the Court

And so that Is correct. There was not

7

a new scheduling order given, based on your

s

client's request that this trial be moved to
February.

9

all of the parties to this, who all acknowledge
that he would not remove himself from the property

10

MR. SHURTLIFF: No, it wasn't my request.

11

until ordered by the Court In May 2012, which

12

THE COURT: Perhaps l have that incorrect.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: No, Your Honor, But

13

evidences an unwillingness to work with the

14

13
14
15
16

10
11
12

15

parties, as requested by both the Hilliards and
Murphy. I'm certainly not holding the Hilllards

16

necessarily -- I mean, they did what they could,

17

as far as this Court Is aware, based on the record
In this case.
But the Court is allowed to assess

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

credibility, and the Court simply finds that based
on those two affidavits, as to that very narrow
factual Issue, the Court did not find Mr. Clark to
be credible without his willingness to allow other
individuals to enter the farm and/or to take
possession of the farm to engage in farming
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

Murphy Land did move to amend the Court's
scheduling order specifically to bring the summary
judgment motion -MR. SHURTLIFF: Exactly right, so we could
get here today.
MR. SCHOSSBERGER: So Your Honor -MR. SHURTLIFF: Without depositions or
anything else.
MR, SCHOSSBER.GER: -- we did acknowledge the
scheduling order, and knew we were bound by it,
and asked forthat relief. So thank you, Your
Honor.

THE COURT: So the Court has

:nr1sty Davenport

127
1

The Court will be in recess.

2

3

proceedings concluded at 4:23 p.m.)

4

5
6
7

8

9
10

11
12

13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
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County of Canyon, State of Idaho, hereby certify:
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proceedings had in the above-entitled action in machine
shorthand and thereafter the same was reduced into
typewriting under my direct supervision; and
That the foregoing transcript contains a
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true, and accurate record of the proceedings had

in the above and foregoing cause, which was heard at
Murphy,

Idaho.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I have hereunto set my

hand January 24, 2014.

Laura L. Whiting, Official Court Reporter
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)
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)
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I

)

MURPHY LAND COMfANY, LLC,
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Defet~t

NDED ORDER
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)
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The Defendant s9eks to have this Court~ this case award it $3,000,000 00 that is
I

:

deposited with the Clerk \of the Court in another

ease (CV-20 l 4-06) under the

judge of this District. In iddition to ignoring and :asking the Court to ignore the iceties of which
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4e

$3,000,000.00 the

0efend~t wishes as will for the
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I

the rather plain fact that

·s Court's decision of pecember 17, 2013 is not a fi al order and that

until and unless there is

final order awarding Defendant the S3,000,000.00 t
I

I

directing payment by the Clerk of the Court of nipds deposited in another case

Defendant

would be simply premattjre and more importantl; beyond the authority of this
MEMORANDUM IN R~SPONSE TO MOTIO; TO ISSUE AMENDED O
,

I

I
I

--------·---·---------r---------··-

I
I
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I
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this case

this
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)

Case No. CV-13-03004
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER
OR AMEND JUDGMENT

)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

I.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and
through its undersigned attorneys of record, hereby submits the following Opposition to the
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Motion to Alter") filed by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
James and Barbara Hilliard ("Hilliards") on January 2, 2014.
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numerous
procedurally problematic, and all are substantive! y unconvincing, if not meritless. On a Rule
59(e) motion such as this, the rnovant must demonstrate that the Court committed errors of fact
or law. But the Hilliards have shown neither.
The Hilliards' primary argument is that this Court erred by hearing Murphy Land's
objections to the affidavits they submitted in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
But that argument is foreclosed by Idaho Supreme Court precedent establishing that objections to
summary judgment affidavits need not be raised prior to hearing at all, and, whenever raised,
must be addressed prior to ruling on the merits of the underlying motion for summary judgment.
The Hilliards also make two new arguments regarding supposed genuine issues of material fact
It is too late, however, for such arguments. And, in any event, neither has merit. Finally, the
Hilliards raise a litany of challenges to the Court's evidentiary rulings. But the Hilliards do not
demonstrate any error of fact or law in the Court's thorough and well-reasoned analysis of the
challenged testimony. Moreover, even if correct, their arguments are of no legal consequence
because this Court made alternative evidentiary rulings, and the Hilliards fail to address those.
As a result, even if this Court agreed with the Hilliards' evidentiary arguments, the result -summary judgment in favor of Murphy Land -- would be the same.

II.

BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2013, Murphy Land moved for summary judgment on grounds that:
(1) the Addendum executed by the parties unambiguously provided that the three million dollars

placed into escrow with Guaranty Title, Inc. (the "Escrow Funds") were to be made available to
compensate Murphy Land for damages suffered by loss or delay of possession of Crysta! Springs
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and (2) there was no genuine

material fact that

amount

such damages

exceeded the amount of the Escrow Funds. Murphy Land supported its motion for summary
judgment with, among other things, the Affidavit of Frank Tiegs, which established that Murphy
Land had been damaged in excess of three million dollars and set forth the basis for Murphy
Land's damages calculations.
On November 29, 2013, the Hilliards filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Murphy
Land's Motion for Summary Judgment, together with affidavits of Robert F. Bennett, Ken
Edmunds, James C. Hilliard, and Jay Clark (collectively, "Plaintiffs' Affidavits").
On December 5, 2013, Murphy Land filed its (1) Motion to Strike and Exclude the
Affidavit of Ken Edmunds and Portions of the Affidavit of Jay Clark and its (2) Objections to
Evidence and Motion to Strike and Disregard Affidavit Testimony of Ken Edmunds, Jay Clark,
Robert F. Bennett and James C. Hilliard (collectively, the "Evidentiary Objections"). That same
day, Murphy Land also filed Memoranda in Support of its Evidentiary Objections, together with
a Notice of Hearing noticing a hearing on the Evidentiary Objections for December 13, 2013, at
1:00 p.m., the same time as the hearing on Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Counsel for the Hil!iards made no objection to the Notice of Hearing regarding the Evidentiary
Objections prior to the time of the hearing. See Affidavit of Matthew Gordon filed concurrently
herewith (''Gordon Aff."), <JI3, Exh. 1 (Hearing Transcript, hereinafter "HT"), at 10:2-13.
On December 13, 2013, this Court heard argument on Murphy Land's Evidentiary
Objections and its Motion for Summary Judgment. At that hearing, counsel for the Hilliards
objected, for the first time, to the Court entertaining the Evidentiary Objections, on grounds that
such motions had not been served upon the Hilliards fourteen days prior to the date of the
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hearing. This Comt

argument on

issue,

Rules 7 and 56, and concluded that,

because of the time requirements established in Rule 56, it would be illogical to impose Rule Ts
14-day requirement on a motion to strike evidence submitted 14 days prior to hearing. HT at
11 :22--14 :9. The Court then proceeded to rule on the Evidentiary Objections and struck portions
of Plaintiffs' Affidavits. See id. at 14:7--59: 11. After so ruling, the Court heard argument on
and granted Murphy Land's Motion for Summary Judgment. See id. at 59: 19--118: 14.
On December 19, 2013, this Court entered: (1) an Order granting, in pait, Murphy Land's
Evidentiary Objections ("Evidentiary Order"); (2) an Order granting Murphy Land's motion for
summary judgment ("Summary Judgment Order"); (3) a Judgment awarding the Escrow Funds
to Murphy Land ("Judgment"); and (4) an Order directing the release and disbursement of the
Escrow Funds to Murphy Land ("Disbursement Order"). On January 2, 2014, the Hilliards filed
their Motion to Alter pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(e). On January 14, 2014, the Hilliards filed their
Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Alter ("Memo").
Meanwhile, the Hilliards have actively sought to prevent the release of the Escrow Funds
to Murphy Land, notwithstanding the Judgment and Disbursement Order from this Court
directing that such monies be so disbursed. Among other things, the Hilliards threatened to sue
Guaranty Title if it followed the direction of this Court's Release Order, causing Guaranty Title
filed an interpleader action with this Court seeking to deposit the Escrow Funds into the Court.

See Affidavit of Matthew Gordon in Support of Murphy Land Company, LLC's Motion to
Consolidate, filed January 31, 2014, Tl[3-4, Exhs. 1-2. On February 28, 2014, this Court
(Honorable Judge Nye) granted Guaranty Title's Motion to Deposit the Escrow Funds with the
Clerk of the Court. See Gordon Aff. at 1[4.
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III.
DISCUSSION
A.

Rule 59(e) Standards.

The purpose of a Rule 59(e) Motion is "to allow the trial court ... to conect en-ors both
of fact and law that had occurred in its proceedings." City of Pocatello v. State (In re SRBA Case
No. 39576), 152 Idaho 830,837,275 P.3d 845 (2012) (quoting First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v.
Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 266, 805 P.2d 468,472 (1991)). "Consideration of I.R.C.P. 59(e)

motions must be directed to the status of the case as it existed when the court rendered the
decision upon which the judgment is based." Id. As a result, a Rule 59( e) motion "may not be
used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have
been raised earlier in the litigation." Id. (quoting Kona Enters, Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d
877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). Nor can it be used "to present new information that the trial court did
not have before it rendered its judgment." Id. (citing Marcher v. Butler, 113 Idaho 867,870, 749
P.2d 486,489 (1988)). In short, a Rule 59(e) motion "cannot be used to raise issues and offer
evidence that, in hindsight, the litigant wishes it would have presented prior to the entry of a final
judgment."

B.

Most of the Hilliards' Arguments are Procedurally Improper as Directed at this
Court's Orders Rather than its Judgment.
As an initial matter, the Hilliards' Motion is procedurally improper insofar as it seeks to

alter or amend not only the Judgment entered by this Court but also the various Orders entered in
connection with the Judgment. Rule 59(e) provides for motions to alter or amend a judgment,
not an order. It is Rule 1 l(a)(2)(B) - not Rule 59 -- that permits a challenge to an interlocutory
order, under the guise of a Motion to Reconsider. Nevertheless, the Hilliards' Motion seeks to
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or amend the Evidentiary Order, Summary Judgment

and Disbursement Order,

addition to the Judgment See Memo at 2. As a result, it is procedurally improper. In any
event, for the reasons discussed infra, the Motion is also substantively infirm.
C.

This Court Did not Err by Hearing Murphy Land's Evidentiary Objections Because
an Objection to Summary Judgment Evidence can be Made at any time Prior to or
During Hearing.

The Hilliards' first -- and primary -- argument is that this Court erred by addressing
Murphy Land's Evidentiary Objections at hearing less than 14 days after those Motions were
filed. The Hilliards contend that because LR.C.P. 7(b)(3)(A) states that written motions shall be
filed and served no later than 14 days before hearing, Murphy Land committed a "patent
violation of the Rule" by filing its Evidentiary Objections on December 5, 2013, and that such
filing prejudiced the Billiards. Memo at 4-8. The Hilliards' argument is contrary to common
sense and to the law.
As this Comt recognized, there is tension between Rule 7(b)(3)(A)'s requirement for
filing motions 14 days prior to hearing and the tirnelines set forth in Rule 56(c), and it would be
illogical to strictly apply the former in summary judgment proceedings. Indeed, if the 14-day
requirement of Rule 7 strictly applied in summary judgment proceedings, and the nonrnoving
party timely filed its supporting affidavits, any motion to strike would necessarily be less than 14
days prior to the hearing, and strict compliance with Rule 7(b)(3)(A) would require a vacation
and re-scheduling of the hearing. This Court acknowledged this problem, and it recognized that
a district court must rule on the admissibility of affidavits submitted in support of or opposition
to a motion for summary judgment prior to reaching the merits. See HT at 11 :22--14:9. See,
e.g., Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho 673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266 (2012) ("trial courts must
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the admissibility

evidence as a 'threshold question' to be answered before

addressing the merits of motions for summary judgment") (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery,
147 Idaho 1, 6, 205 P.3d 650, 655 (2009)). In light of that rule, the Court detennined to go ahead
with the hearing. See HT at 13:16--14:9.
The Comt's decision was correct, not only for the reasons stated on the record, but also
because the Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that objections to affidavits submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment need not be submitted prior to the summary
judgment hearing at all, let alone 14 days prior. Indeed, "Idaho law permits a party to wait until
a summary judgment hearing to object to the affidavits of the opposing party." Gem State Ins.
Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d 172 (2007) (citing Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-

Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196-97 (1992)) (emphasis added).
And there is "no authority in this state that requires a motion to strike." Gem State, 145 Idaho at
15, 175 P.3d 172 (quoting Hecla Mining, 122 Idaho at 782-83, 839 P.2d at 1196-97). Given that

it would have been permissible under Idaho law for Murphy Land to wait until the time of
hearing to raise its objections to the Plaintiffs' Affidavits, the filing of such objections eight days
prior to the hearing did not create grounds for refusing to hear such objections.
The Hilliards' protestations about the alleged prejudice to them from not having a full
two weeks to respond to the Evidentiary Objections are of no legal consequence, even if
accepted at face value. The Idaho Supreme Court has made clear that even though a party may
be disadvantaged by a last-minute objection to summary judgment evidence, such an objection
must still be addressed by the district court. The Gem State court recognized the potential
imbalance created by a rule permitting objections to be raised for the first time at hearing, but it
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nonetheless affirmed that rule. Id.

objections at oral argument reward the

objecting party by depriving the party opposing the objection of the opportunity to provide a
meaningful response. While the party making the objection has had the opportunity to research
the issue and construct an argument, the party opposing the objection must immediately respond
without opportunity for meaningful reflection.") In doing so, that court has already rejected the
foundation of the argument about prejudice made by the Hilliards. And that analysis applies
with even greater force here, given that Murphy Land did not raise Evidentiary Objections for
the first time during oral argument but rather lodged them several days before the hearing.
Moreover, the thrust of the Hilliards' arguments is that they needed extra time to "fix" the
problems with the Plaintiffs' Affidavits. See Motion at 7-8. But a party is obligated to present
affidavits with admissible evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment. See I.R.C.P.
56(e). And if a party truly needs more time to prepare affidavits or take depositions. it may
move for additional time under Rule 56(f). The Hilliards made no such motion. Nor, despite
their repeated lamentations at hearing and in their Memo about being unable to examine Frank
Tiegs regarding the content of his affidavit, did they move under Rule 56(e) or 56(f) for the
opportunity to depose him, despite the fact that Murphy Land provided the Hilliards with a report
regarding Mr. Tiegs's expected testimony, together with supporting data, on October 25, 2013,
and the Hilliards were on notice of Murphy Land's intent to move for summary judgment by
October 22, 2013. See Murphy Land's Disclosure of Expert Witness for Trial filed on October
25, 2013~ Murphy Land's Motion to Re-Set Trial and Adjust Scheduling Date filed on October
22, 2013. Despite their complaints, the reality is that the Hilliards could have -- but, for
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reason,

not to -- seek the

provided for

rules if they truly needed

more time.
For these reasons, the Court's decision to go forward with the hearing on Murphy Land's
Evidentiary Objections and its Motion for Summary Judgment was logically and legally sound.
Even if the Hilliards were actually disadvantaged by having less than two weeks to respond to
the Evidentiary Objections, the law is clear that any such disadvantage is of no legal
consequence.

D.

This Court did not Err by Determining that Murphy Land had Suffered in Excess
of Three Million Dollars in Damages From Delayed Possession.
The Hil!iards next argue that this Court erred in determining that there was no genuine

dispute that the delay in possessing Crystal Springs Farm had damaged Murphy Land in excess
of three million dollars. See Memo at 8-11. The Hilliards' arguments are procedurally deficient
as either improperly directed at the Disbursement Order, raised for the first time in support of
their Rule 59 Motion, or both. In any event, their arguments lack substantive merit.
The Hilliards challenge this Court's Disbursement Order as "ultra fines mandati" because

it was directed at Guaranty Title, a non-party to this case, and further argue that the language of
Addendum No. 4 "anticipates and means" that the Hi11iards "are to be provided from the three
million dollars the amount of their costs in having the exceptions removed from the title policy."
Memo. At 9-11. The Hilliards have waived these arguments, however, because they raised them
for the first time in their Motion to Alter. See City of Pocatello, 152 Idaho at 837 (a Rule 59(e)
motion "cannot be used to raise issues and offer evidence that, in hindsight, the litigant wishes it
would have presented prior to the entry of a final judgment"). Moreover, the Hilliards' "ultra
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argument is improperly directed at the Disbursement

rather than the proper

of a Rule 59(e) motion, the Judgment.
In any event, neither of the Hilliards' arguments has merit. First, the Disbursement Order
was not, as the Hilliards suggest, an order against Guaranty Title, nor was it intended to "bind"
Guaranty Title. Indeed, as evidenced by its Interpleader Action, Guaranty Title claimed no
interest in the Escrow Funds and merely desired to be relieved of liability in connection with
such funds. As a result, the authority cited by the Hilliards is inapposite. See Memo at 10.
Moreover, any argument about the ineffectiveness of the Disbursement Order is for the party
who is the subject of the order to make (here, Guaranty Title), not the Hilliards. In any event, the
issue regarding the Disbursement Order is -- or will soon be -- moot because the Escrow Funds
will be deposited with the Clerk of this Court in short order, and Murphy Land has already

moved for an Amended Order directing the Clerk to disburse those funds to Murphy Land.
Second, the Hilliards' argument that they are entitled to their costs pursuant to the
language of Addendum No. 4, see Memo at 10-11, lacks any textual, legal, or logical support.
Nothing in the second sentence of the second paragraph of Addendum No. 4 "anticipates or
means" that the Escrow Funds are to be used to compensate the Hilliards for their fees and costs.
To the contrary, as this Court correctly concluded, Addendum No. 4 unambiguously provides
that the Escrow Funds are to be used to compensate Murphy Land for damages from loss of or
delay in possessing the farm. See HT at 110: 13--113:6. To read into Addendum No. 4 an intent
to compensate the Hilliards for their expenses would be antithetical to the unambiguous language
and purpose of that agreement.
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In the final analysis, although the Hilliards contend

there was a genuine

issue of fact as to the entitlement to, and availability of, the three million dollars," see Memo at
11, they again fail to identify what, specifically, is the purported "genuine issue of fact." The
Hilliards had every opportunity to identify a genuine issue of material fact in their response to
Murphy Land's motion for summary judgment and at oral argument. But they were unable to
demonstrate the existence of any such issue then, and, in their Motion to Alter, they are similarly
unable to point to anything specific that raises a genuine issue of material fact. The Court did
not elT in granting summary judgment to Murphy Land.

E.

The Court Correctly Struck Portions of the Plaintiffs' Affidavits.
The Hilliards' remaining arguments concern the Court's decision to strike portions of the

Plaintiffs' Affidavits (Memo at 11-22). Again, these arguments are procedurally improper
because they are directed at the Court's interlocutory Evidentiary Order rather than at the
Judgment. As such, they ought to have been raised, if at all, in connection with a Rule
1 l(a)(2)(B) motion rather than a Rule 59(e) motion. In any event, each of the arguments lacks
substantive merit. Contrary to the Hilliards' assertion, the Court properly exercised its discretion

by striking inadmissible portions of the Plaintiffs' Affidavits. Moreover, even if the Hilliards'
arguments concerning the Evidentiary Order were coITect, they would be of no consequence
because they either fail to address the Court's alternative rulings or concern statements in the
Plaintiffs' Affidavits that, even if considered, would fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
1.

Legal Standards Regarding Summary Judgment Evidence.

"When considering evidence presented in support of or opposition to a motion for
summary judgment, a court can only consider material which would be admissible at trial." Taft
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Foods, Inc., -- Idaho---, 314

193, l

(201

(quoting Gem State

145

Idaho at 14, 175 P.3d at 176). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) "requires that 'supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth facts as would be

admissible in evidence, and shall show affinnatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein." Gardner v. Evans, 110 Idaho 925,930,719 P.2d 1185 (1986) (quoting

I.R.C.P. 56(e)) (emphasis in original). As a result, "an affidavit that is conclusory, based on
hearsay, or not supported by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of LR.C.P.
56(e)." Taft, 314 P.3d at 197 (quoting State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho

267,271, 899 P.2d 977, 981 (1995)). And evidence that does not satisfy either the requirement
of admissibility or competency should be excluded and disregarded in ruling on a motion for
summary judgment. Gardner, 110 Idaho at 130. See Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844
P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992) ("if the evidence would be inadmissible at trial, the court should not
consider the evidence in ruling on the motion for summary judgment"). Notably, "mere
conjecture and opinion, without any foundation laid," is inadmissible. Gardner, 110 Idaho at

932. Although a court is not to assess a witness's credibility at the summary judgment stage, "a
sham affidavit which directly contradicts prior testimony may be disregarded on a summary
judgment motion." Keeven v. Estate of Keeven (in Re Estate of Keeven), 126 Idaho 290,298,

882 P.2d 457,465 (Ct. App. 1994).
For affidavit testimony from a putative expert to be admissible, "the party offering the
evidence must show that the expert is a qualified expert in the field, the evidence will be of
assistance to the trier of fact, experts in the particular field would reasonably rely upon the same
type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the probative value of the

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 12
45522.0004,636015 l. I

is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Ryan, 123 Idaho at
45, 844 P.2d 24. "In determining whether these foundational requirements have been satisfied
the trial court must make various factual determinations; i.e., whether the expert is qualified,
whether the evidence will be of assistance to the fact finder, whether the facts upon which the
expert's opinion is based are of the type other experts in the field would reasonably rely on, and
whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Id.

"Expert

opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no
assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Id. at 46-47;
Id. R. Evid. 702. Also inadmissible is expert opinion that "merely suggests possibilities, not
probabilities," because such an opinion "would only invite conjecture." Slack v. Keller, 140
Idaho 916,023, 104 P.3d 958, 965 (2004)).
A trial court's detennination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection with

a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153
Idaho 237,241,280 P.3d 740, 744 (2012). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (l)
correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies
the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason." Id.
( quoting O'Connor v. Harger Constr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)).
2.

The Court Correctly Excluded Inadmissible Portions of Jay Clark's Affidavit.
The Hilliards claim that Mr. Clark's Affidavit raised "at least" two genuine issues of

material fact, regarding damages and regarding mitigation. Memo at 14-15. They are incorrect
on both counts.
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an initial matter, the Hilliards confuse and conflate the

rulings regarding the

Clark Affidavit. The Hilliards devote the bulk of their Jay Clark-related argument to the
contention that the Court erred in considering Mr. Clark's prior affidavits from a related case and
in assessing Mr. Clark's credibility. But, to be clear, the Court considered Mr. Clark's prior
testimony and commented on his lack of credibility only with regard to Mr. Clark's testimony
regarding his alleged willingness to rent the entire farrn to Murphy Land, which testimony is
relevant only to the issue of mitigation.

a)

The Court Correctly Struck Portions of the Clark Affidavit that
Purported to Address the Damages Suffered by Murphy Land.

As to the issue of damages, the Court struck portions of Mr. Clark's testimony regarding
damages on grounds that: (1) to the extent it was expert testimony, Mr. Clark had not been
disclosed as an expert; and (2) Mr. Clark's statements lacked foundation or support and were
conclusory. See HT at 36:9--51:8. In so ruling, the Court properly recognized its role at the
summary judgment stage and ruled accordingly:
rm limited to looking at the affidavits that I have in front of me
and determining, in and of themselves, whether those affidavits
would constitute admissible evidence at trial. Without appropriate
foundation, that statement would not be admissible at trial, and the
Court is therefore going to strike it from the affidavit.
HT at 49:22--50:4. See HT at 51:6-8 ("The affidavit simply doesn't provide sufficient support
for the conclusions that it is making."). The Court's analysis is entirely consistent with
controlling law. See, e.g., Gardner, 110 Idaho at 932 ("mere conjecture and opinion, without
any foundation laid," is inadmissible); Taft, 314 P.3d at 197 ("an affidavit that is conclusory,
based on hearsay, or not supported by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of
LR.C.P. 56(e).)"
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Hilliards

no serious argument to the contrary. Indeed, counsel admitted during

argument that Mr. Clark's statements were "conclusory." HT at 50:9-10. And the Hilliards
raise no challenge to the Court's exclusion of Mr. Clark's statements as purported expert
testimony. Instead of addressing the Court's actual rulings regarding the Clark Affidavit, the
Hilliards instead argue, without any support, that the Court "totally discounted" Jay Clark's
testimony regarding damages "apparently on its view that he lacked credibility.... " Memo at 1415. That is simply incorrect. As the transcript of the hearing demonstrates, the Court's decision
to strike portions of Jay Clark's Affidavit that purported to raise an issue regarding Murphy
Land's damages (paragraphs 6-9) was based upon the lack of foundation or the irrelevancy of the
testimony, not upon assessments of Jay Clark's credibility. See HT at 36:9--51 :8. It was only
later, when issuing its ruling on the motion for summary judgment and discussing the Hilliards'
mitigation defense and the testimony in the second paragraph No. 9 in Jay Clark's Affidavit, lthat
the Court addressed the inconsistency among Mr. Clark's various affidavits and expressed
concerns about his credibility with respect to that "very narrow factual issue." See HT at 116:16117:15; 123:25--125:2.

b)

The Court Correctly Ruled that the Hilliards Failed to Raise a
Genuine Issue of Material Fact Regarding Their Mitigation Defense.

As to the issue of mitigation, the Court correctly ruled that the Hilliards failed to raise
any genuine issue of fact regarding any duty to mitigate its damages. As a result, any error in

1 Jay Clark's Affidavit erroneously had two consecutive paragraphs numbered "9." The first of
these discussed Mr. Clark's alleged "hard costs" in preparing the fann in 2012, while the
second addressed Mr. Clark's alleged willingness to rent the farm to Murphy Land.
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regarding
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willingness to rent the farm to Murphy Land was

harmless because the Court ruled on alternative grounds.

In fact, the Court first held that no authority established that Murphy Land had a duty to
mitigate by attempting to rent property it already owned from a trespasser. HT at 115:25-116: 15. Only after making that legal conclusion, the Court also noted the contradiction among
Mr. Clark's various affidavits and concluded that, in light of Mr. Clark's earlier testimony, it did
not appear that he was actually willing to rent the entire fann to Murphy Land. Id. at 116: 16117:13. The Court further noted that, even if Murphy Land had rented the entire farm, there was
no genuine issue of material fact that renting would have sufficiently mitigated its damages. Id.
at 117: 15. The Court conciuded that the Hilliards failed to establish either that there was a
particular duty to mitigate by attempting to rent from Mr. Clark or "the amount of mitigation that
would have been done." Id. at 117:1.5-19.
The Hilliards had argued that Murphy Land failed to mitigate its damages because it did
not seek to rent the entirety of Crystal Springs Farm from the trespasser on the farm, Jay Clark.
In support, the Hilliards pointed to the second paragraph No. 9 in the Clark Affidavit, in which
he stated that he wouid have been willing to rent Crystal Springs Farm to Murphy Land. The
Court acted within its discretion in recognizing that the second paragraph No. 9 directly
contradicted Mr. Clark's prior testimony. See Keeven, 126 Idaho at 298,882 P.2d at 465. But
even if the Court had not assessed Jay Clark's credibility on that limited issue, the result would
not have changed because the Court correctly concluded, irrespective of Mr. Clark's testimony
regarding renting the farm, that the Hilliards' mitigation argument was legally unsupported, and
that Mr. Clark's testimony did not contain enough specific facts about renting the farm to raise a
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about mitigation. Moreover, although

Court

not

the

issue, it could also have ruled in Murphy Land's favor regarding mitigation based simply on the
fact that mitigation is an affirmative defense that the Hilliard never pled. See McCormick Int'l

USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920,924,277 P.3d 367,371 (2012). As a result, any eITor in
assessing Jay Clark's credibility was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 533, 537,
447 P.2d 10, 14 (1968).
This Court held, as a matter of Jaw, that Murphy Land was not obligated to attempt to
rent back from a trespasser land that it owned in fee simple. Indeed, the Hilliards correctly note
that the Court's determination that Murphy Land had no such obligation was "a conclusion of
law ... " Memo at 14. But the Hilliards cite no authority to the contrary. As a result, they have
failed to establish any basis for the Court to alter its Judgment in that regard.
Moreover, even if a landowner in Murphy Land's position was obligated to attempt to
rent back land it owned from a trespasser, and even if the Clark Affidavit was considered in its
entirety as credible, admissible, evidence, it still failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
regarding mitigation because it contains nothing indicating that, had Murphy Land rented all of
Crystal Springs Farm from Jay Clark, it would have reduced its damages. In particular, the Clark
Affidavit contains no information about the terms on which he would have been willing to rent
the farm and nothing about the amount he would have charged for rent. It can be presumed that,
if Jay Clark had actually been willing to rent the entire farm to Murphy Land, it would not have
come cheaply, given Mr. Clark's testimony about how much he had already invested in the farm
for the 2011 growing season and how much he expected to make from growing the crops
himself.
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Presumptions

there is

the record before this Court indicating that

Murphy Land's damages would have been any less had they been able to rent the entire farm
from Jay Clark. Mr. Clark's testimony is a "mere suggestion" rather than the specific facts
necessary to satisfy the Hilliards' burden of creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding
mitigation. See McCormick, 152 Idaho at 924, 277 P.3d 367 (the party who raises the issue of
mitigation "bears the burden of proving that the proposed means of mitigation were reasonable
under the circumstances, could be accomplished at a reasonable cost, and were within the
plaintiffs ability. Proof of the latter of these three requires more than a mere suggestion that a
means of mitigation exists.") (emphasis added); Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 771, 215
P.3d 485 (2009) ("a nonmoving defendant has the burden of supporting a claimed affirmative
defense on a motion for summary judgment").
3.

The Court Correctly Excluded and Struck Portions of Ken Edmunds's Affidavit.
The Hilliards' arguments regarding this Court's decision to exclude and strike portions of

the affidavit of Ken Edmunds suffer from similar infirmities. The Hilliards again ignore the
alternative rulings made by the Court, and, as a result, their arguments fail even on their own
terms. Moreover, the arguments themselves lack substantive merit
As an initial matter, the Hilliards completely ignore the threshold ruling by the Court to
exclude the summary attached to the Edmunds Affidavit. The Court ordered the summary
excluded on the basis that the Hilliards had failed to comply with the Court's scheduling order by
failing to timely provide Mr. Edmunds's opinion and report. HT at 29:12-17. It was undisputed
that the Hilliards did not make such disclosures, nor that they failed to supplement their
interrogatory responses as required, see HT at 18:5-11, and the Court acted well within the
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of its discretion in making such a ruling. E.g., McKim

Horner, 143 Idaho 568,

149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006) ("Upon motion or on its own initiative, the district court may impose
sanctions for failure to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order"; sanctions may include exclusion of
evidence under Rule 37). For that reason, the Hilliards' arguments about the Edmunds Affidavit
are of no consequence -- even if they were correct that the Court had eITed in its alternative
rulings regarding the Edmunds Affidavit, any such error would be harmless.

In any event, the Hilliards' arguments lack merit. The Hilliards contend that the Court
erred when it struck portions of the Edmunds Affidavit based on lack of foundation, and that the
Court tested the admissibility of the statements in that affidavit on a "summary unquestioned
view of the proffered testimony" rather than based on "thoughtful analysis." Memo at 15-16.
Contrary to the Hilliards' contention, the Court engaged in an extensive, thorough, and
thoughtful analysis of the challenged portions of the Edmunds Affidavit, striking certain portions
as hearsay or lacking in foundation and refusing to strike others. HT at 29: 18--35: 19. As a
result, not only is the Hilliards' attack on the Court's analysis unwarranted, it is also completely
contrary to the record. And the Hilliards fail to explain any error in the Court's conclusion that
certain of Mr. Edmunds's statements iacked foundation. Instead, the Hilliards confuse and
conflate the issue of "foundation." See Memo at 15-16. The law is well-settled that a statement
in an affidavit that lacks sufficient foundation is inadmissible and is properly excluded on that
basis. See Gardner, 110 Idaho at 932; Gerdon, 153 Idaho at 245, 280 P.3d at 748 (affirming
district court's exclusion of affidavit testimony that was "conclusory and lacks foundation").
The Hilliards also appear to contend that this Court eITed by "apparently determin[ing]
that Mr. Edmunds was not an expert. ... " See Memo at 16-17. But while the Court did express
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had relevant expertise -- skepticism that

was presumably not ameliorated by counsel's response, namely that Mr. Edmunds was not an
expert in farming but rather "in numbers, and in dealing with numbers, and in getting to source
of numbers and those sorts of things," see HT at 21 :23--22:2 -- and the Court would have acted
well within its discretion if it had ruled that Mr. Edmunds did not qualify as an expert, the
Court's basis for excluding the attachment to the Edmunds Affidavit was the failure to comply
with the scheduling order, not any conclusion about Mr. Edmunds's qualifications. See HT at
29:12-17.

4.

The Court Correctly Excluded Portions of the Affidavit of Robert R. Bennett.
The Hilliards next argue that the Court erred in determining that portions of the Bennett

Affidavit were hearsay and/or lacked foundation "without granting Plaintiff the opportunity to
lay a foundation." See Memo at 17-19. While not entirely clear, it appears that such argument is
based upon a contention that, if only the Billiards had been afforded more time, they could have
fixed the lack of foundation by supplying more information. See id. But, as discussed above, the
Billiards could have filed a motion for a continuance. In any event, the Hilliards' argument is
essentially a rehash of their contention that they were prejudiced because Murphy Land filed its
Evidentiary Objections less than 14 prior to the hearing. For the reasons discussed supra in
Section C, that argument fails in light of Idaho Supreme Court precedent establishing that an
evidentiary objection to affidavits submitted in support of or opposition to a motion for summary
judgment can be made even at the time of hearing.
As with its analysis of the other Plaintiffs' Affidavits, the Court's analysis of the
challenged portions of the Bennett Affidavit was through, logical, and well within the bounds of
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See

at

51 :2

14. The Court struck some portions as hearsay or lacking in

foundation and let others stand. The Hilliards have provided no cogent argument why any of the
Court's rulings was en-oneous. Other than complaining that they were not afforded ample
opportunity to provide more foundation, the Hilliards only argument is their utterly unsupported
-- and unsupportable -- contention that the hearsay attributions to Sheryl Reyment in paragraph
13 should not have been stricken because Ms. Reyment, the escrow agent, was "representing
both buyer and seller" and she was thus a party opponent. See Memo at 18-19.
5.

The Court Correctly Excluded Portions of the Affidavit of James C. Hilliard.
The Hilliards raise six particular issues with respect to the Court's decision to strike

portions of the Hilliard Affidavit. See Memo at 19-22. None has merit.
As a preliminary matter, the Hilliards fail to establish how any of the alleged e1Tors in
striking portions of the Hilliard Affidavit ( or the Bennett Affidavit) are of any consequence.
Even if considered, none of those statements created an issue regarding the material fact at issue
in this case -- the amount of damages incurred by Murphy Land from the extensive delay in
possession of Crystal Springs Farm. As a result, even if the Court had erred in striking those
statements -- and it did not -- any such error would have been harmless because it wouid not
have affected the Court's ultimate decision on Murphy Lands' motion for summary judgment.

In any event, the Hilliards' arguments are unsupported by fact or law.
Indeed, many of the Hilliards' arguments about the Hilliards Affidavit are premised upon
an apparent fundamental misunderstanding of contract law and a court's role at the summary
judgment stage. The Hilliards appear to fail to understand that the Court ruled, as a matter of
law, that Addendum No. 4 was unambiguous, a ruling the Court is unquestionably permitted to
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at

summary judgment stage, and that, in light

the parties'

understandings of the meaning of the Addendum are irrelevant. See, e.g., Boise Mode, LLC v.
Donahoe Pace & Partners LTD, -- Idaho---, 294 P.3d 1111, 1120 (2013) ("When interpreting a

written contract, this Comt begins with the language of the contract itself. If a contract's
language is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must be determined from its
words ....Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law[.]"); Swanson v. Beco
Constr. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63, 175 P.3d 748 (2007) ("[a] contract is not rendered ambiguous on

its face because one of the parties thought that the words used had some meaning that differed
from the ordinary meaning of those words"). This error infects and vitiates nearly all of the
Hil!iards' arguments regarding the Hilliard Affidavit.
The Hill iards first argue that the Court somehow erred in stating that the statement in
paragraph 17 was "'unclear' as a concept of what Addendum 4 was." Memo at 19. But the
Court did not strike that paragraph. It merely stated that it would not allow Mr. Hilliard's
subjective understanding "as a legal interpretation." HT at 55:25--56:13. The Court was correct
because a party's subjective understanding of contract language is irrelevant and inadmissible
when the contract is unambiguous. See Swanson, 145 Idaho at 63.
The Hilliards next argue that paragraph 18 is not hearsay because it was offered "as to the
state of the mind as to the issue of going forward with the sale ... " Memo at 19-20. The Court
con-ectly ruled that paragraph 18 was two levels of hearsay. See HT at 56: 14-19. The statement

I

!
!

was clearly being offered for the truth of its assertion about Murphy Land's alleged
unwillingness to accept a refund of the earnest money and alleged desire to close the sale before
year end. And even if the Hilliards' argument about state of mind was correct, that would still

II
!

i
f
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a hearsay exception for only one

of hearsay

Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574, n. 9, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995)
("Hearsay within hearsay is not admissible unless each part of the combined hearsay statements
conforms with an exception to the hearsay rules.") (citing LR.E. 805).
The Hilliards' challenges to the Court's decision to strike a portion of paragraphs 20 and
22, see Memo at 20-21, are misguided because they again ignore the fact that the Court ruled, as
a matter of law, that Addendum No. 4 was unambiguous, and, as a result, Mr. Hilliard's view of
the meaning of Addendum No. 4 was irrelevant. The Hilliards' contention that the Court "could
only reach" the conclusion that Addendum No. 4 was unambiguous "by weighing the evidence"
is again completely contrary to well-settled law and to the facts. See Boise Mode, LLC, 294 P.3d
at 1120.
The Court also properly struck Mr. Hilliard's conclusory statement regarding
consideration. The Hilliards' argument to the contrary, see Memo at 21-22, e1Toneously
contends that Mr. Hilliards' conclusory opinion about a matter of law is sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact. It is not. Taft, 314 P.3d at 197 ("an affidavit that is conclusory,
based on hearsay, or not supported by personal knowledge does not satisfy the requirements of
I.R.C.P. 56(e)").
The Hilliards' final argument again raises the issue of the Court's ruling that Addendum
No. 4 is unambiguous. See Memo at 22. The Hilliards reveal the depth of their
misunderstanding by claiming that "the Court's conclusion that Addendum 4 is unambiguous is a
finding of fact or a conclusion of law outside the parameters of summary judgment." Id.
(emphasis added). To the contrary, it is well-settled that, on a motion for summary judgment

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 23
45522Jl004.636015 J. I

a dispute over the meaning

a contract, a court must

contract is unambiguous as a matter of iaw. See Boise Mode,

determine whether
294 P.3d at 1120.

IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the Hilliards' Motion to Alter. This
Court did not err in excluding certain evidence, in granting Murphy Land's motion for summary
judgment, or in ordering the disbursement of the Escrow Funds to Murphy Land.

DATED THIS

1"' ~ y of March, 2014.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

~~

BY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-

Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554
Attorneys for Defendant
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nd authority that the failure to adhere to the time require*1ents of Rule

7(b)(3)(A) is to be igno~d or that to so require would be beyond common sen~e or the law.
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Gem State Ins.
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¢0. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 15, 175 P.3d !72 (20?7) cites Hecla

Mlning Co. v. Star-Moijrung Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782-83, 839 P.2d 11 ~2 (I 992). Gem
i

i

I

I

State does not stand for\the proposition that there is a "tension" between Rule hb)(3)(A) and

!

Rule 56 and neither do~s any other Idaho case.

I

I
I
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While Gem Statf may be read to excuse the need to raise in advance o~ a hearing on a
motion for summary j"igment objections to adverse affidavits there is nothin~ in Gem State
or Hecla or anyplace e1Je that would suggest that once embarked on a Rule 7(,)(3) motion
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had
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l
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adhere to the Rule and the failure of the Court to require that it do so.
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Thus on the l 3tl of December 2013 rather than accept without the ben~fit of briefing
or thoughtful analysis Jc nakedness of the assertion of "tension" the Court re~dily and easily
j

could have exercised

J

it4 discretion and simply vacated the hearing on the motibn(s) and set
i
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them in a timely (per R~e 7(b)(3)(A)) fashion. There was no emergent need
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tJ proceed on the

of December and ~hile Murphy would have been disadvantaged by beinglrequired to
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move forward in the ca~e on merits, that fact does not vitiate the plain fact tha~ the Hilliards
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noted in Gem State "[L{ast minute objections at oral argument reward the objjting party by

depriving the party opptsing the objections the opportunity to provide a meantgful response.
While the party rnaking\the objections has had the opportunity to research the 1ssue and

construct an argument, te party opposing the objection mast immediately res,ond without
the opportunity for me~gful reflection". He could just as well have been sp,aking to the
disadvantage caused by

la failure to adhere to the time requirements of procedjal rules. ·while

the Rules of Civil Procture have done much to avoid "trial by ambush" - the apparently, so
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Murphy wou]d assert, ht"e done nothing to avoid swnmary judgment by ambth. A result at

odds with the notion of ~ual advan~ge to all litigants.
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puty Clerk

Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)
VS.

)

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
ISSUE AMENDED ORDER

)

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)

limited liability company,

)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"), by and
through its undersigned attorneys of record, submits the following reply in support of its Motion
to

Issue an Amended Order filed February 28, 2014 ("Motion") and in response to the

Opposition to the same filed by Plaintiffs James & Barbara Hilliard on March 7, 2014
("Opposition").

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER - 1
45522.0004.6458521.

Page 3

1 a11uny M 1.1.1 er

its Motion, Murphy Land seeks an

the

Court to release the $3,000,000 deposited with the Clerk by Guaranty Title, Inc_ In its
Opposition, the Hilliards raise two objections, neither of which is supported by authority or
logical argument.
First, the Billiards claim that the Court's decision of December 17, 2013 "is not a final
order" and that until there is a final order, any order directing the Clerk of this Court to disburse
the $3,000,000 would be "simply premature." This argument echoes the statements and threats
made by the Billiards to Guaranty Title, Inc., in connection with the Order that this Court
previously issued regarding the disbursement of the funds. See Affidavit of Matthew Gordon in
Support of Mmphy Land Company, LLC's Motion to Consolidate, filed January 31, 2014, <j[<[3-4,
Exhs. 1-2. Contrary to the Hilliards' contentions to Guaranty Title and in its Opposition, this
Court entered a final Judgment in this case on December 19, 2013. See I.R.C.P. 54(a). The
Billiards subsequently moved this Court, pursuant to Rule 59(e), to alter or amend that
Judgment. Hearing on the Billiards' motion is scheduled for March 14, 2014, and hearing on
Murphy Land's instant Motion is set to follow thereafter. If this Court denies the Billiards' Rule
59(e) Motion, the Judgment entered December 19, 2013 will again be a final Judgment, and
proceedings to enforce the Judgment "may issue immediately." I.R.C.P. 62(a). In the interest of
avoiding further delay, Murphy Land filed this Motion so that it could be heard directly after this
Court rules on the Billiards' Rule 59(e) Motion. In short, if this Court denies the Hilliards' Rule
59(e) Motion, the Order requested by Murphy Land will not be premature but will be consistent
with the Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's prior rulings and orders.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER - 2
45522.0004.645852 I.

Tammy Miller

the

208-954-5242

no

assert that

Page 4

to

to disburse the $3,000,000 because tliose funds "are not deposited in this case." But the
Hilliards cite nothing in support of their contention. And the funds are -- or soon will be -deposited with the Clerk of this Court. Moreover, this Court has, in this case, already determined
that Murphy Land is entitled to such funds. The Interpleader Action filed by Guaranty Title, Inc.
was for the purposes of depositing the $3,000,000 with the Clerk of the Court. The issue of
which pruty is entitled to that money is the subject of this case, and it has been already
determined that Murphy Land is so entitled. As a result, unless this Court rules differently in
response to the Hilliards' Rule 59(e) Motion, this Court should, consistent with its prior
determination that the funds belong to Murphy Land and its previous Order directing the release
of those funds to Murphy Land, issue an Amended Order directing the Clerk of this Court to
disburse the funds to Murphy Land.
DATED THIS 12th day of March, 2014.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

BY~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Matthew Gordon, ISB No. 8554
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER - 3
4552:UJ004.645852 l

Tammy M11.1.er

1--'age

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12th day of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER by
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
[Attorney for Plaintiffs]

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
DE-mail
ErTelecopy: 208-343-3282

Weldon S. Wood
Attorney at Law
17 Alvemo Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
D E-mail: weldon@weldonwood.com
B-Telecopy: 650-298-8097

Jay R. Friedly
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 East 2nd North
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
[Attorneys for PlaintijfJ

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
D E-mail: jay@hfwlaw.com
B"Telecopy: 208.587.3144

Matthew Gordon

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ISSUE AMENDED ORDER - 4
45522.0004.645852 l

~

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV-13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)
)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

The Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment filed by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants James
and Barbara Hilliard (the "Hilliards") came on for hearing before this Court on March 14, 2014.
M. Karl Shurtliff appeared and argued for the Hilliards. Matthew Gordon of Hawley Troxell
Ennis & Hawley LLP appeared and argued for Defendant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land
Company, LLC ("Murphy Land"). Having considered the filings and arguments of the parties,
and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and in accordance with the Court's oral

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT-!
45522.()004.6463699. I

201

are incorporated herein by

Court rules as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Hilliards' Motion to
Alter or Amend Judgment is denied.
SO ORDERED THIS

fr

day of March, 2014.

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT-2
45522,()004.6463699 I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I ~,{1,:i,

14

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
.,,day of March, 2014, I caused to be served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
[Attorney for Plaintiffs]

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Ovo/night Mail

Weldon S. Wood
Attorney at Law
17 Alverno Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Ove ight Mail

Steven F. Schossberger
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 }
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Over 1ght Mail

~¥mil
tf'lelecopy: 208-343-3282

D

ail: weldon@weldonwoo<l.com

DE 1ail
elecopy: 208-954-5260

ANGELA BARKELL
Clerk of the Court

sy

{gS11,vw., (1wl1-V
Deputy Clerk

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS'MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT-3
45522.0004 6463699 l
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE

JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)
)

Case No. CV -13-03004

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, )
)

vs.

)
)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF
COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED
FUNDS

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho)
limited liability company,
)
)

Defendant/Counterclaimant.

)
)

Pursuant to: (1) the Order granting Defendam/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company.
LLC's ("Murphy Land"} Motion for Summary Judgment entered on December 19, 2013; (2) the
Order Denying Plaintiffs/Counterclaimants James and Barbara Hilliard's Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment entered on March 14, 2014~ and (3) Murphy Land's Motion to Issue Amended
Order, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and in accordance with the Court's
findings of fact and conclusions of law announced orally at hearing on December 13, 2013 and
March 14, 2014,

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED
FUNDS- 1
45522 ()()(l4.643'.l8I5 l

IT IS HEREBY

~~n~~

that the Clerk

Court shall disburse to Murphy Land

Company the $3,000,000 previously deposited with the Clerk of Court by Guaranty Title, Inc.,
together with any accrued interest. The disbursemenl shall be payable to "Murphy Land, LLC"
and shall be sent to Murphy Land's counsel, Steven F. Schossberger of Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley, LLP, at 877 Main Street, Suite 1000, Boise, Idaho, 83701.
SO ORDERED THIS

r::::t_ day of March, 2014.

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED
FUNDS-2

Jtlrt'day

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
of March, 2014, I caused to he served a true
copy of the foregoing ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE
DEPOSITED FUNDS THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED FUNDS by the
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
M. Karl Shurtliff
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
P.O. Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
[Attorney for Plaintiffs]

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
D E;lf{ail

Weldon S. Wood
Attorney at Law
17 Alverno Court
Redwood City, CA 94061

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
D ~ail: weldon@weldonwood.com

DTelecopy: 208-343-3282

~Telecopy: 650-298-8097
Steven F. Schossberger
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 }
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701-1617

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
D Hand Delivered
D Overnight Mail
D~ail
JJ'Telecopy: 208-954-5260

ANGELA BARKELL
Clerk of the Court
A

By

&/lruVL a1rutt----

Deputy Clerk

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO RELEASE DEPOSITED
FUNDS-3
45522.0004.64328! 5. l
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES & BARBARA HILLIARD,

)

. .
)
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ANG~Btf:t-Jt/:JRK
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES and BARBARA HILLIARD,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CVB-3004
FINAL JUDGMENT

vs.
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability company,
Defendants.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that judgment is
entered in favor of Defend.ant/Counterclaimant Murphy Land Company, LLC and against
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants James and Barbara Hilliard on all claims and counterclaims
in the amount of three million dollars ($3.()00,000). The Hilliards' claims are dismissed
with prejudice in their entirety.
Dated this

4

FINAL JUDGMENT

day of March, 2014.

OF SERVICE
undersigned certifies that on
of March, 20 l 4, s/he served a true and
correct copy of the original of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT on the following
individuals in the manner described:
•

upon counsel for plaintiff:
M. Karl Shurtliff
AITORNEY AT LAW
PO Box 1652
Boise, ID 83701

•

rri~: Jt/3,, 3:J.f'd/

upon counsel for defendants:
Steven F. Schossberger
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 W Main St, Ste 1000
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
~#,£. 1l/Z/.-§:%:v

and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above.

ANGELA BARKELL,
Clerk of the Court

JutL(l~

By:-----------Deputy Clerk of the Court

FINAL JUDGMENT

2

(8 K!:IOCERi3

Send Resul Report
MFP
Firmware Version 2GR_2000.022.001 2008.08.06

Job No.

: 069596

Total Time

: 0°01'29"

Page

: 002

Completed
Document:

doc20140320141155

FILED

(j:l[D A.M.

P.M.

MAR 20-201~
ANG~Btr~~,RK
Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES and BARBARA HILLIARD,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CVB-3004

vs.

FINAL JUDGMENT

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho Limited Liability company,
Defendants.
No.
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2014
M. KARL SHURTLIFF
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
PO Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
Telephone (208) 343-2900
Facsimile (208) 343-3282
WELDON S. WOOD
Attorney at law
Idaho State Bar Number 1015
17 Alvemo Court
Redwood City, California 94061
Telephone: (650) 743-1079
Fax: (650) 298-8097
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLIARD,
Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant/Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 13 03004

NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT MURPHY LAND COMPANY
LLC AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY STEVENS. SCHOSSBERGER, HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, 877 MAIN ST., SUITE 1000, BOISE, IDAHO 83701
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN
THAT:
1. The above named Plaintiffs/Appellants James and Barbara Hilliard appeal against the
NOTICE OF APPEAL - l

above-named Defendant/Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment
granting Defendant/Respondent's Counterclaim and Claim in the amount of three million dollars
($3,000,000.00) and dismissing Plaintiffs/Appellant's claims with prejudice and filed March 20,
2014. The basis for the right to appeal in Rule 11 (a)(1) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Honorable
Judge Molly J. Huskey presiding.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and
orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1).
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert
in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal: the appeal is taken as to matters of law and fact including
whether the District Court (a) applied the proper legal/factual standard in determining whether a
grant of Summary Judgment was in accord with said standards and in accord with the record as
adduced on the Motion for Summary Judgment (b) properly heard on December 13, 2013 a
motion by Defendant/Respondent to exclude

witness testimony and motion to strike and

disregard affidavit evidence notwithstanding the failure of movants to comply with Rule 7(b)(3)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (time limits); (c) whether the court properly determined to
exclude and strike certain testimony from Plaintiffs/Appellant's affidavits; (d) whether the
court's judgment awarding three million dollars ($3,000,000,00) to Defendant/Respondents was
properly based on the evidence produced and supported by fact and law; (e) grant of summary

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

judgment is supported by fact and law and (f) whether the court properly complied with the
proper legal standard in considering the motion for summary judgment; i.e. and e.g. did the Court
indulge in weighing evidence to reach its decision to grant summary judgment.
4. (a) ls a reporter's transcript requested? Yes; a standard transcript; both hard copy and
electronic.
5.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

(agency's) record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, l.A.R.: affidavits
filed by the parties in support of and opposition to motion for summary judgment.
6. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter.
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the Clerk's record.
(d) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid.
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.

DATED This

_i__ day of

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

be:----?-

, 2014.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -11__ day of
and correct copy of the foregoing document to:

µ

Steven F. Schossberger
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701

M. KARL SHURTLIFF

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4

, 2014, I served a true

In the Supreme Court of the State~{r~o
--iA.M.

P.M.

MAY 12 20flt
JA1v1ES HILLIARD and BARBARA
HILLIARD,
Plaintiffs-Cross Defendants-Appellants,
V.

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant-Cross RespondentRespondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

~~ BARKE,L.L, CLERK
. ~QA

ORDER

J

puty"tierk

Supreme Court Docket No. 42093-2014
Owyhee County No. 2013-3004

The Notice of Appeal filed April 24, 2014 in District Court and April 28, 2014 with
this Court is not in compliance with Idaho Appellate Rule 17 in that it does not list by date(s) the
hearings requested, neither the Notice of Appeal nor the Certificate of Service shows service on the
reporter of whom a transcript is requested and the email address of both Karl M. Shurtliff and
Weldon S. Wood; therefore,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is SUSPENDED in order
for Appellant to file an AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL in compliance with Idaho Appellate
Rule 17. The Amended Notice of Appeal shall be filed in the District Court within fourteen (14)
days from the date of this Order or this appeal will be DISMISSED.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal is SUSPENDED until further notice.
DATED this

cc:

Li!!_ day of April, 2014.

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Judge

ORDER TITLE- Docket No. 42093-2014

II

Trina Aman
From:

Sent:
To:
Subject:
Attachments:

Trina Aman
Monday, May
2014 11:10 AM
Linda Steude (secls@canyonco.org); whitinglaural@yahoo.com
FW: Hillard vs. Murphy land CV-13-3004
doc20140512110220.pdf

Order/on Appeal to Supreme Court

1

FILED
A.M~P.M.

MAY 19 2014

M. KARL SHURTLIFF
Attorney at Law
816 West Bannock, Suite 200
PO Box 1652
Boise, Idaho 83701-1652
karlshurtlift@gmail.com
Telephone (208) 343-2900
Facsimile (208) 343-3282
WELDON S. WOOD
Attorney at law
Idaho State Bar Number 1015
17 Alverno Court
Redwood City, California 94061
weldon@weldonwood.com
Telephone: (650) 743-1079
Fax: (650) 298-8097
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLIARD,
Plaintiffs/Appellants
vs.
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant/Respondent

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 13 03004

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT MURPHY LAND COMPANY
LLC AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY STEVENS. SCHOSSBERGER, HAWLEY
TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP, 877 MAIN ST., SUITE 1000, BOISE, IDAHO 83701,
sschossberger@hwalevtroxell.com, TELEPHONE 208-388-4975 AND THE CLERK OF THE
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1. The above named Plaintiffs/Appellants James and Barbara Hilliard appeal against the
above-named Defendant/Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment
granting Defendant/Respondent's Counterclaim and Claim in the amount of three million dollars
($3,000,000.00) and dismissing Plaintiffs/Appellant's claims with prejudice and filed March 20,
2014. The basis for the right to appeal in Rule 1 l(a)(l) of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Honorable
Judge Molly J. Huskey presiding. The changes highlighted herein are in response to the Order of
April 12, 2014.
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgment and
orders described in paragraph I above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l).
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert
in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant from
asserting other issues on appeal: the appeal is taken as to matters of law and fact including
whether the District Court (a) applied the proper legal/factual standard in determining whether a
grant of Summary Judgment was in accord with said standards and in accord with the record as
adduced on the Motion for Summary Judgment (b) properly heard on December 13, 2013 a
motion by Defendant/Respondent to exclude

witness testimony and motion to strike and

disregard affidavit evidence notwithstanding the failure of movants to comply with Rule 7(b)(3)
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (time limits); (c) whether the court properly determined to
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exclude and strike certain testimony from Plaintiffs/Appellant's affidavits; (d) whether the
court's judgment awarding three million dollars ($3,000,000,00) to Defendant/Respondents was
properly based on the evidence produced and supported by fact and law; (e) grant of summary
judgment is supported by fact and law and (f) whether the court properly complied with the
proper legal standard in considering the motion for summary judgment; i.e. and e.g. did the Court
indulge in weighing evidence to reach its decision to grant summary judgment.
4. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes; a standard transcript; both hard copy and
electronic. Hearings of December 13, 2014 and March 4, 2014.
5.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

(agency's) record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: affidavits
filed by the parties in support of and opposition to motion for summary judgment.
6. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the reporter; Laura
Whiting, c/o Judge Husky, Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho.
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(c) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the Clerk's record.
(d) That the Appellate filing fee has been paid.
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(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.

DATED This

Jl day of f/':--:::ar=

, 2014.

M'. KARL SHURTLIFF

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

n

day of
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
and correct copy of the foregoing document to:

~

Steven F. Schossberger
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
{
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
'7_ " ,l
Boise, Idaho 83701

M. KARL SHURTLIFF
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLARD
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV13-3004

vs.

MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

ORDER ON COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES

Defendants.

The Defendant, Murphy Land Company, LLC (Murphy Land), seeks attorney fees in this
matter pursuant to LC. §§12-120 and 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), 54(d)(5), 54(e)(l), and
54(e)(3).
This case arose out of a contract for the sale of farm land in Owyhee County between the
Hilliards, Plaintiffs, as seller, and Murphy Land, Defendant. as buyer. The Hilliards used the
property for commercial farming purposes, and Murphy Land likewise purchased the property
for commercial farming purposes. Addendtun No. 4 to the land sale contract provided that the
Plaintiffs would place three million dollars ($3,000,000) of the purchase price to be held in trust
by Guaranty Title, Inc., pending deletion of Exception Nos. 32 and 33 on the commitment for
title insurance. Specifically, these funds were intended to cover damages that resulted from the
inability of Murphy Land to take possession of the land at the time of the sale.
Upon what the Hilliards understood to be the completion of all conditions necessary to
effectuate the removal of Exception Nos. 32 and 33, they filed this action seeking declaratory

ORDER ON COSTS AND ATfORNEY FEES

PAGE-I

disbursal

the funds to them. Murphy Land filed a motion

asserting that its losses were

surrunary judginent

to or greater than $3,000,000, and

it was entitled to the funds being held by Guaranty Title, lnc. in their entirety. The Plaintiffs

objected. challenging the method(s) by which Murphy Land's losses were calculated. After a
hearing, the Court granted Murphy Land's motion and ordered the finds be disbursed to it.
Prevailing Party
In order to be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the party requesting those fees must

be determined to be the prevailing party. The issue of the prevailing party is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court by I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). ln determining whether or which party
to an action is a prevailing party, ... the trial court shall ... consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v.

Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc~, 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005)(citing AgriLines Corp.. 106 Idaho 687,682 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.1984)).
The Plaintiffs concede that Murphy Land was the prevailing party in this case, as it
received the relief requested - disbursement of the $3,000,000 to Murphy Land.

Therefore,

based upon the course of proceedings in this case 1, the Court finds that Murphy Land is the
prevailing party.
Attorney Fees Pursuant to I.C. §12-121 and I.R.C.P .. 54(e)(l)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) provides in pertinent part:
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or
parties as defined in Rule 54( d)(l )(B ), when provided for by any statute or
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be
1

The Court notes that there several other cases involving these parties, as well as related third
parties~ however, for purposes of determining the prevailing party for attorney fees in this case,
only the course of litigation in this case is being considered.
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awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to
that the
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.
Idaho Code §12-121 further provides:
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend any statute which othenvise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association. private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
Thus, attorney fees under LC. §l2-12I and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are limited to those
situations in which the court finds that the action was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation!' Id

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the

determination of such is within the broad and sound discretion of the trial court. Anderson v.
Good/if.le, 140 Idaho 446, 450, 95 P.3d 64, 68 (2004). It is clear, however, that the Court must

consider the entire course of litigation and, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney
fees may not be awarded to the prevailing party even though the losing party has asserted factual
or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian
Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524-25, 20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (2001).
See also McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). Even where

summary judgment has been entered, where there was an issue or defense that was fairly
debatable, then such case or defense cannot be said to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. See Camp v. Jiminez, 107 ldaho 878,884,693 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Ct. App. 1984).
Here, although Murphy Land ultimately prevailed, there was a fairly debatable issue with
respect to the amount of loss incurred by Murphy Land and who was entitled to what portion of
the funds. Thus, despite the fact that some of the Hilliards arguments could be considered
frivolous, the case as a whole was not. As such, Murphy Land is not entitled to attorney fees
ORDER ON COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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pursuant to

§1

and

54(e)(1 ).

Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, biH, negotiable
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the
court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions
for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
[An] award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is
remotely connected with a case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises
the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under I.C. § 12-120(3) unless
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party
is attempting to recover. Brower v. E.l. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792
P.2d 345, 349 (1990).

In Buku Properties. LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 291 P.3d 1027 (2012), reh'g denied
(Jan. 23, 2013), the Court held that contracts between the parties were commercial transactions
because neither party entered into the transaction for personal or household purposes. Buku
explicitly sought the land for commercial development. Similarly, the sale of the land by the
Clarks and Petersons was not performed for a personal or household purpose, considering the
large acreage sold and the fact that both parcels of land were historically used for commercial

fanning

purposes.

Furthermore, the

commercial

transaction

between

Buku

and

the

Clarks/Petersons was integral to Buku's claim because it was the sole basis upon which recovery
was sought by Buku in its Complaint. The Court further found that the commercial transaction
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was the actual basis for Buku's suit and constitmed the grnvamen

Buku's claims where Buku

on the contract terms.

the transactions at

issue in that case were commercial transactions and satisfied the Court's two-part test to invoke
LC. § 12-120(3), making the district court's award of attorney fees proper. Buku Properties, LLC

v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 836-37, 291 P.3d 1027, 1035-36 (2012), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2013).
Pursuant to Buku, the contract in the case at hand was a commercial transaction because
neither party entered into it for personal or household purposes: both the historical and future use
of the property was commercial farming. In addition, the terms of the contract relating to money
held in trust pursuant to the purchase and sale contract was the sole basis of recovery. Thus, as in

Buku, Id, the two-part test to invoke LC. §12-120(3) is satisfied, and Murphy Land, as the
prevailing party, is entitled to attorney fees thereW1der.
Amount of Attorney Fees
The calculation of the amount of attorney tees is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 987 P.2d 314
( 1999). In making its determination, the Court considered the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) as follows:
(A) The time and labor re.quired. This litigation was commenced in 20i3. A great deal of

time was expended due to numerous motions filed by the Plaintiffs after the Defendant's motion
for summary judgment was granted.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. The underlying issues in this case were not

particularly novel or complex.
(C) The skill requisite to perfonn the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the

attornev in the particular field of law. Though the issues in this case were not particularly complex, the
attorneys handling this case are both experienced in this area of law.
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(D) The prevailing charges for like work. The hourly rate charged

Plaintiff's counsel is

comparable to that charged by similarly experienced counsel in the area for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. The fees charged were hourly.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. There were no
such limitations in this case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. Defendants sought and obtained the full
amount of three million dollars ($3,000,000) held in trust.
(H) The undesirability of the case. This case was not an undesirable one.
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. Defense counsel has
represented Murphy Land for years prior to the commencement of this action.
(J) Awards in similar cases. The Court is unaware of specific amounts awarded in similar cases.

(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research. None has been requested.

Objections
Plaintiffs first object to an award of costs and fees because the Defendant failed to
request fees at the summary judgment hearing and, therefore, Plaintiffs assert, the issue of fees
and costs is waived. Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5), the Defendant had until 14 days
after entry of the judgment to file a memorandum of costs seeking costs and fees. Final judgment
was entered in this matter on March 20, 2014. The memorandum of costs was filed on April 2,
2014, thirteen days later. As such, the issue of attorney fees was not waived, and the request was
timely made.
Plaintiff next objects to the lack of specificity in the billing detail, paying for multiple
attorneys when they confer, and the lack of efficiency is delegating assignments among
attorneys.
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As to the lack

specificity, the

specific to determine whether time was

finds that the billing itemization was sufficiently

on

case and

what manner it was being spent.

As to specific items, the Court finds that there was some duplication and therefore the Court
declines to award $8,517.50 in attorney fees, more specifically set forth as follows:
7/23/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 1.3 ($260) to .6 ($120)-reduction of $140

8/2/13

Richard Goodson .5 $132.50 eliminated

8/2/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 3.8 ($760) to 3.3 ($660) reduction of $100

8/16/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from .2 ($40) to .I ($20) reduction of $20

8/29/13

Matthew Gordon .3 $60 eliminated

9/30/13

Richard Goodson 1.0 $265 eliminated

10/16/13

Matthew Gordon .9 $180 eliminated

10/31 /13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 5 .1 ($1,020) to 3 .6 ($720) reduction of $300

11/1/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 4.9 ($980) to 2.5 ($500) reduction of $480

12/2/13

Matthew Gordon 3.0 $600 eliminated

12/3/13

Matthew Gordon 2.6 $520 eliminated

12/4/13

Matthew Gordon 6.2 $1,240 eliminated

12/6/13

Matthew Gordon 2.9 $180 eliminated

12/12/13

Matthew Gordon 2.8 $560 eliminated

12/13/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 9.4 ($1,880) to 7.9($1,580) reduction of$300

12/16/13

Matthew Gordon 2.9 $580 eliminated

12/3/13

Matthew Gordon 1. l $220 eliminated

12/23/13

Matthew Gordon .4 $80 eliminated

12/3/13

Matthew Gordon 2.2 $40 eliminated
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I /6/14

Matthew Gordon l

eliminated

1/16/14

Matthew Gordon

1/20/14

Matthew Gordon .5 ($105) reduced to .3 ($63) reduction of $42

1/27/14

Matthew Gordon 1.7 $357 eliminated

3/7/14

Matthew Gordon 5.9 $1,239 eliminated

$525 eliminated

In 2013, the billing rate for Matthew Gordon was $200/hr. In 2014. that increased to
$210/hr. The total amount of attorney fees requested shall be reduced by $8,517.50
After review of the paralegal fees, it appears that the work performed was clerical in
nature. The question of whether to award fees for clerical work is discretionary with the Court.
See P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239, 159 P.3d 870,
876 (2007). This Court finds that such costs are part of the cost of doing business and the Court
therefore declines to award such fees in the total amount of $1,075.00, which are more
specifically set out as follows:
11/1/13 Christian Wamhoff 2.8 $280
11/4/13 Christian Wamhoff 3.6 $360
1 I/5/13 Christian Wamhoff .6 $60
l l /5/13 Kyle Millard .3
11/14/13 Kyle Millard 3.3

$30
$330

1/15/14 Denise Heller .1 $15
Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that there should have been greater efficiency in the use of
attorney time and delegation, using as an example that a Hawley Troxell attorney from the
Pocatello office should have been used 10 handle the deposition that took place in Pocatello. The
difficulties with doing that in this case are two-fold: first, there is the additional time that would
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1

need to be expended by the new attorney educating him- or herself on the potential issues

this

case, especially in light of the contentious nature of this litigation, and second, the deposition
was of Lance Funk, one of the principals of Murphy Land and, in effect, one of the parties.
Given these circumstances, the Court does not find it unreasonable that Mr. Schossberger
handled the deposition himself Similarly, the Court finds that defense counsel's trip to Pasco
was reasonable given that it is the location of Murphy Land's corporate office and there was a
need to meet with company officials regarding discovery and to assist in the collection of
documents in this case.
After carefully considering the factors set forth above and the objections of the
Defendants, the Court awards attorney fees to the City in the amount of $65,115.50

The following costs are awarded as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(C):

Filing Fee:
Deposition of Lance Funk

$69
$223.24

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to a total of $292.24
in costs and fees.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff is awarded a total of $65.407. 74 in costs

and attorney fees.
Dated this

2C{

day of May, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ilt/J

attZL

1
The undersigned certifies that on _~_
_ day o ~ , 2014, s/he served a true and correct copy of
the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the manner described:

•

upon counsel for plaintiff:
M. Karl Shurtliff
ATI'ORNEY AT LAW
PO Box 1652
Boise, ID 83701

•

upon counsel for defendants:
Steven F. Schossberger
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 W Main St, Ste l 000
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above.

ANGELA BARK.ELL, Clerk of the Court

By:

1
_,_J-"12_0_1il1_;.,_fl_t_r1J2_
~u_'__

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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~-~EDP.M.
JUN O6 2014
ANffE1t@ BARKELL, CLERK

)':f!r1k~
Lr 6iputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF OWYHEE
JAMES AND BARBARA HILLARD
CASE NO. CVB-3004

Plaintiff,

vs.
MURPHY LAND COMPANY, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

AMENDED ORDER ON COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

Defendants.

The Defendant, Murphy Land Company, LLC (Murphy Land), seeks attorney fees in this
matter pursuant to I.C. §§12-120 and 12-121, and I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), 54(d)(5), 54(e)(l), and
54(e)(3).
This case arose out of a contract for the sale of farm land in Owyhee County between the
Billiards, Plaintiffs, as seller, and Murphy Land, Defendant, as buyer. The Hilliards used the
property for commercial farming purposes, and Murphy Land like\\tise purchased the property
for commercial fa.rming purposes. Addendum No. 4 to the land sale contract provided that the
Plaintiffs would place three million dollars ($3,000,000) of the purchase price to be held in trust
by Guaranty Title, Inc., pending deletion of Exception Nos. 32 and 33 on the commitment for
title insurance. Specifically, these funds were intended to cover damages that resulted from the
inability of Murphy Land to take possession of the land at the time of the sale.
Upon what the Hilliards understood to be the completion of all conditions necessary to
effectuate the removal of Exception Nos. 32 and 33, they filed this action seeking declaratory
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and disbursal

funds to them. Murphy Land filed a motion for summary judgment
$3,000,000, and sought a determination

it was entitled to the funds being held by Guaranty Title, Inc. in their entirety. The Plaintiffs
objected, challenging the method(s) by which Murphy Land's losses were calculated. After a
hearing, the Court granted Murphy Land's motion and ordered the finds be disbursed to it
Prevailing Party
In order to be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the party requesting those fees must
be determined to be the prevailing party. The issue of the prevailing party is committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court by LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). In determining whether or which party
to an action is a prevailing party, ... the trial court shall ... consider the final judgment or result of
the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v.

Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc:.., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005)(citing AgriLines Corp., I 06 Idaho 687, 682 P.2d 640 (Ct.App.1984)).
The Plaintiffs concede that Murphy Land was the prevailing party in this case, as it
received the relief requested - disbursement of the $3,000,000 to Murphy Land. Therefore,
based upon the course of proceedings in this case 1, the Court finds that Murphy Land is the
prevailing party.
Attorney Fees Pursuant to LC. §12-121 and I.R.C.P .. 54(e)(l)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1) provides in pertinent part:

In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or
parties as defined in Rule 54( d)( 1)(B), when provided for by any statute or
contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be
1

The Court notes that there several other cases involving these parties, as well as related third
parties; however, for purposes of determining the prevailing party for attorney fees in this case,
only the course of litigation in this case is being considered.
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awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to
that the
case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation.
Idaho Code §12-121 further provides:

In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or
amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The
term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
Thus, attorney fees under LC. §12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) are limited to those
situations in which the court finds that the action was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." Id

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the

determination of such is within the broad and sound discretion of the trial court. Anderson v.

Goodlijfe, 140 Idaho 446, 450, 95 P.3d 64, 68 (2004). It is clear, however, that the Court must
consider the entire course of litigation and, if there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney
fees may not be awarded to the prevailing party even though the losing party has asserted factual
or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian

Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 524-25, 20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (2001).
See also McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). Even where
summary judgment has been entered, where there was an issue or defense that was fairly
debatable, then such case or defense cannot be said to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without
foundation. See Camp v. Jiminez, 107 Idaho 878,884,693 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Ct. App. 1984).
Here, although Murphy Land ultimately prevailed, there was a fairly debatable issue with
respect to the amount of loss incurred by Murphy Land and who was entitled to what portion of
the funds. Thus, despite the fact that some of the Hilliards arguments could be considered
frivolous, the case as a whole was not. As such, Murphy Land is not entitled to attorney fees
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pursuant to LC. § 1

1 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l ).

Attorney Fees Pursuant to LC. §12-120(3)
Idaho Code §12-120(3) provides:
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable
instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares,
merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by
law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the
court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except transactions
for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person,
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or political
subdivision thereof.
[An] award of attorney's fees is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is
remotely connected with a case. Rather, the test is whether the commercial transaction comprises
the gravamen of the lawsuit. Attorney's fees are not appropriate under LC. § 12-120(3) unless
the commercial transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party
is attempting to recover. Brower v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792
P.2d 345, 349 ( 1990).

In Buku Properties, LLC v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 291 P.3d 1027 (2012), reh'g denied
(Jan. 23, 2013), the Court held that contracts between the parties were commercial transactions
because neither party entered into the transaction for personal or household purposes. Buku
explicitly sought the land for commercial development. Similarly, the sale of the land by the
Clarks and Petersons was not performed for a personal or household purpose, considering the
large acreage sold and the fact that both parcels of land were historically used for commercial
farming

purposes.

Furthermore, the

commercial

transaction

between

Buku and

the

Clarks/Petersons was integral to Buku's claim because it was the sole basis upon which recovery
was sought by Buku in its Complaint. The Court further found that the commercial transaction
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was

actual basis for Buku's suit and constituted the gravamen of Buku's claims where Buku

its earnest money returned

at

on the contract terms.

issue in that case were commercial transactions and satisfied the Court's two-part test to invoke
I.C. § 12-120(3 ), making the district court's award of attorney fees proper. Buku Properties, LLC
v. Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 836-37, 291 P.3d 1027, 1035-36 (2012), reh'g denied (Jan. 23, 2013).

Pursuant to Buku, the contract in the case at hand was a commercial transaction because
neither party entered into it for personal or household purposes: both the historical and future use
of the property was commercial farming. In addition, the terms of the contract relating to money
held in trust pursuant to the purchase and sale contract was the sole basis of recovery. Thus, as in

Buku, Id, the two-part test to invoke I. C. §12-120(3) is satisfied, and Murphy Land, as the
prevailing party, is entitled to attorney fees thereunder.
Amount of Attorney Fees
The calculation of the amount of attorney fees is committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Eastern Idaho Agricultural Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 987 P.2d 314

(1999). In making its determination, the Court considered the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) as follows:
(A) The time and labor required. This litigation was commenced in 20 i 3. A great deal of

time was expended due to numerous motions filed by the Plaintiffs after the Defendant's motion
for summary judgment was granted.
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. The underlying issues in this case were not
particularly novel or complex.
(C) The skill requisite to perform t]1e legal service properly and the experience and ability of the

attorney in the particular field of law. Though the issues in this case were not particularly complex.. the

attorneys handling this case are both experienced in this area ofiaw.
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(D)

The prevailing charges for li_ke work. The hourly rate charged

Plaintiff's counsel is

comparable to that charged by similarly experienced counsel in the area for like work.
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or con~jngent. The fees charged were hourly.
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. There were no
such limitations in this case.
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. Defendants sought and obtained the full
amount of three million dollars ($3,000,000) held in trust.
(H) The undesirability of the case. This case was not an undesirable one.

(() The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. Defense counsel has
represented Murphy Land for years prior to the commencement of this action.

(J) Awards in similar cases. The Court is unaware of specific amounts awarded in similar cases.
( K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research. None has been requested.

Objections
Plaintiffs first object to an award of costs and fees because the Defendant failed to
request fees at the summary judgment hearing and, therefore, Plaintiffs assert, the issue of fees
and costs is waived. Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) and 54(e)(5), the Defendant had until 14 days
after entry of the judgment to file a memorandum of costs seeking costs and foes. Final judgment
was entered in this matter on March 20, 2014. The memorandum of costs was filed on April 2,

20 I 4, thirteen days later. As such, the issue of attorney fees was not waived, and the request was
timely made.
Plaintiff next objects to the lack of specificity in the billing detail, paying for multiple
attorneys when they confer, and the lack of efficiency is delegating assignments among
attorneys.
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As to the lack of specificity, the Court finds that the billing itemization was sufficiently
specific to determine whether time was spent on this case and in what manner it was being spent
As to specific items, the Court finds that there was some duplication and therefore the Court
declines to award $8,517.50 in attorney fees, more specifically set forth as follows:
7/23/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 1.3 ($260) to .6 ($120)-reduction of $140

8/2/13

Richard Goodson .5 $132.50 eliminated

8/2/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 3.8 ($760) to 3.3 ($660) reduction of$100

8/16/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from .2 ($40) to . I ($20) reduction of $20

8/29/13

Matthew Gordon .3 $60 eliminated

9/30/13

Richard Goodson 1.0 $265 eliminated

10/16/13

Matthew Gordon .9 $180 eliminated

10/31/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 5.1 ($1,020) to 3.6 ($720) reduction of $300

11 /l/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 4.9 ($980) to 2.5 ($500) reduction of $480

12/2/13

Matthew Gordon 3.0 $600 eliminated

12/3/13

Matthew Gordon 2.6 $520 eliminated

12/4/13

Matthew Gordon 6.2 $1,240 eliminated

12/6/13

Matthew Gordon 2.9 $180 eliminated

12/12/13

Matthew Gordon 2.8 $560 eliminated

12/13/13

Matthew Gordon reduced from 9.4 ($1,880) to 7.9($1,580) reduction of$300

12/16/13

Matthew Gordon 2.9 $580 eliminated

12/3/13

Matthew Gordon 1.1 $220 eliminated

12/23/13

Matthew Gordon .4 $80 eliminated

12/3/13

Matthew Gordon 2.2 $40 eliminated
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eliminated

Matthew Gordon 1.7
4

Matthew Gordon

$525 eliminated

1/20/14

Matthew Gordon .5 ($105) reduced to .3 ($63) reduction of $42

1/27/14

Matthew Gordon 1.7 $357 eliminated

3/7/14

Matthew Gordon 5.9 $1,239 eliminated

In 2013, the billing rate for Matthew Gordon was $200/hr. In 2014, that increased to

$2 l 0/hr. The total amount of attorney fees requested shall be reduced by $8,517.50
After review of the paralegal fees, it appears that the work performed was clerical in
nature. The question of whether to award fees for clerical work is discretionary with the Court.

See P.O. Ventures. Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 239, 159 P.3d 870,
876 (2007). This Court finds that such costs are part of the cost of doing business and the Court
therefore declines to award such foes in the total amount of $1,075.00. which are more
specifically set out as follows:
11/1/13 Christian Wamhoff 2.8 $280
11/4/13 Christian Wamhoff 3.6 $360
11/5/13 Christian Wamhoff .6 $60
11/5/13 Kyle Millard .3

I 1/14/13 Kyle Millard 3.3

$30

$330

l /15/14 Denise Heller .1 $15
Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that there should have been greater efficiency in the use of
attorney time and delegation, using as an example that a Hawley Troxell attorney from the
Pocatello office should have been used to handle the deposition that took place in Pocatello. The
difficulties with doing that in this case are two-fold: first, there is the additional time that would
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need to be expended by the new attorney educating him- or herself on the potential issues in this
case, especially in light

the contentious nature of this litigation, and second, the deposition

was of Lance Funk, one of the principals of Murphy Land and, in effect, one of the parties.
Given these circwnstances, the Court does not find it unreasonable that Mr. Schossberger
handled the deposition himself. Similarly, the Court finds that defense counsel's trip to Pasco
was reasonable given that it is the location of Murphy Land's corporate office and there was a
need to meet with company officials regarding discovery and to assist in the collection of
documents in this case.
After carefully considering the factors set forth above and the objections of the Plaintiffs,
the Court awards attorney fees to the City in the amount of $65,115.50

The following costs are awarded as a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l )(C):

Filing Fee:
Deposition of Lance Funk

$69
$223.24

Based on the foregoing, the Coun finds that the Defendant is entitled to a total of $292.24
in costs and fees.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant is awarded a total of $65,407.74 in costs
and attorney fees .

.--r-

~~

Dated this _6..,...___ day of.Mtty, 2014.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

w4!

day of May, 2014, s/he served a true and correct copy of
The undersigned certifies that on
the original of the foregoing AMENDED ORDER on the following individuals in the manner
described:
•

upon counsel for plaintiff:

M. Karl Shurtliff
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO Box 1652
Boise, ID 83701
•

upon counsel for defendants:
Steven F. Schossberger
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 W Main St, Ste I 000
PO Box 16 I 7
, I ( ri 0
Boise, ID 83701-1617
~
00'(;

f {\'{. q6tr"'

and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with sufficient
postage to individuals at the addresses listed above.

ANGELA BARKELL, Clerk of the Court

By:

~ flM'.;, (J171,,---

-~
---~----Deputy Clerk of the Court
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Weldon S. Wood
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